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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Directors hold a significant position of influence over the assets and affairs of the 
company. This position gives rise to the potential for the misuse of the company's 
assets for the directors' own gain. In an era of marked growth of the significance of 
companies, there has been an increasing awareness of the need for protection of the 
company against abuse by directors. 
In recognition of the position of influence held by directors, equity has regarded 
directors as fiduciaries. Fiduciary duties to the company have been imposed on 
directors, specifically constraining self-dealing by directors. 
The Malaysian legislature introduced further statutory provtstons regulating self-
dealing by directors in the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) in response to the perceived 
need to strengthen regulation against self-dealing. Specific provisions of the 
Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) and subsequent amendments1 have supplemented the 
equitable fiduciary duties against self-dealing. In particular, the statutory provisions 
have highlighted various situations involving potential self-dealing by directors, and 
attempted to curb self-dealing in those situations. 
Since the recent economic crisis of 1997, the problem of self-dealing has attracted 
substantial public interest. Various corporate transactions have been the subject of 
controversy, particularly where directors have appeared to have engaged in self-dealing 
to the detriment of the company. Shareholders have raised an outcry against the alleged 
self-dealings by directors. Calls have been made for the strengthening of corporate 
1 Companies (Amendment) Act, 1985 (Act A616), Companies (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act 
657), Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1992 (Act A836), Companies (Amendment) Act, 
1993 (Act A845). 
govemance,2 in order to establish investor confidence in Malaysian share markets. 
Invariably, the adequacy of the regulatory provisions relating to self-dealing have been 
called to question. 
In response to such questions, this dissertation examines the existing laws regulating 
self-dealing. The specific objectives of this study are as set out below. 
1.1 Objectives 
The first of the objectives of this dissertation is to examine the existing duties of 
directors in relation to self-dealing. These include the duties imposed on directors, both 
by equity as well as by statute. The question as to whether these existing rules 
adequately address the current need for regulation of self-dealing will be considered. 
In studying the existing laws on self-dealing, this study recogmses some of the 
inadequacies of the existing laws regulating self-dealing by directors. The second 
objective of this dissertation is to identify some of the measures which may be taken to 
address these inadequacies. Particular focus is given to potential statutory amendment 
of existing laws. 
A survey of the law relating to self-dealing would be incomplete without considering 
the possibility of ratification of directors' breaches of duties against self-dealing. 
Hence, the third objective of this dissertation is to consider the conditions on which 
2 Corporate governance is concerned with entrusting directors with responsibilities and duties in 
relation to the direction of a company's affairs. This includes duties to restrain directors from 
abusing their powers and engaging in self-dealing. See forexample Sheikh, S. and Chatterjee, 
S.K., 'Perspectives on Corporate Governance', In Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 
(Ed. Sheikh, S. and Rees, W.), (1995), 5. 
2 
directors' breaches of duty may be ratified. The implications of ratification on the 
company and its shareholders will also be discussed. 
As the remedies which may be obtained by the company for a breach of directors' duties 
form an integral part of the problem of self-dealing, the fourth objective will be to 
survey the remedies available for a breach of directors' duties against self-dealing. In 
discussing the available remedies, some of the factors which impede the enforcement of 
these remedies will also be considered. In particular, attention will be given to the 
perspectives of minority shareholders. 
1.2 Scope 
This study is confined mainly to statutory provisions and judicial decisions relating to 
self-dealing. The relevant statutory provisions regulating self-dealing are found in the 
Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). Duties against self-dealing are also imposed on 
directors by equitable principles. These equitable principles are found in case law. 
Ratification of breaches of directors' duties and the remedies available to the company 
in the event of a breach of directors' duties are also considered, as they are an integral 
part of the issue of self-dealing. 
Brief mention is made of directors' competition with the company and minority 
shareholders' remedies. The study of self-dealing would be incomplete without 
considering these issues. However, it is not intention of this study to examine these 
matters in detail, as they merit in depth study on their own. 
3 
This study does not extend to a study on insider trading. Similarly, the position of 
nominee directors is not discussed. Both of these issues require separate treatment on 
their own. 
The law clearly accords to the company legal rights and remedies in the event of self-
dealing by directors. Nonetheless, there are practical impediments to the enforcement 
of the company's rights and remedies. In view of these practical impediments, judicial 
and statutory remedies alone may be ineffective to address the problem of self-dealing. 
Extra-judicial remedies may be required as an alternative solution. These issues are 
briefly considered in this dissertation. However, it is not the intention of this 
dissertation to examine these issues in detail. 
1.3 Outline 
This dissertation is divided into separate chapters, each of which concentrates on a 
specific area of study. 
Chapter 2 seeks to establish the basis for directors' duties against self-dealing. It also 
explores the need for these duties to adapt to the changing circumstances of companies 
as they develop. 
In Chapter 3, a survey is made of the first of the equitable duties against self-dealing, 
namely the no-conflict rule. The application of the rule to Malaysian corporate 
situations is considered. 
Chapter 4 studies the no-profit rule, the second of the equitable duties against self-
dealing. The chapter focuses on an area of significant controversy, namely the 
4 
exploitation of corporate opportunity by directors for their own gain. The limitations of 
the no-profit rule and suggestions for legislative reform are considered. 
The statutory duties which are imposed by the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) on 
directors in relation to self-dealing are reviewed in Chapter 5. Comparisons are made 
with legislative provisions of two other Commonwealth jurisdictions, namely Australia 
and the United Kingdom. The limitations of the Malaysian statutory provisions are 
discussed. The chapter also explores potential measures for reform of the existing 
legislative provisions. 
Chapter 6 consists of case studies of various corporate transactions, which are 
scrutinised in the light of the existing laws regulating self-dealing. The case studies 
illustrate the limitations of the existing Malaysian laws on self-dealing. 
fn Chapter 7, the conditions on which the directors' breaches of duties may be ratified 
are studied. Particular attention is given to the issue of who may ratifY such breaches 
on behalf of the company. The effect of ratification on the company's right to recourse 
against errant directors is also examined. 
Chapter 8 consists of two sections. fn the first section, the statutory provision allowing 
directors relief from liability for breaches of directors' duties are surveyed. The 
conditions for the granting of relief are explored. The second section of the chapter 
discusses the remedies available to the company for breaches of directors' duties. 
Specific emphasis is placed on the position of minority shareholders of the company in 
relation to the remedies. The unique position of institutional shareholders in 
influencing the corporate governance of companies is also canvassed. 
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Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation. The chapter reviews the need for reform of the 
existing laws regulating self-dealing. Proposed measures for reform are canvassed in 
the light of various factors which influence the regulation of self-dealing. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The research methodology adopted for this dissertation consists primarily of library 
research. Materials were obtained from text books as well as international and local 
law reports. Various provisions of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) and the 
companies legislation of Australia and the United Kingdom were adverted to in the 
course of this study. Reference was also made to articles from local and international 
law journals, parliamentary debates and various senate committee reports. 
Materials on corporate transactions forming the basis of the case studies were obtained 
from newspaper and journal articles. In addition, information disclosed by various 
public listed companies through KLSE Link was obtained through the relevant web-
site. Press releases from the Securities Commission and the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange were also accessed through the internet. 
The writing of this dissertation involved an in depth study and reading of cases, 
statutory provisions and materials from the resources mentioned above. For the 
purpose of a comparative study between the position on self-dealing in Malaysia and 
other Commonwealth jurisdictions, materials from various Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, especially Australia and the United Kingdom, were referred to. Proposals 
fo r legislative reform were based largely on the developments in Australia and the 
United Kingdom. As for the equitable principles, locally reported cases were referred 
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to wherever possible. Nonetheless, constant reference to cases of other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions was necessary due to the dearth of locally reported cases on the subject. 
1.5 Problems and Limitations 
One of the main difficulties encountered in this study was in relation to the extent and 
depth to which various aspect of self-dealing should be covered. Self-dealing fonns a 
part of the wider fiduciary obligations owed by directors to the company. In view of 
the limited scope of this study, endeavours had to be made to limit the extent to which 
various issues arising from fiduciary obligations were elaborated on. 
The few reported cases and articles on self-dealing in Malaysia were also a limitation in 
this study of self-dealing by directors. As a result, where Malaysian authorities were 
lacking, reported cases and articles from other Commonwealth jurisdictions were 
resorted to, as being of persuasive influence. 
The case studies in Chapter 6 have been inserted for the purpose of illustrating the 
limitations of the existing laws on self-dealing. While there is a need to examine 
existing laws against the background of reality, there is the opposing consideration of 
maintaining anonymity on the part of the companies. Consequently, efforts have been 
made to examine factual situations and issues which are realistic. At the same time, 
excessive details have been avoided so as not to resemble any particular company's 
transactions. No intentional reference has been made to the transactions of any specific 
company, and the writer apologises for any inferences to any particular company which 
may inadvertently arise. 
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CHAPTER 2 - DIRECTORS' DUTIES 
From a backwater in the 1950s, Malaysia's economy has experienced phenomenal 
expansion to become one of Asia's fastest-growing economies.' Companies have been 
a significant vehicle of this economic growth. In line with this, the share market has 
seen exceptional growth.2 It currently features in the lives of a wide cross-section of 
the community. Shareholders are now from varied walks of life. They include the 
owners of family businesses, the man-in-the-street as well as those who own controlling 
stakes in large corporate conglomerates. 
The pervasiveness of the influence of the company on Malaysian society was 
highlighted during the recent economic crisis of 1997. The impact of the crisis was 
significantly felt in the share market in which the market value of shares plunged 
sharply.3 Among the pertinent consequences of this was the widespread default on 
loans, particularly where the collateral to the loans had been shares.4 As a result, a 
notable number of companies and individuals found themselves in financial difficulty, 
and the repercussions were felt in various parts of society. 
One of the issues that was the source of much concern during the crisis was the 
apparent misuse by directors of companies' assets to benefit themselves. This issue 
currently continues to be the focal point of much discussion. The basis of this issue is 
found in the separation of the ownership and control of companies. An examination of 
this issue requires consideration of one of the basic principles of company law, namely 
the notion that the company is a separate legal entity. 
1 Gill, R. , Asia Under Siege, (1998), 93; Asiaweek, 7 November 1997, 24; The Economist, 8 
February 1997, 33. 
2 The Economist, 22 February 1997, 93. 
3 The Economist, 27 September 1997,29. 
4 Ibid. 
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It is common knowledge that the company is an artificial entity, legally separate from 
the shareholders who own the company.5 The company, being an artificial entity, also 
requires natural persons to manage the company. In some situations, the shareholders 
who own the shares of the company may also manage the company. However, at times, 
some shareholders may wish merely to own shares without involving themselves in the 
management of the company. Particularly with large companies having a large number 
of shareholders, there appears to be a tendency towards such a separation between the 
ownership and management of the company. In such circumstances, it may in fact be a 
practical impossibility for all shareholders to manage the business. 
The increasing number of public listed companies has resulted in a large number of 
shareholders who are not involved in the management of the company. This, in turn, 
has highlighted the problems associated with the separation of ownership and 
management or control of the company. 
Those who manage or control the company would also have control of its corporate 
assets. Such control over assets may at times give rise to the temptation to misapply 
those assets for the benefit of the manager or controller instead of the company as a 
whole.6 Consequently, there arises a need to enforce loyalty from the managers or 
controllers of the company. This need is addressed by the imposition of duties of 
loyalty on the directors, who control and manage the company.7 
5 Sa/oman v A Sa/oman & Co Ltd [ 1897] AC 22. 
6 See Whincorp, M.J. , 'An Economic Analysis of the Criminalisation and Content of Directors' 
Duties', ( 1996) 24 Australian Business Law Review 273, 275-6; Sheikh, S. and Chatterjee, S.K., 
'Perspectives on Corporate Governance', In Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, (Ed. 
Sheikh, S. and Rees, W.), (1995), 41. 
7 Wllincorp, supra note 6, 277. 
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2.1 Directors' Duties Against Self-Dealing 
Directors have power and control over the company's assets, and make decisions 
regarding dealings by the company. Propriety would expect that these directors 
exercised the powers vested in them in ways which are fair and just towards the owners 
of the company. After all, directors are appointed by the owners of the company. The 
powers over the company's assets are vested in directors by virtue of their appointment 
by the shareholders. However, proprietary rights over the company are vested in the 
shareholders. In many situations, the directors may have some proprietary rights in the 
company due to their ownership of shares of the company. In a large number of 
situations, however, the shares of the company would be held together with other 
shareholders who are not directors. 
Nonetheless, where directors have control over corporate assets, this potentially allows 
directors to prefer their own interests over the interests of the company.8 Hence, 
directors may at times choose to apply the company's assets for their own benefit 
instead of the company and its shareholders. It is this preference of one's own interests 
over the interests of the company that is the essence of self-dealing. 
The potential for self-dealing by directors has long been recognised by the courts and 
the legislature. Consequently, a substantial body of case law as well as legislation has 
developed over time with the object of curbing the misuse of directors' powers. 
2.1.1 Fiduciary Duties 
The equitable duties of loyalty were first imposed on directors by the courts. Equitable 
principles applicable to fiduciaries have been held to extend to directors of companies. 
8 Ibid. 
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These fiduciary duties are owed by directors to the company, rather than to individual 
shareholders.9 Nonetheless, the interests of the company have generally been construed 
in terms of the interests of the shareholders as a general body. 10 This does not mean the 
interests of a majority of present members. 11 Rather, it refers to the interests of both 
present and future shareholders of the company as a whole. 12 Hence, the short-term 
interests of present members should be balanced against a long-term view of the 
company. 
There are essentially two fiduciary principles which govern self-dealing by directors. 
They are commonly known as the no-conflict rule and the no-profit rule. Whilst both 
rules concern self-dealing by directors, each of the rules deals with different aspects of 
self-dealing. The no-conflict rule, in essence, prohibits directors from entering into 
engagements in which they have a personal interests conflicting with the interests of the 
company. The avoidance of such conflict is clearly an important ingredient of the duty 
of loyalty .13 
The no-profit rule, on the other hand, deals with situations where the director makes a 
personal profit from his position as a director. Hence, it addresses situations where 
there is a connection or causal link between the profit made by the director and the use 
9 Percival v Wright [ 1902] 2 Ch 421. 
1° Caiman v National Association for Mental Health [1971] Ch 317, 330; Heydon, J.D., 
'Directors' Duties and the Company's Interests', In Equity and Commercial Relationships, (Ed. 
Finn, P.O.), (1987), 123; Farrar, J.H. and Hannigan, B.M., Farrar's Company Law, (4th edition, 
1998), 383. 
11 Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cunninghame [ 1906] 2 Ch 34; Australian 
Metropolitan Life Assurance Co Ltd v Ure ( 1923) 33 CLR 199, 218; Howard Smith v Ampol 
PetroleumLtd[1974] I NSWLR68, 79. 
12 Caiman v National Association/or Mental Health [1971] Ch 317, 330; Heydon, supra note 
I 0, 123. It is noted that the interests of the company may also include other interests such as the 
interests of creditors, where the company is of doubtful solvency; Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) 
Ltd ( 1985] I NZLR 242; Walker v Wimborne ( 1976) 50 ALJR 446; Kinsel a v Russell Kinsel a Pty 
Ltd(1986) 4 ACLC 215. 
13 Austin, R.P. , 'Fiduciary Accountability for Business Opportunities', In Equity and Commercial 
Relationships, (Ed. Finn, P.O.), (1987), 148. 
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of his position in the company. The crux of this rule is the test of connection or 
I. 14 causa tty. 
The no-conflict rule has at times been stated to be the more fundamental rule. 15 
Nonetheless, one of the criticisms of the no-conflict rule is that it involves some 
ambiguity and uncertainty. It is not always clear what the director's duty to the 
company entails. Further, there is no principle for determining the scope of the 
fiduciary undertaking and the content of the duty to the company. 16 It has also been 
noted that the no-conflict rule is not adequate to deal with all cases of profit-making by 
directors.17 
An example of situations in which the no-profit rule was breached, but did not involve a 
conflict of interests may be found in the cases of Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver18 and 
P JTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd v Roxy (M) Sdn Bhd. 19 In both of these cases, the directors 
entered into transactions from which they made a profit. These transactions were 
entered into as a result of the opportunities which came to them in their capacity as 
directors. As such , they breached the no-profit rule. However, the companies 
concerned did not have the necessary funds for the transactions which the directors 
entered into. Thus, the companies could not themselves acquire the property. Hence, it 
is arguable that the no-conflict rule was not breached, as there was arguably no conflict 
with the interest of the company.20 
14 /d. 149. 
15 /d. 147; Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 373 , 393. 
16 Austin, supra note 13, 147. 
17 /d. 148. 
18 [ 1942] I All ER 378. 
19 (1980] 2 MLJ 136. 
20 Beck's arguments to the contrary are, however, noted; Beck, S.M., 'The Saga of Peso Silver 
Mines: Corporate Opportunity Reconsidered', ( 1971) 49 Can Bar Rev 80, I 0 I. 
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Conversely, there may also be situations in which the no-conflict rule is breached but 
there is no breach of the no-profit rule.21 Nonetheless, there is some overlap between 
the two rules. In many cases of profit-taking by directors, both rules would apply, and 
thus overlap significantly.22 
2.1.2 Statutory Duties 
Apart from equitable fiduciary duties, statutory provisions have been enacted which 
impose duties of loyalty on directors. Statutory regulation of self-dealing by directors 
was introduced in Malaysia with the enactment of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 
125).23 Subsequent amendments have also introduced further provisions regulating 
specific situations of self-dealing. 
These statutory provts1ons reinforce the general fiduciary duties of directors in a 
number of ways. Firstly, the provisions deal with specific instances of self-dealing. 
This is in contrast to the fiduciary principles which are general principles of fairly wide 
ambit. Where fiduciary principles set out essential principles of propriety, they are at 
times vague and not very precise. The statutory provisions complement the fiduciary 
principles by providing precise and concrete meaning to these principles. Hence, this 
enables fiduciaries to recognise the legal limits of what they can do. Similarly, the 
statutory provisions assist shareholders in recognising breaches of directors' duties. 
21 In Green v Bestobe/1 Industries Pty Ltd [ 1982] WAR I, a manager who tendered for a 
government contract when he knew that his company would also tender, was held to be in breach 
of the no-conflict rule. Arguably, there was no breach of the no-profit rule as the tenders were 
ca lled fo r by public announcement, and anyone was free to respond. Accordingly, it his profit 
did not ari se in connection with his fiduciary office; Austin, supra note 13 , 146. 
22 See for example Yuki/on Manufacturing Sdn Bhd v Dato Wong Gek Meng (No. 4) [1998] 7 
MLJ 551; Ave/ Consultants Sdn Bhd v Mohamed lain Yusof [ 1985] 2 MLJ 209; Houng Hai 
Kong v MBJ Management Sdn Bhd [ 1997] MLJU 313. 
23 It is noted that the earlier local companies legislation such as the Companies Ordinance 1940 
did not contain any regulation on directors' self-dealing. 
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Secondly, the statutory duties assist in the enforcement of the fiduciary duties by 
providing for criminal penalties. This enables the public prosecutor to bring an action 
for breach of directors' duties. Due to the rule in Foss v Harbottle/4 the proper plaintiff 
in respect of a breach of directors' fiduciary duties is the company and not the 
shareholders. Thus, where the company is controlled by those in breach of fiduciary 
duties, it may be impossible for an aggrieved shareholder to bring a claim against errant 
directors except in limited situations. Criminal penalties, however, assist such 
shareholders. They not only permit actions by the public prosecutor, but also provide 
some impetus for directors to avoid such behaviour and to take action against a fellow 
director who is in breach of his duties. 
Thirdly, the statutory provisions Impose additional duties on directors, which 
supplement the fiduciary duties. Fiduciary duties do not impose duties on directors to 
disclose information except where the directors wish to obtain the consent of the 
company to a potential breach of duty. However, statutory provisions have been 
enacted which require the disclosure of various specific details concerning the 
company. Hence, this enables shareholders to monitor the management and control of 
the company. This is of particular value to shareholders who are not involved in the 
management of the company. These shareholders would otherwise have no access to 
information regarding the management of the company. In addition, disclosure has also 
often been seen to operate as a deterrent against directors' misuse of powers. The 
rationale underlying this is that if directors knew their activities would be subject to 
public scrutiny, they would probably modify their behaviour to avoid public 
d. I 2s 1sapprova . 
24 ( 1843) 2 Hare 46 1. 
25 Farrar, supra note I 0, 463. 
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2.2 Directors' Duties: Perennial and Dynamic? 
As seen above, an important role of the statutory duties is to apply the general fiduciary 
principles to specific situations of self-dealing. Fiduciary duties espouse principles 
which are seemingly ageless. The essence of the fiduciary principles remains relevant 
to the issue of self-dealing by directors regardless of developments and changes in 
companies and their dealings. Nonetheless, the application of these principles may vary 
in accordance with changes in the corporate scene.26 Consequently, as companies and 
their dealings change over time, the application of the fiduciary principles to specific 
situations of self-dealing may take different forms in order to address the relevant and 
current needs of companies. 
A brief survey of the development of companies would reveal that companies have seen 
much change over the last century. The profile of the average company fifty years ago 
is likely to differ substantially from the average company today. As mentioned earlier, 
the statutory duties relate fiduciary principles to practical and specific situations. 
Accordingly, the statutory duties which were relevant to companies fifty years ago may 
no longer properly address the needs of the average company of today. It is imperative, 
therefore, that the statutory duties should be re-examined for the purpose of ensuring 
that they are relevant and adequately address the present needs of companies. 
In determining whether the statutory provisions are relevant to and adequate for the 
present corporate scene, it is pertinent to consider some of the ways in which the 
modern company differs from the traditional company. 
26 Gilligan, G.P., 'Regulating companies in an era of late-modernity', (2000) 21 The Company 
Lawyer 145, 145-8. 
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2.2.1 The Traditional Company v The Modern Company 
Early entrepreneurs generally both owned and managed their businesses and 
companies.27 Hence, the traditional profile of the company is the small, owner-
managed company.28 As companies have grown, it has resulted in larger numbers of 
shareholders holding a smaller proportion of shares each. In other words, the result is 
less concentrated shareholding with consequent greater power to management.29 
Hence, there has been a gradual shift of power from those who own the company to 
those who control or manage the company. In many large public companies, the top 
management have relatively small personal shareholdings.30 Nevertheless, due to the 
spread of shareholdings in public companies, their shareholding enables them to have 
functional control over the companies.31 
As mentioned earlier, the shift of power from those who own the company to those who 
control the company increases the potential for directors to engage in self-dealing and 
at the same time to cloak such self-dealing in a shroud of secrecy. Shareholders who 
are not involved in the management of the company have limited access to information 
on the dealings of the company. Accordingly, one of the consequences of the shift of 
power to those who control the company is the need for disclosure of information to 
shareholders. This enables shareholders to be informed, and to monitor dealings by 
directors on behalf of the company. The shift of power to those who manage or control 
the company also creates a greater need to enforce directors' duties of loyalty. 
27 Farrar, supra note 10, 9. 
28 Sheikh, supra note 6, 163 . 
29 Ibid. 
3° Farrar, supra note I 0, 9. 
31 The Finance Committee on Corporate Governance notes that a distinguishing feature of the 
Malaysian corporate landscape is the number of public companies which have a significant 
shareholder whose shareholdings are such that he or she can exercise control of the company. 
Many Malaysian public companies are under the influence of one shareholder or a group of 
shareholders; Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, Report on Corporate Governance, 
February 1999,62. 
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The second change in the corporate scene involves a change in the profile of 
shareholders. Traditionally, shares have largely been owned by those who ran the 
businesses. In contrast, there are now many shareholders who regard their shareholding 
purely as an investment, and do not engage in the management of the company. A 
significant amount of personal savings is now invested in company shares.32 The 
average wage-earner may invest a part of his monies in shares in the hope of gaining 
some financial return for his investment. In addition, funds have been placed in 
companies through institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance companies 
and investment trusts.33 The number and spread of investors, direct and indirect, has 
greatly increased. 
It follows that although misconduct by directors is not a new problem, its consequences 
have spread more widely and affected more investors than in earlier times.34 Hence, 
this heightens the necessity of curbing the occurrence of self-dealing by directors. It is 
evident that self-dealing, which generally depletes the company of its assets and 
deprives the company of various benefits, has the effect of undermining the company, 
depriving its shareholders of their investments. In an era of increasing globalisation, 
self-dealing also erodes the confidence of both local and foreign investors in 
companies, and has the undesirable result of undermining the credibility and value of 
Malaysian companies as investment opportunities. 
Thirdly, one of the by-products of the placing of funds in company shares as a form of 
investment is the involvement of institutional investors in companies. These 
institutional investors frequently have substantial shareholding in large public listed 
companies. Such shareholding may often be equivalent to the controlling shareholding 
32 Sheikh, supra note 6, 145. 
33 Farrar, supra note 10, 10. 
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held by the controllers of these large companies. Hence, institutional investors would 
appear to be able to exercise material influence on the management of the companies. 
Particularly in large public listed companies where the shareholding is less 
concentrated, the substantial shareholding held may frequently confer on institutional 
investors sufficient influence to obtain disclosure of information on important dealings 
by the company. Similarly, they may be able to significantly influence any resolution 
put before shareholders at a general meeting. In addition, they may also function as a 
check on the controllers against self-dealing. 
The potential influence of institutional investors on the management of companies has 
in recent times acquired increasing recognition. 35 In the United Kingdom for instance, 
institutional investors have exercised their influence as shareholders to monitor 
compliance by directors with their duties of loyalty.36 Hence, the shift of power from 
owners to controllers of the company, resulting in greater potential for self-dealing, 
may be ameliorated by the influence of institutonal investors. 
Fourthly, another important modern development in companies is the development of 
increasingly elaborate structures among companies.37 A large number of companies are 
now grouped into large groups known as conglomerates. These companies are 
frequently linked through shareholding. They often have subsidiaries in similar 
industries. They may also have related companies in a number of different industries. 
One of the consequences of these conglomerates is that companies frequently enter into 
transactions within the conglomerate. These transactions may at times involve terms 
34 Green, 0., 'Corporate Governance - Great Expectations', In Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, (Ed. Sheikh, S. and Rees, W.), (1995), 145. 
35 Potter, J., 'The Role of the Institutional Shareholders' Committee', In Corporate Governance 
and Corporate Control, (Ed. Sheikh, S. and Rees, W.), ( 1995), 284. 
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which are more favourable to a party than an ordinary 'arm's-length' commercial 
transaction, if the parties are related. However, it may often also be the case that the 
directors of these companies may have a personal shareholding in a number of these 
companies. Hence, the transactions are complicated with issues of potential self-
dealing which may not easily be detected by the shareholders, given the complex 
relations between the companies. 
Some of the pertinent changes in the corporate scene have been examined above. As 
mentioned at the beginning of this section, although the essence of directors' fiduciary 
duties is essentially perennial, the application of these principles should adapt to the 
changing needs of companies. Hence, the directors duties, especially statutory duties 
which apply the principles to more concrete situations, should not remain static, lest 
they become stale and lose their effectiveness. Rather, these rules which assist in the 
I 
application of principles should be dynamic, adapting to changes within the corporate 
scene, in order to address the needs of companies as they change and develop.38 
This raises the question of whether the directors' duties against self-dealing in Malaysia 
adequately address the present needs of companies. This dissertation seeks to find 
some answers to this question. In the following chapters, the quest for such answers 
commences with an examination of the fiduciary duties of directors, the essence and 
origin of directors' duties against self-dealing. 
36 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No. 2) [ 1982] Ch 204; Farrar, supra 
note I 0, 580. 
37 Farrar, supra note 10, 9. 
38 Gilligan, supra note 26, 145-8. 
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In Yuki/on Manufacturing Sdn Bhd v Data Wong Gek Meng (No. 4),6 two directors of 
Company A incorporated a company, Company B, to manufacture the products which 
were then being manufactured by Company A. The intention was to divert Company 
A's business to Company B, at the expense and to the detriment of Company A. The 
two directors then took steps to cause Company A to cease operations. These directors 
were found to have breached the no-conflict rule. By preferring their personal interest 
and their duty to Company B over the interest of Company A, they had breached their 
fiduciary obligations to Company A. 
A literal application of the no-conflict rule could give rise to difficulties in various 
commercial contexts.7 For instance, according to the strict fonnulation of the no-
conflict rule, a director could not hold shares in the company, and would encounter 
difficulties where the director had a directorship in a competing company.8 Thus, the 
modem courts in particular have been inclined to adopt a more practical approach.9 
The courts have in fact accepted that in certain situations a director can act despite 
having a personal interest, even though the director cannot be shown to have freed his 
mind of that personal interest when acting. 10 Directors can own shares in the company, 
and make decisions which could affect different classes of shares in different ways. 
The fact that they may benefit from their decision does not necessarily impugn their 
decision. The decision would be unlawful only if the directors' personal interests were 
the actuating motive rather than some bona fide concern for the benefit of the 
company. 11 
6 [ 1998) 7 MLJ 551. 
7 Ford, supra note I, 306. 
8 Ibid. 
9 !d. 307. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150; Ford, supra note I, 307. 
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The tendency of modem courts toward a more practical approach is also evidenced in 
Lord Upjohn's views in Boardman v Phipps. 12 In Boardman v Phipps, Lord Upjohn 
took the view that the no-conflict rule arises where there is a real sensible possibility of 
conflict, rather than an imagined situation of conflict. 13 
The rule that directors should avoid conflicts between the company's interests and the 
directors' own interests appears to be the essence of the duty of loyalty to the company. 
Nonetheless, a closer look at the no-conflict rule reveals that there appears to be little 
guidance as to what the rule actually entails. 
Key elements of this rule are the company's interests, the directors' personal interests 
and the conflict between the two interests. The parameters as to what would be 
regarded as the company's interests, and what is deemed to be personal interests are not 
clearly spelt out. From case law, one may draw examples of these interests. However, 
there would also be situations which do not come within the examples from case law. 
Hence, it may at times not be clear whether the company would be deemed to have an 
interest in the matter, or whether the director would be considered to be interested. 
This may happen, for instance, where the director or the company has an interest which 
is rather indirect or remote. 
For instance, consider a company which attempts to obtain a contract from a third party, 
but the third party chooses not to give the contract to the company, and subsequently 
awards it to a director of the company in his personal capacity instead. In such a 
situation, it is arguable that it was the director's duty to try to persuade the third party to 
change their minds and award the contract to the company. 
12 [1967] 2 AC 46. 
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The company clearly had an interest in the contract initially. However, from the time 
the third party declined to give the contract to the company, the position becomes less 
certain. It is arguable that after continual rejection by the third party on the grounds 
that the company was not suitable, there should be a point at which the director's 
obligations to persuade the third party to give the contract to the company comes to an 
end. Consequently, the company's interest in the matter can be said to have ceased, or 
at most, any interest in the matter would be negligible. The third party may then 
subsequently choose to award the contract to the director in his personal capacity, based 
on his own merits, rather than that of the company. At that point, it may be argued that 
there would be no conflict of interest for the director to then accept the contract in his 
personal capacity. 
Nonetheless, the company's interest in the matter is largely a question of degree. In the 
example above, this interest would seem to diminish over time, in line with the 
continual rejection of the company by the third party. Hence, there is some uncertainty 
as to the point at which the director would be free to pursue his own interests, without 
breaching the no-conflict rule. 
3.2 Relaxation of the No-Conflict Rule 
As the no-conflict rule is imposed essentially for the protection of those to whom 
fiduciary duties are owed, the rule may be relaxed by the persons entitled to the benefit 
of the rule. 14 Hence, a director may enter into a transaction in which he has a conflict 
of interest provided that the informed consent of the shareholders in general meeting is 
13 !d. 124; This principle was followed by the Privy Council inQueensland Mines Ltdv Hudson 
( 1978) 18 ALR I and a similar principle referred to in Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178, 
199 and Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41, 103. 
14 See Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44, 51; Imperial Mercantile Credit Association v Coleman (1871) 
6 Ch App 558; Davies, P.L., Gower's Principles of Modem Company Law, (6th edition, 1997), 
611. 
23 
obtained. Under the common law, disclosure to the board of directors, rather than to 
the shareholders, is ineffective even if the interested directors refrain from attending 
and voting. 15 Accordingly, only full disclosure of the conflict of interest and 
ratification by the general meeting of the transaction would be effective to absolve a 
director from liability for breach of the no-conflict rule. 
Nonetheless, this position may be modified by the provisions of the company's articles 
of association. 16 The company may by its articles pennit directors to be interested in 
contracts with the company or other transactions in which the company is interested. 17 
The effect of such articles would be to eliminate the need to present every contract in 
which the directors are interested to the general meeting. 18 
15 See Imperial Mercantile Credit Association v Coleman (I87I) 6 ChApp 558, 567-8; Benson v 
Heat horn ( 1842) I Y & CCC 326, per Knight-Bruce V -C, 34 I -2. 
16 Shanghai Hall Ltdv Chong Mun Foo (1967] I MLJ 254. 
17 Examples of such articles are found in Article 85 ofTable A ofthe Companies Act, I985 (UK) 
and Section 23 I (I A) of the Corporations Law (Australia). Section 23 I (I A) of the Corporations 
Law (Australia) reads as follows: 
"If a director of a proprietary company has an interest in a contract or proposed contract 
with the company (other than as a member) and the director discloses the nature and 
extent of the interest at a meeting of directors: 
(a) the director may vote on whether the company enters into the contract; and 
(b) the contract may be entered into; and 
(c) the director may vote on matters involving the contract; and 
(d) if the disclosure is made before the contract is entered into: 
(lj the director may retain the benefit under the contract even though the director has an 
interest in the contract; and 
(ilj the company cannot avoid the contract merely because of the existence of the 
interest." 
It is noted that Section 23 I (I A) of the Corporations Law (Australia) is a replaceable rule. 
Consequently, it may be displaced or modified by the company's constitution; Section 135(2) of 
the Corporations Law (Australia). 
18 Movitex Ltdv Bulfield [I988] BCLC I04; Woolworths Ltdv Kelly (I99I) 4 ACSR 43 I; Farrar, 
J.H. and Hannigan, B.M., Farrar's Company Law, (4th edition, I 998), 397. Whilst it is possible 
to entirely remove the duty of disclosure under common law, an attempt to exclude the statutory 
rule requiring disclosure of conflicts to the board of directors is unlikely to be effective; See 
Tomasic, R., Jackson, J. and Woellner, R., Corporation Law: Principles, Policy and Process, (2nd 
edition , I 992), 380. The statutory duty of disclosure is discussed in Section 3.4 below. 
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3.3 Breach of the No-Conflict Rule 
In situations where a director breaches the no-conflict rule, the transaction will be 
voidable at the option of the company. 19 In addition, the director may be called to 
account for any profits he has made from the transaction.20 This equitable rule is 
inflexible and will be applied regardless of whether the transaction is fair or 
otherwise.21 The rigidity with which the equitable no-conflict rule IS applied is 
reflected in the decision of the House of Lords in Guinness v Saunderi2• 
In Guinness v Saunders, the House of Lords did not permit a director to claim any 
payment for services rendered to the company, as such payment would have involved a 
conflict between his personal interest and his duty to the company. The fact that Mr 
Ward, the director concerned, had acted in good faith, believing that his services were 
rendered under contract binding on the company, was held to be irrelevant, as the no-
conflict rule was found to override such considerations. 
The no-conflict rule espoused in Guinness v Saunders was applied in the Malaysian 
case of Ave! Consultants Sdn Bhd v Mohd lain Yuso/3 The defendants were directors 
of the plaintiff companies. The defendants obtained a contract for themselves in place 
of plaintiff companies without disclosing the same to the plaintiff companies. 
Subsequently, the defendants claimed professional fees pursuant to the contract. 
Richard Talalla J held that in claiming for themselves professional fees for work which . 
19 Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros ( 1854) I Macq 461 ; Transvaal Lands Co v New Belgium 
(Transvaal) Land and Development Co [ 1914] 2 Ch 488. Note, however, that the right to avoid 
the contract may be lost if the company delays unduly, or has affirmed the contract, orrestitutio 
in integrum is impossible, or of the rights of bona fide third parties intervene. This will be 
further discussed in Chapter 8. 
20 Ave/ Consultants Sdn Bhd v Mohamed lain Yusof[ 1985] 2 MLJ 209. 
21 Yuki/on Manufacturing Sdn Bhd v Data Wong Gek Meng (No. 4) [ 1998] 7 MLJ 551; Aberdeen 
Railway Co v Blaikie Bros ( 1854) I Macq 461 . 
22 [ 1990]2 WLR 324. 
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was in fact done by the plaintiff companies, the directors were blatantly in breach of 
their fiduciary duty.24 Consequently, the defendants were required to account to the 
plaintiff companies for the profit made pursuant to the contract. Apart from the 
equitable no-conflict rule, the judgment of the High Court also referred to the statutory 
provisions requiring disclosure of conflicts of interest. 
3.4 Statutory Duty of Disclosure 
In addition to the equitable no-conflict rule, statutory provisiOns which requtre 
disclosure of specific conflicts of interest have been introduced by the Companies Act, 
1965 (Act I 25). Section 131 (I i5 of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) requires every 
director who is in any way, whether directly or indirectly, interested in a contract or 
proposed contract with the company to declare the nature of his interest at a meeting of 
directors of the company as soon as practicable after the relevant facts have come to his 
knowledge. The declaration may be made by a general notice given to the directors of 
the company specifying the nature and extent of his interest. 26 The notice must be 
given at a meeting of directors.27 Alternatively, the director must take reasonable steps 
to ensure that it is brought up and read at the next meeting of the directors after it is 
given. 28 Section 131 (I) is pari materia to Sections 317( I )29 of the Companies Act, 
23 [ 1995] 4 MLJ 146; See also Lim Koei lng v Pan Asia Shipyard & Engineering Co Pte Ltd 
[ 1995] I SLR 499 for an application of a similar principle in Singapore. 
24 A similar conclusion was reached by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Chew Kong Huat v 
Ricwil (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2000] I SLR 385. 
25 Section 131 (I) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) states that: 
"Subject to this section every director of a company who is in any way, whether directly 
or indirectly, interested in a contract or proposed contract with the company shall as 
soon as practicable after the relevant facts have come to his knowledge declare the 
nature of his interest at a meeting of the directors ofthe company. " 
26 See Section 131 ( 4 ). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Section 317( I) of the Companies Act, 1985 (UK) stipulates that: 
"It is the duty of a director of a company who is in any way, whether directly or 
indirectly, interested in a contract or proposed contract with the company to declare the 
nature of his interest at a meeting of the directors of the company." 
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1985 (UK) and Section 231 ( 1 )30 of the Corporations Law (Australia), save that the 
aforesaid Section 231 is applicable only to proprietary companies.31 
From the wording of Section 131 ( 1) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125), the crux of 
the Section appears to be the declaration or disclosure of conflicts of interests. In the 
case of Tneu Beh v Tanjong Kelapa Sawit Sdn Bhd, 32 Dato' Siti Norma bte Y aakob J 
appeared to place greater emphasis on the principle that the board of directors should be 
aware of the conflict of interest, rather than on the act of declaring or disclosing the 
conflict. In her judgment, Dato Siti Norma bte Yaakob J remarked that the purpose of 
the Section is to make all the directors aware of interests which one or more of the 
directors may have in a contract entered into with the company. 
In this case, one of the directors, Boon Eu, had failed to disclose his interest in the 
contract at a board meeting. Nevertheless, all the directors were already aware of Boon 
Eu's interest in the transaction. Dato' Siti Norma bte Yaakob J found that Boon Eu had 
not contravened Section 131 (I). 33 Her reasoning was based on the finding that the 
30 Section 231 (I) of the Corporations Law (Australia) reads as follows: 
"Subject to this Section, a director of a proprietary company who is in any way, whether 
directly or indirectly, interested in a contract or a proposed contract with the company 
shall, as soon as practicable after the relevant facts have come to the director's 
knowledge, declare the nature of the interest at a meeting of the directors. " 
31 As regards public companies, Section 232A of the Corporations Law (Australia) requires 
directors of public companies who have a 'material personal interest' in a matter that is being 
considered at a meeting of directors not to vote on the matter and not to be present while the 
matter is being considered. Although as a matter of strict construction, the director who has a 
material personal interest is not obliged to disclose the interest, Professor Ford observes that the 
practical effect of the Section is that the director is still under a duty to disclose his conflict of 
interest, as general equitable principles nonetheless subject him to a duty of disclosure. See Ford, 
supra note I, 314. Whilst Section 131 of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) applies to both 
private and public companies, additional requirements of disclosure are imposed on public listed 
companies by the guidelines of the Securities Commission as well as the listing requirements of 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 
32 [1995] I CLJ741. 
33 This decision is in line with the Australian decision of Woolworths Ltd v Kelly (1991) 4 ACSR 
431 . The majority of the court held that the equivalent statutory provision did not require the 
director to fonnally disclose his interest if the other directors were plainly aware of that interest. 
Kirby P dissented, asserting that fonnal disclosure is desirable. He adopted the view that the duty 
to disclose is owed to the company itself rather than to the directors. The interest would not be 
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purpose of the Section is to make the directors aware of the interests which one or more 
of the directors may have in the contract. As the directors were aware of his interest, it 
was held that there was no contravention of the Section. 
The purpose of Section 131 and the principle underlying the Section would seem to be 
the creation of awareness of the conflict of interest, so as to enable the board of 
directors to make an infonned decision regarding the transaction. Nonetheless, on 
reading Section 131 , there appears to be a clear requirement that the director concerned 
should declare his interest. In addition, the Section requires the company secretary to 
record such a declaration in the minutes of the meeting. The latter requirement, in 
particular, would ensure that a record is made of the conflict of interest. This would 
facilitate awareness of the conflict of interest not only among the directors present at 
that meeting, but also among other directors, such as those who are appointed at a 
future time. Where the contract is one that is continuing over a substantial period of 
time, such a record would facilitate the monitoring of the situation by directors 
appointed subsequently. Although it is arguable that the possibility of such a record 
being utilised may be fairly remote, it may nonetheless serve as a safeguard against 
se lf-dealing by directors. 
In addition to the duty to disclose interests in contracts or proposed contracts with the 
company set out in Section 131 (I), Section 131 (5) requires directors to disclose 
conflicts with duties or interests arising out of the director holding any office or 
possessing any property.34 In such situations, Section 131(5) requires the director 
known to shareholders unless formally disclosed to the board and minuted by the company 
secretary in accordance with the statutory provision. 
34 Section 131 (5) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) states that: 
"Every director of a company who holds any office or possess any property whereby 
whether directly or indirectly duties or interests might be created in conflict with his 
duties or interests as director shall declare at a meeting of the directors of the company 
the fact and the nature character and extent of the conflict." 
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concerned to declare at a meeting of directors of the company, the fact and the nature, 
character and extent of the conflict.35 
The case of Ngan Tuck Seng v Ngan Yin Hoi36 illustrates the strictness with which the 
duty under Section 131(5) is construed. In Ngan Tuck Seng v Ngan Yin Hoi Clement 
Skinner JC held that:-
"the duty to disclose under Section 131 (5) is so strict that all that is required is 
that there might be conflict of interest before the duty to disclose under Section 
131 (5) arises. ,,37 
The case involved a company which owned an oil palm plantation in Sandakan, Sabah. 
One of the directors had personally acquired another oil palm estate close to the 
company's estate. It was argued on behalf of the company that the director had failed to 
disclose the conflict of interest arising from his acquisition of the oil palm estate and 
further that he had misappropriated financial and labour resources of the company for 
his own estate. The director argued that there was no conflict of interest, and therefore 
that there was no duty to disclose, as the articles of association did not prohibit him 
from being a director in another company. Nonetheless, the court held that the director 
should have had no difficulty in realising that there might be a conflict of interest, given 
that both estates were oil palm plantations where their needs would to a great extent be 
similar. Consequently, the court found the director to be in breach of his duty to the 
company. 
3 ~ Section I 3 I (5) is pari materia to Section 23 I (6) of the Corporations Law (Australia). Section 
23 1(6) of the Corporations Law (Australia) reads as follows: 
"A director of a proprietary company who holds any office or possesses any property 
whereby, whether directly or indirectly, duties or interests might be created in conflict 
with his or her duties or interests as director shall, in accordance with subsection (7), 
29 
The statutory rules set out in Sections 131(1) and 131(5) appear largely to be 
restatements of the equitable no-conflict rule, except that they require disclosure to the 
directors of the company instead of the shareholders. Nonetheless, the statutory duties 
of disclosure only apply to a limited category of conflicts of interest, namely conflicts 
of interest arising out of a contract or proposed contract with the company or any office 
or property held by the director.38 
These statutory duties are in addition to the duty of disclosure under the equitable no-
conflict rule. The basis for this is found in Section 131 (8) of the Companies Act, 1965 
(Act 125).39 This subsection specifies that Section 131 is in addition to and not in 
derogation of the operation of any rule of law or any provision in the articles restricting 
a director from having any interest in contracts with the company or from holding 
offices or possessing properties involving duties or interests in conflict with his duties 
or interests as a director. Consequently, in addition to disclosing the conflict of interest 
to the board of directors pursuant to the statutory duty, it would be necessary for the 
director concerned to obtain the consent of the company in general meeting as required 
by the equitable no-conflict rule.40 
declare at a meeting of the directors of the company the fact and the nature, character 
and extent of the conflict." 
36 [1999]5 MLJ 509. 
37 /d. 525. 
38 Conflicts of interest such as the usurping of corporate opportunities by directors may often not 
be covered by the statutory provisions. Opportunities which have not reached the stage of 
becoming proposed contracts with the company would not come within the ambit of Sections 
13 1(1) or (5); Davies, supra note 14, 627. 
39 Harun Mahmud Hashim (et al), The Annotated Statutes of Malaysia, 1995. 
40 See Tan Kiang Hwa v Andrew S.H. Chang (1974] 2 MLJ 188; Boulding v Association of 
Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians (1963] QB 137. 
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3.5 Critique of the Statutory Duty of Disclosure 
As mentioned above, the statutory duty of disclosure appears to be largely a restatement 
of the equitable no-conflict rule. The equitable no-conflict rule espouses an essential 
aspect of the directors' duties of loyalty. Nonetheless, the parameters of key elements 
of the no-conflict rule are not clearly defined.41 Apart from specifying a number of 
specific instances of conflict with the directors' personal interests such as the holding of 
any office, the possession of property and contracts with the company, the statutory 
duty appears to add little to the equitable no-conflict rule. One of the ways in which the 
statutory duty is of assistance is the stipulation of penalties for the contravention of the 
Section. 
Section 13 I provides for crimina! penalties for contravention of the Section. 42 In 
contrast, contravention of the equitable no-conflict rule would result in the transaction 
being voidable at the option of the company. Alternatively, the director in breach of the 
rule may be called to account for any profits made. The severity of criminal penalties 
stipulated by statute would serve as a greater deterrent from self-dealing than the 
equitable remedies. This is so, particularly as the errant directors would not be able to 
avoid criminal penalties by attempting to procure the ratification of the impugned 
transaction. 43 
Notably, however, Section 131 does not expressly exclude the equitable no-conflict 
principle. Hence, there has been considerable debate as to whether in addition to the 
criminal penalties, the company will be entitled to avoid the impugned contract in the 
41 Refer to Section 3 .I for a more detailed discussion of this point. 
42 See Lim Foo Yong v Public Prosecutor [1976]2 MLJ 259. 
43 It is noted that there is some debate as to whether it is appropriate to use fiduciary duties as a 
basis for criminal provisions; Whincorp, M.J., 'An Economic Analysis of the Criminalisation and 
Content of Directors' Duties', ( 1996) 24 Australian Business Law Review 273, 290-1 . 
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event of a breach of Section 131. Case law indicates that the company will have the 
right to avoid the contract in the event of a breach of the no-conflict rule, in situations 
where the articles of the company require the directors to disclose their conflicts of 
interests in accordance with the statutory requirement.44 However, the position is less 
certain where the articles do not make any such provision. The dicta by Lord Pearson 
in Hely-Hutchinson~5 and Lord Goff in Guinness v Saunder/6 on the issue has led some 
commentators to the view that where the articles make no reference to the statutory 
duty of disclosure, contravention of Section 131 may not have any effect on the 
contract.47 And as such, those contracts may remain unimpeachable.48 
This issue is of particular importance in Malaysia, as the provisions of Table A of the 
Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) do not expressly require compliance with Section 
131.49 It would be regrettable if companies were to be bound by contracts which are 
essentially entered into by directors in breach of fiduciary duties, due to the enactment 
of Section 131 , where they would have been able to avoid the contract under common 
law. If a company is bound by a contract made in contravention of Section 131 , it 
would enable a director to profit at the expense of the company notwithstanding that he 
44 Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead [ 1968] 1 QB 549; Guinness v Saunders [ 1990] 2 WLR 324. An 
example of such an article is found in Article 85 of Table A of the Companies Act, 1985 (UK). 
45 [1968] I QB549. 
46 [1990] 2 WLR 324. 
47 Davies, supra note 14, 614; Baker, C.D., 'Disclosure of Directors' Interests in Contracts', 
(1975) Journal of Business Law 181 , 184-6. 
48 Davies, supra note 14, 614. Professor Davies nonetheless concedes that as the articles in both 
the cases required compliance with the statutory provision, the judges did not have to consider 
what the position would otherwise have been and may not have directed their minds to the issue. 
49 Article 81 of Table A of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) deals with directors' interests in 
contracts or proposed contracts with the company. It states that 'a director shall not vote in 
respect of any contract or proposed contract with the company in which he is interested or any 
matter arising thereout, and if he does so vote his vote shall not be counted'. The Table A 
articles make no reference to the statutory duty of disclosure. 
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had breached his statutory duty. Such a conclusion could not be one that was intended 
by the legislature.50 
It is submitted that even where the articles do not expressly require compliance with 
Section 131, the company would have the option of avoiding the contract when its 
directors breach the no-conflict rule. Equitable principles are clear that when directors 
breach the no-conflict rule, the transaction is voidable at the option of the company. 51 It 
is clearly stipulated that Section 131 is in addition to and not in derogation of the 
equitable principles.52 As such, the equitable remedy of rescission should still be 
available notwithstanding the enactment of Section 131. Further, the historical 
background of the Section indicates that its purpose was for the protection of the 
company and its shareholders.53 
Another notable feature of the statutory duty of disclosure is the fact that the disclosure 
is required to be made to the board of directors. As mentioned above, under the 
common law, disclosure to the board of directors, rather than to the shareholders, is 
ineffective. Accordingly, a lesser standard of disclosure appears to be required by 
statute than at common law. Professor Davies expresses some scepticism about the 
protective value of such disclosure for shareholders, particularly as fellow directors 
may be inclined to take a more lenient view of conflicts of interest especially if they 
50 Davies, supra note 14, 614. Companies may avoid this problem by adopting an article which 
requires directors to comply with Section 131. Consequently, where Section 131 is breached, it 
would also amount to a breach of the provisions of the articles of association. As a result, a 
breach of the provisions of the articles would allow the company to have the option of avoiding 
the contract with the director: Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead [ 1968] I QB 549; Guinness v 
Saunders [ 1990] 2 WLR 324. 
51 Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros (1854) I Macq 461; Transvaal Lands Co v New Belgium 
(Transvaal) Land and Development Co [ 1914) 2 Ch 488. Note, however, that the right to avoid 
the contract may be lost if the company delays unduly, or has affirmed the contract, orrestitutio 
in integrum is impossible, or of the rights of bona fide third parties intervene. This will be 
further discussed in Chapter 8. . 
52 Section 13 I (8) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). 
53 Ford, supra note I, 312. 
33 
entertain hopes of similarly lenient treatment should they themselves have to disclose a 
conflict in the future. 54 
3.6 Competition with the Company 
As mentioned in Section 3.1 above, a strict interpretation of the no-conflict rule would 
mean that a director could not carry on or be associated with a business competing with 
that of the company. Nonetheless, case law indicates that a director can indeed act as a 
director of a rival company, provided that the director does not make use of the 
property of the company or confidential information which comes to him as a director 
of the company for the benefit of the rival company.55 This principle was affirmed in 
Shanghai Hall Ltd v Chong Mun Foo. 56 
The case of Ngan Tuck Seng v Ngan Yin Hoi57 concerned a competing business which 
was set up by one of the directors. The articles of the company neither expressly 
permitted nor prohibited its directors from holding an office in another company. The 
High Court found that in setting up a competing business without disclosing the same, 
54 Davies, supra note 14, 629. 
55 This is provided that the regulations of the company do not require that the director's services 
be rendered to that company and to no other company; London and Mashonaland Exploration 
Co Ltd v New Mashonaland Exploration Co Ltd (1891] WN 165; Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [1932] 
AC 161 ; Berlei Hesria (NZ) Ltd v Fernyhough (1980) 2 NZLR 150; On the Street Pty Ltd v Cott 
( 1990) 3 ACSR 54, 61 per Powell J. What the director can do for a rival company, he can also 
do for himself; Bell v Lever Bros Ltd [ 1932] AC 161, per Lord Blanesburgh. An executive 
director, however, may be subject to an express or implied tenn that the he must provide his 
services exclusively for the company; Hivac v Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd {1946] Ch 
169; On the Street Pty Ltd v Cott ( 1990) 3 ACSR 54. 
56 ( 1967] I MLJ 254. In this case, Raja Azlan Shah J (as he then was) took the view that in the 
absence of a prohibition in the regulations of the company, a director is at liberty to become a 
director of a rival company. The paramount consideration would be whether the articles of 
association contain any such prohibition. It is noted that the articles of association in Shanghai 
Hall specified that the director could hold an office of profit in other companies subject to certain 
conditions. 
57 [1999] 5 MLJ 509. 
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the director had not only breached his fiduciary duty, but in addition, he had breached 
the statutory duty under Section 131 ( 5) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). 58 
A significant factor in the decision in Ngan Tuck Seng is the fact that the director was 
found to have misappropriated the company's finances for his competing business. As 
such, he breached the condition on which directors are permitted to act for a rival 
company as stated in London and Mashonaland Exploration Co Ltd v New 
Mashonaland Exploration Co Ltd. 59 
Accordingly, in Malaysia, it appears that a director may compete with the company or 
hold a directorship in a rival company provided that he keeps within the limits of the 
principle in London and Mashonaland. However, there also arises the question of 
whether he must disclose the same to the of directors in accordance with Section 131(5) 
of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). 
As mentioned earlier, in Ngan Tuck Seng v Ngan Yin Hoi,60 it was held that the duty to 
disclose under Section 131(5) arises where there 'might be conflict of interest' .61 The 
Singaporean equivalent of Section 131 (5), namely Section 156(5)62 of the Companies 
Act (Cap 50) (Singapore), was considered in the recent case of Yeo Geok Seng v Public 
Prosecutor.63 Yong Pung How CJ observed that Section 156(5) of the Companies Act 
58 Section 131 (5) had not come into effect at the time of the events complained of in Shanghai 
Hall. The Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) came into effect on 15th April 1966 (P.U. 168/66), 
whereas the circumstances giving rise to the application inShanghai Hall occurred in September 
1965. TI1e Companies Ordinance, 1940, which was the companies legislation in force at that 
time, did not impose any duty on directors to disclose conflicts of interest. 
59 [ 1891] WN 165 . 
60 [1999]5 MLJ 509. 
61 !d. 525 . 
62 Section 156(5) of the Companies Act (Cap 50) (Singapore) states that: 
"Every director of a company who holds any office or possesses any property whereby 
whether directly or indirectly duties or interests might be created in conflict with his 
duties or interests as director shall declare at a meeting of the directors of the company 
the fact and the nature, character and extent of the conflict." 
63 [2000]1 SLR 195. 
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(Cap 50) (Singapore) is wide enough to impose a duty of disclosure on a director who 
holds a directorship in another company, as long as there is a potential conflict of duty 
arising from his office as a director in both companies.64 He noted that the duty under 
Section 156(5) may not arise under every case of multiple directorships. The question 
as to whether such duty arises would depend on the circumstances, including the 
relationship between the companies.65 
The interpretation accorded to Section 131(5) and its Singaporean equivalent by the 
above cases indicate that the statutory duty of disclosure, which arises where there 
'might be a conflict of interest'66 or there is a 'potential conflict of duty'67, appears to be 
stricter than the equitable duty of disclosure. As seen in Section 3.1 above, the 
equitable duty has been construed as arising where there is a real, sensible possibility of 
conflict, and not some situation which one may imagine might, in some conceivable 
possibility, result in conflict.68 Consequently, under the statutory duty a director may 
be required to disclose a potential conflict of interest to the board of directors even 
where the equitable rule would not require disclosure. 
ft has been acknowledged that such a strict interpretation of the Section would mean 
that directors may fairly easily be caught by the Section. Even an innocent failure to 
disclose a potential conflict of interest, with no proven loss to the relevant company, 
could bring about the conviction of the director involved.69 Nevertheless, in Yeo Geok 
64 !d. 200. 
6s Ibid. 
66 Ngan Tuck Seng v Ngan Yin Hoi [ 1999] 5 MLJ 509. 
67 Yeo Geok Seng v Public Prosecutor [2000] I SLR 195. 
68 Boardman v Phipps ( 1967] 2 AC 46, per Lord Upjohn. 
69 Yeo Geok Seng v Public Prosecutor (2000] I SLR 195, 203 , per Yong Pung How CJ. Section 
131 of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) provides for a penalty of imprisonment of seven years 
or one hundred and fifty thousand ringgit or both for contravention of the Section. Section 
156( I 0) of the Companies Act (Cap 50) (Singapore) stipulates that any director who fails to 
comply with Section !56 shall be liable to a fme not exceeding $5,000 or to imprisonment for a 
tenn not exceeding one year. 
Seng v Public Prosecutor70, Yong Pung How CJ remarked that such an interpretation of 
the Section is necessary to give effect to its purpose, its purpose being:-
"to assist in ensuring proper administration of the affairs of the company by 
preventing a director abusing his knowledge and powers for his own benefit 
and being put in a position where his duty may conflict with his interests". 71 
He further reasoned that:-
"This is a harsh reality but the fact remains that directors are under an onerous 
duty by virtue of their positions as fiduciaries entrusted with the 
responsibilities of managing their companies' businesses and making corporate 
decisions for the benefit of their companies. If a person undertakes such duties 
and responsibilities as a company director, he should also be responsible for 
familiarising himself with the various rules of disclosure and other statutory 
duties under the Act. "72 
The decision in Yeo Geok Seng v Public Prosecutor73 appears to be reflective of the 
current trend, both in Malaysia and the surrounding region, towards greater 
. d 74 transparency, corporate reportmg an corporate governance. 
Although the statutory duty of disclosure may be harsh, it is arguable that it is 
nonetheless justifiable. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the changes in the modem 
70 [2000]1 SLR 195. 
71 /d. 203; Castlereagh Motels Ltd v Davies-Roe ( 1966) 67 State Reports (NSW) 279, 284. 
72 [2000] I SLR 195, 203. 
73 [2000] I SLR 195. 
74 See Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 'ASAF 1999 Calls for Objective and Responsible 
Securities Reporting', II October 1999; Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, 'KLSE LINK Enhances 
Corporate Disclosure for Investors', 8 October 1999; Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, 
'Companies to Promote Corporate Governance', 15 July 1999. 
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con,pany, and in particular, the separation between ownership and control of the 
company, have increased the need for accountability by directors to shareholders. The 
effectiveness of the equitable no-conflict rule relies significantly on disclosure by 
directors. If directors conceal conflicts of interest, and other shareholders are unaware 
of the conflicts, the enforcement of the no-conflict rule would be impaired. 
Consequently, the statutory duty's stricter requirements of disclosure of conflicts of 
interests coupled with more onerous penalties75 would be likely to enhance directors' 
accountability to shareholders. The harsher penalties would need to be balanced with 
the obvious injustice which could result to shareholders when directors engage in self-
dealing and abuse their positions. 
Further, an element of public interest is involved. The increase in the number and 
spread of investors who invest in shares has resulted in a significantly wider impact of 
the consequences of self-dealing. Self-dealing deprives shareholders of the value of 
their investments and undermines the credibility of Malaysian companies as investment 
opportunities. This, in tum, undermines the strength of our capital markee6 and erodes 
the competitiveness of our economy.77 Along those lines, Dato' Mohd Azlan Hashim, 
the Executive Chairman of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange stated that:-
"Amongst various forces shaping the future of business, corporate reporting 
and corporate governance will play a significant role. Corporate reporting is 
75 Section 131 of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) provides for a penalty of imprisonment of 
seven years or one hundred and fifty thousand ringgit or both for contravention of the Section. 
Section 156(10) of the Companies Act (Cap 50) (Singapore) stipulates that any director who fails 
to comply with Section !56 shall be liable to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or to imprisonment for 
a tenn not exceeding one year. 
76 See Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 'ASAF 1999 Calls for Objective and Responsible 
Securities Reporting', II October 1999; Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, 'KLSE LINK Enhances 
Corporate Disclosure for Investors', 8 October 1999; Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, 
'Companies to Promote Corporate Governance', 15 July 1999. 
77 Ibid. 
evolving towards a framework that requires high standards and rigorous 
interpretation whilst keeping pace with the changing needs of business. "78 
This is indeed an apt reminder of the importance of directors' duties of loyalty. It is 
also inherent that stringent standards of directors' duties need to be maintained. Among 
the most significant of directors' duties is the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and to 
disclose such conflicts to the company. This duty of directors, whether imposed by 
statute or equitable principles, should be rigorously interpreted and enforced, for the 
benefit of the company as well as the corporate environment as a whole. 
78 Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, 'NACRA '99 Honours Excellent Corporate Reporting', 18 
November 1999. 
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CHAPTER 4 - THE NO-PROFIT RULE 
The principle that a director may not use for his own profit the company's assets, 
opportunity or information is another important principle relating to self-dealing by 
directors. The no-profit principle stems from the equitable principle that a fiduciary is 
not allowed to make any profit in the course of his duties as a fiduciary, without the 
informed consent of the person to whom he stands in a fiduciary position. The courts 
have traditionally taken a strict view of the principle which is succinctly stated by 
Laskin J:-
"[A} director ... is precluded from obtaining for himself, either secretly or 
without the approval of the company, any property or business advantage 
either belonging to the company or for which it has been negotiating ... An 
examination of the case law in this Court and in the Courts of other like 
jurisdictions on the fiduciary duties of directors shows the pervasiveness of a 
strict ethic in this area of the law. In my opinion, this ethic disqualifies a 
director from usurping for himself or diverting to another person or company 
with whom or with which he is associated a maturing business opportunity 
which his company is actively pursuing. "1 
The cases relating to the use of the company's property for a director's personal profit 
reflect the fiduciary principle that the company should be protected from any abuse of 
position by their directors. Where information and corporate opportunity are 
concerned, there is a clear need for similar protection of the company's interests.2 
However, attempts to prevent abuse of power have been fraught with many more 
1 Canadian Aero Services Ltd v O'Malley (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 371, 382. This principle was 
applied in Yuki/on Manufacturing Sdn Bhd v Data' Wong Gek Meng (No. 4) [ 1998] 7 MLJ 551. 
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complexities in the areas of corporate information and opportunity. Both the areas of 
the misuse by directors of corporate property as well as the misuse of corporate 
information and opportunity will be further explored below. 
4.1 Corporate Property 
A director's misuse of corporate assets for his own profit is clearly proscribed by the 
fiduciary duties of a director. Even the most unsophisticated director should realise that 
he must not use the company's property as if it were his own.3 
The High Court case of Ng Pak Cheong v Global Insurance Co Sdn Bhcf illustrates the 
application of this principle. The facts of the case involved a scheme by the chairman 
of the company to purchase the assets of the company. At various board meetings 
comprising members of the chairman's family, the board purported to accept the 
chairman's offer to purchase the company's property. The board of directors also 
approved the transfer of the properties to the chairman. In the event that the sale had 
gone through, the chairman would have taken with him all the assets of the company, 
leaving behind a shell company. 
Mohamed Dzaiddin FCJ held that the chairman had breached his fiduciary duties to the 
company. He had used the agreements as a scheme or device to appropriate the assets of 
the company to himself and for his own benefit, and had thus breached the no-profit 
rule. 
2 It may be noted that information is at times regarded as part of the property of the company; 
Pacifica Shipping Co Ltd v Andersen [ 1986) 2 NZLR 328. 
3 Davies, P.L. , Gower's Principles of Modem Company Law, (6th edition, 1997), 615 . 
4 [1995]1 MLJ 64. 
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In the recent case of Simmah Timber Industries Sdn Bhd v David Low See Keat5, 
Kamalanathan Ratman J found that the first defendant, a director of the plaintiff 
company, obtained a profit for himself, namely shares in the plaintiff company by a 
fraudulent device. This device involved the transfer of assets of the plaintiff company 
to a third party. Subsequently, the assets of the company which had been transferred 
and assigned were to be leased by the company. It was found that this arrangement was 
a clear case of fraud on the plaintiff company by its director. The company not only 
lost its assets but was further burdened with the additional liability of making monthly 
payments to lease-back the same assets it once owned. The first defendant was held to 
have breached his duty as a director of the plaintiff company and was required to 
account for all the monies received by him.6 
In the situations above, the directors who misappropriated the property of the 
companies concerned were also found not to be acting in the interests of the companies 
to whom they owed fiduciary duties. As such, they were in breach not only of the duty 
not to make a personal profit by using the assets of the company, but also of their duty 
to act bona fide for the benefit of the company. It is envisaged in most cases involving 
the directors' making a profit from the use of the company's property, that the duty to 
act bona tide for the benefit of the company will also be breached. This is because the 
use of the company's property by directors to obtain a personal profit would in most 
cases invariably deprive the company of the use of those assets. 
Where directors profit from the use of information obtained or opportunities discovered 
in the course of carrying out their duties, the complexities involved in ascertaining 
5 [1999] 5 MLJ 421. 
6 Similarly, in Ngan Tuck Seng v Ngan Yin Hoi [1999] 5 MLJ 509, another recent case which 
came before the High Court, a director was found to have withdrawn monies from the respondent 
company's account for his own purposes. The High Court held that the director had failed to 
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whether there is a breach of fiduciary duties increase. Infonnation and opportunities 
are far less tangible than property and hence it is not always clear what infonnation or 
opportunities belong to the company. Unlike chattels or real property which physically 
belong to the company or to which the company has concrete evidence of title or 
ownership, corporate opportunity frequently has a much more intangible link to 
companies. Many opportunities may be subject to various contingencies before the 
opportunity can be said to have matured into a chose in action or other right which the 
company can definitively claim to be theirs. 
4.2 Corporate Information and Opportunity 
As mentioned above, by virtue of his fiduciary position in relation to the company, a 
director is not allowed to use corporate infonnation and opportunity to make a profit for 
himself, without the infonned consent of the company. Should this restriction be 
violated, the director would then be liable to account to the company for the profit 
made. In practice, there would frequently be an overlap between corporate infonnation 
and opportunity/ particularly as it is infonnation which gives rise to the discovery of 
corporate opportunity. 
The issue of directors profiting from corporate information and corporate opportunity is 
likely to be of increasing significance and importance in view of the current move 
towards a "K-economy". In the K-economy, knowledge is regarded as having a 
predominant role in the creation of wealth.8 The K-economy seeks to effectively use 
and exploit of all types of knowledge in all manner of economic activity.9 Knowledge 
discharge his duties to act in good faith and had accordingly breached his fiduciary duties to the 
company as a result of having misappropriated the respondent's finances. 
7 Davies, supra note 3, 61 5. 
8 UK Department of Trade and Industry, White Paper - "Our Competitive Future Building the . 
Knowledge Driven Economy", December 1998; Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report 1999, 13. 
9 Ibid. 
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and information are, therefore, regarded as valuable assets of the company. 
Consequently, this highlights the need to protect corporate information from being 
misused by those in control of the company for their own benefit. 
The equitable no-profit rule generally adopts a strict attitude against any exploitation of 
corporate information or opportunity by directors for their own profit. This is a 
position which is beneficial to the company. The decision of the House of Lords in 
Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver10 illustrates the severity with which the no-profit rule 
has been applied. In Regal (Hastings), the company were the owners of a cinema. 
They were anxious to acquire two other cinemas with a view to selling the property of 
the company as a going concern at a later date. For this purpose they incorporated a 
subsidiary company. The intention of the directors was that the first-mentioned 
company should hold all the shares of the subsidiary. They were offered a lease which 
required a guarantee of rent by the directors, unless the paid-up capital of the subsidiary 
was five thousand pounds. Hence, the directors decided that the paid-up capital of the 
subsidiary should be increased to five thousand pounds. The company was unable to 
provide capital of more than two thousand pounds. Consequently, the directors agreed 
that the company would subscribe for two thousand shares of one pound each, and the 
directors would subscribe for five hundred shares each. Five hundred shares were also 
allotted to the solicitor of the company. However, Gulliver, the chairman of the 
company, found people to take up five hundred shares instead of subscribing for those 
shares himself. Subsequently, the proposed sale and purchase of the Regal cinema and 
the leasehold cinemas fell through. Instead, the shares in the subsidiary company were 
at a later date sold at a profit. 
10 [ 1942]1 All ER 378. 
The House of Lords held that the directors were liable to account for the profit they 
made on the shares. In a frequently quoted passage of his judgment, Lord Russell of 
Killowen remarked:-
"My Lords, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion, upon the facts of 
this case, that these shares, when acquired by the directors, were acquired by 
reason, and only by reason of the fact that they were directors of Regal, and in 
the course of their execution of that office. "1 1 
In their judgments, their Lordships acknowledged that the directors acted bona fide, 
intending to act in the interest of the company. Nevertheless, they were of the opinion 
that the fact that they acted bona fide was irrelevant. The directors were liable for the 
reason that they made a profit while standing in a fiduciary relationship to Regal. 
The no-profit principle is targeted primarily at secret profit made by directors through 
the use of corporate assets, information or opportunity. Hence, in Regal (Hastings), the 
courts acknowledged that the directors could have protected themselves by obtaining a 
resolution of the company in general meeting approving the directors' actions. 12 
Although the decision in Regal (Hastings) demonstrates a strict application of equitable 
principles, the decision has been criticised as having produced an inequitable result. 
The directors were held accountable whilst two of the parties who were most closely 
associated with the transaction, namely the chairman and the solicitor, were able to 
avoid liability. Moreover, the purchasers of the shares obtained a windfall gain, and 
II fd. 387. 
12 !d. 389. 
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although they had paid the agreed price for the shares of the company, were able to use 
the newly-acquired company to claw back some of the purchase money. 13 
In Malaysia the no-profit rule was held to be applicable in the case of P lTV Denson (M) 
Sdn Bhd v Roxy (M) Sdn Bhd. 14 The facts of P lTV Denson concerned a sale agreement, 
in relation to land, entered into by the first appellant. The land was subsequently 
registered in the names of the directors of the first appellant instead of the first 
appellant. The first appellant averred that it did not complete the purchase due to lack 
of funds. It alleged that the directors had bought the land with their own money as a 
consequence. In the judgment of the Federal Court given by Raja Azlan Shah CJ (as he 
then was), the Federal Court applied the decisions in Regal (Hastings) and Keech v 
Sandford15 , and decided that as trustees the directors could not purchase the land for the 
reason that the "inflexible rule of equity forbade them to do that", regardless of 
however honest they may have been in the circumstances. 
It is clear from the authorities that one of the primary reasons for the strict imposition 
of this profit rule is for the protection of the companies in whose interests the directors 
are to act. However, this must be balanced with the requirement that a duty that is too 
harsh or onerous should not be imposed on the directors. The two opposing 
13 Ford, H.A.J. and Austin, R.P., Principles of Corporations Law, (7th edition, 1995), 324. It is 
also noted that the directors also had held a majority of the shares of the company and hence 
there would have been no difficulty in obtaining a resolution of the shareholders of the company 
approving the their actions. They had acted in good faith and in full belief of the legality and 
propriety of their actions, and it had not occurred to them to go through this formality. See also 
Davies, supra note 3, 616. 
14 [1980]2 MLJ 136. 
1 ~ (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61. The case of Keech v Sandford involved a trustee holding a lease on 
trust for an infant beneficiary who had been refused a renewal of the lease in his capacity as 
trustee, but had been given a lease of the same property for his own benefit. The trustee was 
ordered to assign the lease to the infant. 
4n 
considerations were aptly described by Lord Buckmaster LC in the Privy Council 
decision of Cook v Deeks 16 in the following tenns:-
"It is quite right to point out the importance of avoiding the establishment of 
rules as to directors' duties which would impose upon them burdens so heavy 
and responsibilities so great that men of good position would hesitate to accept 
the office. But, on the other hand, men who assume complete control of a 
company's business must remember that they are not at liberty to sacrifice the 
interests which they are bound to protect, and, while ostensibly acting for the 
company, divert in their own favour business which should properly belong to 
the company they represent. "17 
4.2.1 Protection of the Company's Interests 
The facts of Cook v Deeks illustrate the need to impose restrictions on directors for the 
purpose of ensuring that the interests of the companies which the directors represent are 
duly safeguarded. As a company is an entity which functions primarily through human 
agents, the most significant of whom are its directors, it remains vulnerable to the 
actions and decisions of its agents. 
In Cook v Deeks, some of the directors of the company proceeded to negotiate for a new 
contract on their own behalf. The contract concerned the construction of railway lines, 
which was the very business which the company carried on. These directors negotiated 
the contract in the same manner as they had always acted for the company. Their 
negotiations were enforced by the expeditious manner in which they, while acting for 
the company, had caused the previous contract to be carried through. It was only after 
16 [1916] AC 554. 
17 /d. 563. 
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all the necessary preliminaries of the contract had been concluded that the directors 
informed the contracting party that the contract was to be made not with the company 
but with the directors themselves. Similarly, no mention was made to the company of 
the fact that the contract was to be made with the directors personally and not with the 
company, until the directors knew that they had obtained the contract for themselves. 
The Privy Council found that the diversion of the contract for the directors' own profit 
amounted to a breach of their fiduciary duties, noting that:-
"[T]hey intentionally concealed all circumstances relating to their negotiations 
until a point had been reached when the whole arrangement had been 
concluded in their favour and there was no longer any real chance that there 
could be any interference with their plans. This means that while entrusted 
with the conduct of the affairs of the company they deliberately designed to 
exclude, and used their influence and position to exclude, the company whose 
interest it was their first duty to protect. "111 
The Privy Council found that the directors were 'guilty of a distinct breach of duty in 
the course they took to secure the contract'. The Privy Council further declared that the 
directors could not retain the benefit of the contract for themselves, but must be 
regarded as holding it on behalf of the company. Hence, we see the intervention of the 
equitable principle, resulting in the protection of the company's interest. 19 
18 !d. 562. 
19 A similar consequence was reached in the case of Cranleigh Precision Engineering Ltd v 
Bryant ( 1965] 1 WLR 1293, as a result of the intervention of the no-profit principle. The case 
involved the managing director of company A, which made swimming pools. This managing 
director learned of a rival patent for a swimming pool similar to that marketed by company A. 
He never disclosed this to· the other directors, but instead introduced the manufacture of the 
swimming pool to company B, a company of which his wife and son were directors. He was held 
to have been in breach of his duty in concealing the existence of the rival patent. Further, in 
The case of Ave! Consultants Sdn Bhd v Mohamed lain Yuso/0 also concerned the 
exploitation of corporate opportunity by directors for their personal profit. The 
directors of the company had formed a firm which was a rival to the company. They 
obtained for the rival firm a job which should have been given to the company. 
Further, the directors canvassed for work from the established clients of the company. 
The Federal Court held that the directors were clearly in breach of their fiduciary 
duties. 
Similarly, in Houng Hai Kong v MBJ Management Sdn Bhd,21 the applicant was a 
director and shareholder of a company incorporated by the MBf group. The applicant 
procured a secret profit for himself through some transactions, and made elaborate 
efforts to conceal the profits. The court found that the applicant had breached the no-
profit rule and was thus in breach of his fiduciary duties to the company. 
In all of the above cases, the equitable rule against a director making a personal profit 
from his position intervened to prevent the companies from being deprived of corporate 
opportunity which should have accrued to the companies. Such intervention appears to 
accord with the purpose of the equitable principles, namely the prevention and 
deterrence of abuse of the fiduciary's position.22 
In order for the no-profit rule to operate effectively, the scope of the rule should be 
sufficiently wide to impede attempts by directors to deprive the company of opportunity 
which should accrue to the company. Clearly, situations in which this may occur are 
making use of the information to his and company B's advantage, he had breached the no-profit 
rule. 
20 (1985]2 MLJ 209. 
21 [1997] MLJU 31 3. 
22 Heydon, J.D., Gummow, W.M.C. and Austin, R.P., Cases and Materials on Equity and Trusts, 
(4th edition, 1993), 215. 
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likely to be varied, and the formulation of a rule which would produce an equitable 
result in the various circumstances would not be a simple task. 
4.2.1.1 Formulation of the no-profit rule 
The principle espoused by Lord Russell of Killowen in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v 
Gulliver23 , that a director is liable and should account to the company for profits 
acquired by reason of the fact that they were directors, and in the course of their 
execution of that office, has often been regarded as a significant statement of the no-
profit principle.24 However, this statement has been criticised as being too narrow to 
deal effectively with the problem of profit-taking by directors. The words 'by reason of 
imply a causal limitation. This limitation implies that a fiduciary might be able to take 
advantage of a profit-making opportunity which comes to him in some capacity other 
than as a fiduciary. 25 According to Professor Austin:-
"The causal limitation ("by reason of') suggests that a director, even an 
executive director, can wear two hats, and is exonerated from responsibility if 
the opportunity arises when his directorial Akubra is on the locker-room 
shelf ,16 
The words 'in the course of suggest a temporal limitation, that the obligation to account 
for a profit might be avoided by resignation from the fiduciary office before the 
23 [1942]1 All ER378. 
24 The principle was cited in Boardman v Phipps [I 967] 2 AC 46, Peso Silver Mines Ltd v 
Cropper (1966) 58 DLR I, Queensland Mines Ltd v Hudson [1978] 52 ALJR 399, Industrial 
Development Consultants v Cooley [I 972] 2 All ER I 62, P JTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd v Roxy (M) 
Sdn Bhd [I 980] 2 MLJ I 36. 
25 Ford, supra note 13, 320. 
26 Austin, R.P., 'Fiduciary Accountability for Business Opportunities', In Equity and Commercial 
Relationships, (Ed. , Finn, P.O.), (1987), 150. 
opportunity is taken.27 Both these limitations are obviously capable of giving rise to 
opportunities for manipulation of the rule and manifest injustice.28 
Subsequent cases have dealt with situations which appear to test the boundaries of the 
restrictive test propounded by the House of Lords in Regal (Hastings). Industrial 
Development Consultants v Coole/9 is a case which involved a profit-making 
opportunity which came to a director seemingly in his personal capacity. In Industrial 
Development Consultants v Cooley, the plaintiff company offered comprehensive 
construction services to large industrial enterprises. In the course of his employment 
with the plaintiff, the defendant had corresponded with the Eastern Gas Board. The 
plaintiffs were interested in providing services to the Eastern Gas Board, but the 
Eastern Gas Board were not prepared to engage the plaintiffs as they did not like the set 
up of the plaintiffs organisation.30 Subsequent to the plaintiffs having been turned 
down by the gas board, the deputy chairman of the gas board telephoned the defendant 
at his home, as they had heard that the defendant was thinking of going into private 
practice, and they thought that he was just the man the gas board needed for the project. 
Following discussions with the gas board, the defendant resigned from the company on 
the false representation that he was a sick man, in order to obtain an early release by the 
plaintiffs and secure the prospective contract with the Eastern Gas Board. 
In his judgment, Roskill 1 held that the defendant was in breach of his fiduciary duty to 
the company, as he had made a profit as a result of having allowed his duty to the 
27 Ford, supra note 13 , 320. 
28 Austin, supra note 26, 150. 
29 [1972] 2 AllER 162. 
30 The success which the plaintiff company had attained had largely been in the private sector. 
The defendant was engaged by the company because he was considered to be 'an admirable 
person with whom to enter the public sector, in view of his connection with the gas industry'; 
Ibid. 164. Such facts clearly indicated that the company was interested in the contract with the 
gas board. 
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company to conflict with his personal interests. Roskill J's decision turned on the 
following:-
"The first matter to be considered is whether or not the defendant was in a 
fiduciary relationship with his principals, the plaintiffs. Counsel for the 
defendant argued that he was not because he received this information which 
was communicated to him privately. With respect, I think that argument is 
wrong. The defendant had one capacity and one capacity only in which he was 
carrying on business at that time. That capacity was as managing director of 
the plaintiffs. Information which came to him while he was managing 
director and which was of concern to the plaintiffs and was relevant for the 
plaintiffs to know, was information which it was his duty to pass on to the 
plaintiffs because between himself and the plaintiffs a fiduciary relationship 
. d ,,JJ exlSte ... 
The test applied by Roskill J appears to have in fact addressed the causal limitation for 
which the test propounded by Lord Russell of Killowen in Regal (Hastings) has been 
criticised. As discussed above, the words 'by reason of the fact that they were directors' 
appear to imply that a director could escape liability if the corporate opportunity came 
to him in some way other than by reason of the fact that he was a director. Hence, a 
strict interpretation of the test may have led to the conclusion that a director would not 
be liable to account for profits made from an opportunity which came to his knowledge 
in hi s personal capacity. However, Roskill J held that notwithstanding that the 
information was communicated to the director privately, at his home, he nonetheless 
remained a fiduciary. Consequently, he had a duty to pass on to the company any 
31 [1972] 2 All ER 162, 173-174. 
information which was of concern to the plaintiffs and was relevant for the plaintiffs to 
know. 
This duty appears to be significantly wider than the test in Regal (Hastings). According 
to Roskill J's formulation of the profit rule, a director would be liable to account for 
profit even if it was acquired outside the execution of his duties as a director. 
To the company and its shareholders, this formulation of the duty owed by directors is 
advantageous. It would prevent directors from taking for themselves opportunities 
which arise from circumstances which may be strictly outside the execution of a 
director's work but may nonetheless be of relevance and concern to them, such as 
business opportunities discovered at a social event while talking to a business 
associate.32 From a director's point of view, this may seem rather onerous. The 
grounds on which a director may exploit an opportunity for his own profit are narrower 
and less certain. Further, there is a subjective element in the phrase "information which 
is of concern to the company and relevant for the company to know". This would 
involve questions regarding the degree of relevance or concern to the company.33 
One of the anomalies of the outcome of this decision is the fact that the company 
obtained a windfall as a result of the director having to account for his profit.34 
32 It has been argued that Roskill J's fonnula has potential to do justice more effectively than Lord 
Russell's test in Regal (Hastings), noting that opportunities may be of equal concern and 
relevance to a company whether they arise on the golf course or in the boardroom; Austin,supra 
note 26, 150. 
33 This fonnulation of the profit rule has been criticised as being too broad and onerous, 
particularly where an unremunerated_ part-time director is concerned, and for the ambiguity of the 
words 'concern' and 'relevance'; Austm, supra note 26, 150-1. 
34 The facts of the case indicated that the Eastern Gas Board was not prepared to engage the 
plaintiff in any capacity since they did not like the set up of the plaintiffs organisation. Roskill J 
in his judgment acknowledged that by requiring the director to account for the profit made by 
him, the company would receive a benefit which they would probably not have obtained if the 
director had complied with his duty to them. 
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However, Roskill J took into account previous case law, such as Keech v SandforcfS , 
which have treated as irrelevant the question whether or not the benefit would have 
been obtained but for the breach of trust. The overriding principle of equity is that a 
man must not be allowed to profit as a result of having put himself into a position in 
which his duty to the company and his personal interests conflict. Roskill J also 
remarked that:-
"[T] here was always the possibility of the plaintiffs persuading the Eastern 
Gas Board to change their minds; and ironically enough, it would have been 
the defendant's duty to try and persuade them to change their minds. It is a 
curious position under which he whose duty it would have been to seek to 
persuade them to change their minds should now say that the plaintiffs suffered 
not loss because he would never have succeeded in persuading them to change 
h . . d ,,]6 t e1r mm . 
It would be honourable for directors to consider the company's interests to be of 
paramount importance, and hence, to subject their own interest to the interest of the 
company. However, requiring directors to account to the company for profits made 
even where it would have been impossible for the company to have succeeded in 
obtaining the same profit appears to be rather harsh. Justice would seem to require that 
there should be a point at which the company should acknowledge that it is unable to 
obtain those profits even with the best efforts of its directors. Hence, the company 
should be regarded as having ceased to be interested in the matter. 
At such a point, it would seem fair to allow directors should be pursue such matters, 
without having to account to the company for profits received. This is so, particularly 
Js ( 1558-1774] All ER 230. 
where the directors are able to make those profits on their own merits, without using the 
position or information vested in them by virtue of their positions as directors of the 
company. 
Similarly, the directors should ensure that in pursuing such matters, the interests of the 
company would not be compromised. Permitting this would arguably not be 
detrimental to the company, as the company which is unable to obtain the benefit for 
themselves would not suffer any loss. It would also have the advantage of ensuring that 
directors are not over-burdened with obligations to the company at unreasonable cost to 
themselves. 
Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that where directors harbour hopes of personal profit, 
they may choose not to exercise their best efforts for the benefit of the company. Thus, 
there may be difficulties in ensuring that the company would genuinely be unable to 
obtain such profits. It follows that the more convenient alternative may be to prohibit 
directors from procuring any profits for themselves in areas in which the company has 
an interest, a position which is reflected in the equitable no-profit rule. 
The second case which tests the boundaries of the profit rule as propounded by Lord 
Russell of Kill owen in Regal (Hastings) is Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O'Malley. 37 
Whereas Industrial Development Consultants v Cooley addresses the causal limitation 
of the Regal test, Canadian Aero Service deals with the temporal limitation. 
Canadian Aero Service was a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada which involved 
the topographical mapping and aerial photographing of parts of Guyana, a project 
which Canadian Aero Service had been pursuing through O'Malley and Zarzycki. 
36 [1972] 2 AllER 162, 176. 
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Subsequently, O'Malley and Zarzycki resigned from their positions with Canadian Aero 
Service and successfully obtained the Guyana project for themselves. The court found 
that O'Malley and Zarzycki were fiduciaries and were thus precluded from obtaining for 
themselves, either secretly or without the approval of the company, any business 
advantage for which the company had been negotiating. 
The facts show that the fiduciaries, O'Malley and Zarzycki, obtained the Guyana project 
after having resigned from the company. As such, the temporal limitation implied by 
the phrase "acquired by the directors in the course of their execution of that office"38 in 
the rule in Regal (Hastings) is brought to test. The Supreme Court of Canada took a 
radical step in declaring that the test of accountability for profits acquired 'by reason of 
being directors and in the course of execution of the office', reflected in the judgment of 
Lord Russell of Killowen in Regal (Hastings), should not be considered as the 
exclusive touchstone of liability. Rather, new fact situations may require a 
reformulation of existing principles to maintain its vigour in new settings. The court 
opined that previous decisions39 indicate "an updating of the equitable principle whose 
roots lie in the general standards [ ofJ loyalty, good faith and avoidance of a conflict of 
duty and self-interest".40 
In short, the decision in Canadian Aero Service is indicative of the Supreme Court of 
Canada's breaking away from the strict confines of the formulation of the profit rule 
espoused in Regal (Hastings). In its place, the court held that the principle should be 
flexible rather than rigid, and should be based on general standards of loyalty, good 
37 ( 1973) 40 OLR (3d) 371 . 
38 [ 1942] I All ER 378, 387. 
39 Some of the decisions referred to by the Supreme Court of Canada in that case werelndustrial 
Development Consultants v Cooley [1972]2 AllER 162, Boardman v Phipps [1967]2 AC 46, 
Smith v Harrison (1872) 27 LTR 188, Furs Ltdv Tomkies (1936) 54 CLR 583, and G.E. Smith 
Ltd v Smith; Smith v Solnik [1952] NZLR 470. 
40 ( 1973) 40 OLR (3d) 371, 384. 
faith and avoidance of conflict of duty and self- interest.41 These general standards 
must be tested in each case by many factors such as the position or office held, the 
nature of the corporate opportunity, its ripeness, its specificness and the director's 
relation to it.42 This flexible approach has an edge over the more rigid approach of the 
House of Lords in Regal (Hastings), for the reason that the facts surrounding different 
claims may be so varied that a rigid principle may not bring about justice or equity. 
Nevertheless, a loosely formulated principle brings with it a greater degree of 
uncertainty as to its application. 
In relation to the facts of Canadian Aero Service, the court held that fiduciary 
principles:-
"disqualif[y] a director from usurping for himself, or diverting to another 
person or company with whom or with which he is associated, a maturing 
business opportunity which his company is actively pursuing ... even after his 
resignation where the resignation may fairly be said to have been prompted or 
influenced by a wish to acquire for himself the opportunity sought by the 
company, or where it was his position with the company rather than a fresh 
initiative that led him to the opportunity which he later acquired. ,,.JJ 
41 !d. 391. 
42 The court also made reference to several other factors which include the amount of knowledge 
possessed, the circumstances in which it was obtained and whether it was special or private. The 
factor of time, in the continuation of fiduciary duty, where the alleged breach occurs after 
tennination of the relationship with the company was also regarded as relevant. In addition, the 
circumstances under which the relationship was tenninated would also be considered;Jbid. This 
approach was affinned in Island Export Finance Ltd v Umunna [ 1986] BCLC 460. See also 
Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd [ 1990] FSR 385; Framlington Group pic v Anderson [ 1995] I 
BCLC 475 and Lowry, J. Edmunds, R., 'The No Conflict-No Profit Rules and the Corporate 
Fiduciary: Challenging the Orthodoxy of Absolutism', (2000] Journal of Business Law 122. 
43 (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 371, 382. This approach was followed in the New Zealand case of 
Pacifica Shipping Co Ltd v Andersen [ 1986] 2 NZLR 328. However, in Island Export Finance 
Ltd v Umunna ( 1986] BCLC 460, Hutchinson J took the view that the principle espoused was 
more widely stated than the facts in Canadian Aero Service required. 
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moulds used in manufacturing products and unlawfully utilised funds belonging to 
Company A for their personal gain. 
In deciding the case, Abdul Malik Ishak J relied substantially on the principles 
espoused in Canadian Aero Services. Laskin J's views that the tests in Regal Hastings 
v Gulliver should not be considered as the exclusive touchstones of liability appeared to 
have been relied on. In addition, the assertion that previous decisions indicated an 
updating of the equitable principles whose roots lie in general standards of loyalty, 
good faith and avoidance of conflict of duty and self-interest were also cited. 
However, notably, in the case of P lTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd v Roxy (M) Sdn Bhd,46 the 
Federal Court rigidly applied the approach in Regal (Hastings), notwithstanding that the 
decision was made subsequent to decisions such as Industrial Development Consultants 
v Coole/7 and Canadian Aero Service. No mention was made of any of these later 
cases which. extended the principle in Regal (Hastings). 
It is noted that PJTV Denson is a decision of the Federal Court. Yuki/on was decided by 
the High Court. As such, the principle of stare decisis would require that the decision 
of the Federal Court should prevail. 
Nonetheless, in view of the particular facts of P lTV Denson, the decisions in Industrial 
Development Consultants v Cooley and Canadian Aero Service may not have affected 
45 [1998] 7 MLJ 551. 
46 [ 1980] 2 MLJ 136. 
47 The Singaporean case of Hytech Builders Pte Ltd v Tan Eng Leong & A nor [1995] 2 SLR 795 
is a decision based on the equitable profit rule in Industrial Development Consultants v Cooley 
and Keech v Sandford. The director concerned had clearly obtained the corporate opportunity by 
reason of his office and the issue of the causal limitation of the Regal (Hastings) approach did not 
arise. As such, the court did not elaborate on whether in relying on Industrial Development 
Consultants v Cooley, the court was also adopting the wider fonnulation of the no-profit principle 
that a director has a 'duty to pass on to the company any infonnation which was of concern to the 
plaintiffs and was relevant for the plaintiffs to know'. 
the outcome of the case, even if they had been taken into account. The directors in 
P JTV Denson were clearly stated to have been directors at the time of the impugned 
transaction, hence the temporal factor which Canadian Aero Service addressed was not 
an issue. In a similar vein, the causal link between the directors' position and the 
corporate opportunity was unmistakably evident, as the opportunity to acquire the land 
was undoubtedly obtained by reason of their positions as directors. 
From the judgment, it is not clear whether in applying Regal (Hastings), the Federal 
Court intended the approach in Regal (Hastings) to be the exclusive touchstone of 
liability, or whether Regal (Hastings) was followed because the facts were sufficiently 
similar that there was no need for a reformulation of existing principles. It is also 
noted, however, that in Yuki/on the facts also did not raise any issues regarding the 
temporal limitation or the causal link. 
As seen above, there are merits to the contributions made by the decisions in Industrial 
Development Consultants v Cooley and Canadian Aero Service in the interest of equity. 
It is submitted that the developments made in Industrial Development Consultants v 
Cooley and Canadian Aero Service should be taken into account in order that the 
interests of the company may be duly protected from abuse by its directors. 
4.2.1. 2 Statutory provisions 
In Malaysia, the fiduciary principle against a director making a profit from information 
acquired by virtue of his position as an officer of the company is reflected in Section 
132(2) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125).48 The Section essentially deals with 
4s Section 132(2) of the Companies Act 1965 (Act 125) provides as follows:-
"An officer or agent of a company or officer of the Stock Exchange shall not make 
improper use of any information acquired by virtue of his position as an officer or agent 
of the company or officer of the Stock Exchange to gain directly or indirectly an 
advantage for himself or for any other person or to cause detriment to the company." 
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improper use of any information acquired by virtue of his position as a director of the 
company.49 This raises the question of what would be considered as 'improper use'. 
The Section itself does not define the meaning of the phrase 'improper use'. The 
Section only specifies that the 'improper use' of such information should be for the 
purpose of acquiring a direct or indirect advantage for the director, or for any other 
person. 5° Alternatively, the 'improper use' of such information should cause detriment 
to the company. 
Section 132(2) is pari materia to Section 232(5) of the Corporations Law (Australia).51 
The Australian courts appear to have declined to give the phrase 'improper use' a 
common inflexible meaning. 52 Instead, it has been remarked that what is proper must 
The section clearly applies to directors of a company given that the definition of 'officer' in 
Section 4 of the Companies Act 1965 (Act 125) includes any director. 
49 The Section also applies to other officers and agents of the company and officers of the Stock 
Exchange. However, the position of these other persons will not be discussed as it is beyond the 
ambit of this dissertation. 
50 The fact that the advantage received is reasonable does not preclude the finding that a director 
made improper use of information; Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1992) 9 ASCR 58; 
Ford, supra note 13, 328. 
51 Section 232(5) of the Corporations Law (Australia) states that: 
"An officer or employee of a corporation, or a former officer or employee of a 
corporation, must not in relevant circumstances, make improper use of information 
acquired by virtue of his or her position as such an officer or employee to gain, directly 
or indirectly, an advantage for himself or herself or for any other person or to cause 
detriment to the corporation." 
52 McNamara v Flavel (1988) 13 ACLR 619; Grove v Flavel (1986) 11 ACLR 161. In 
McNamara v Flavel, the director of the defendant company acquired information that the 
defendant was in serious financial problems and that liquidation was a real possibility. He then 
changed the name of the defendant company from 'Duna World Pty Ltd' to 'Dunquil Pty Ltd'. 
Then he procured another company to carry on business under the name of 'DunaWorld' which 
carried on the business of Dunquil Pty Ltd. As a result, Dunquil Pty Ltd was left with no 
business but all of its debts. The Supreme Court of South Australia held that the director had 
made improper use of information acquired as a director. The company and its creditors had 
suffered a detriment because of the actions of the director. He had not acted for the benefit of the 
company but had gained an a~vanta~e :or .h.irnself by being able t~ trade using the name 'Duna 
World' . It is noted that the dtrectors ltab!ltty was based on Sectton 229(3) of the Companies 
(South Australia) Code which is pari mate~ia to Section 232(5) of the Corporations Law 
(Australia) and Section 132(2) of the Compames Act, 1965 (Act 125). A similar reasoning was 
applied in Grove v Flavel (1986) II ACLR 161. 
be determined by reference to the particular duties and responsibilities of the particular 
officer whose conduct is impugned. 53 
The consequences of a breach of Section 132(2) are two-fold, encompassing both civil 
and criminal liability. Pursuant to the said section, the officer who breaches the section 
shall be liable to account for the profit made by him or for any damage suffered by the 
company as a result of the breach. In addition, the officer will be guilty of a criminal 
offence.54 
Section 132(2) appears largely to be a restatement of the equitable fiduciary principle 
that a director should not make a profit from the misuse of corporate information. 
Nonetheless, it fails to provide clarification of the ambiguities of the equitable 
principle. The ambit of Section I 32(2) is narrower than the corporate opportunity 
principle, as it expressly deals with the use of information, rather than with corporate 
opportunity and corporate property. However, it goes further in that it provides that 
liability will ensue if the improper use of information results in either an advantage for 
the director, or for any other person, or causes detriment to the company. This would 
extend the application of the no-profit principle to situations where the director himself 
did not obtain a profit but enabled a third party to profit from the use of the corporate 
information. It is submitted that this would cover the situation of Gulliver in Regal 
(Hasting5), discussed above, as Gulliver himself did not make a profit, but the profit 
accrued to third parties by virtue of the corporate information and opportunity acquired 
through Gulliver. Section 132(2) would also apply to situations where the directors did 
jJ McNamara v Ffavel ( 1988) 13 ACLR 619; Grove v Flavel ( 1986) II ACLR 161. In Grove v 
F!ave/ 43 SASR 41 O, Jacobs J remarked that the word 'improper' is to be understood in its 
commercial context to refer to conduct which is inconsistent with the proper discharge of duties. 
Ford reasons that Section 232(5) of the Corporations Law (Australia) seems to import a notion of 
wrongdoing which is narrower than the fiduciary principle. A director may breach his fiduciary 
duty while acting honestly; Ford, supra note 13, 330. 
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not make a personal profit, but their misuse of corporate information caused detriment 
to the company.55 
Nonetheless, despite the presence of Section 132(2), it is submitted that the case Jaw on 
the equitable rule against a director making a profit from the misuse of corporate 
information will still be applicable. Section 132(5) specifically states that Section 132 
is in addition to and not in derogation of any other written law or rule of law relating to 
the duty or liability of directors. In addition, cases involving sub-section (I) of Section 
132, which is similarly a restatement of the general fiduciary duties of a director, have 
also applied common law cases on the fiduciary duties of directors. 56 
4.2.2 Limits to the Fiduciary Duty 
As mentioned above, the need for protection of the company should be balanced with 
the requirement that a duty that is too harsh or onerous should not be imposed on the 
directors. If the protection of the company is carried to the extreme, this would 
discourage prudent persons from being directors. Nonetheless, the two considerations, 
namely the protection of the company, and, the need to limit the duty of directors, are 
directly opposed to each other. Consequently, restricting the extent of the duty owed by 
directors to the company would have the inevitable consequence of reducing the 
protection to the company. 
From the viewpoint of a director, knowing which profit-making activities will amount 
to a breach of fiduciary duty is essential. A director cannot reasonably be expected to 
54 Section 132(3) states that the defaulting officer will be guilty of an offence against the 
Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) which has a penalty of imprisonment for five years or a fine of 
thirty thousand ringgit. . 
H Note that under equitable principles, loss flowmg from failure by a fiduciary to discharge his 
fi duciary duties can be recovered; Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932; Heydon, supra note 
22, 251. 
avoid every profitable activity which may possibly be remotely related to the company. 
The issue as to when a director is free to pursue opportunities for his own benefit 
depends largely on the way we define the connecting link between profit and the 
fiduciary office. As seen in section 4.2.1 above, this connecting link has not been 
defined with certainty and the various formulations of the profit rule reflect the present 
indeterminate state of the law on corporate opportunity. 57 
In Malaysia, it is submitted that a director may not necessarily escape liability if he 
adheres strictly to the rule espoused in Regal (Hastings), as P JTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd 
v Roxy (M) Sdn Bhcf8 arguably does not expressly reject the more liberal approaches. 
Further, the principles espoused in Canadian Aero Service have been applied in 
Yuki/on. Arguments have been made in favour of limiting the duty of directors to 
business opportunities which are within the company's present or contemplated line of 
business. 59 This will be further explored in section 4.3 below. 
Some of the other frequently explored possible limits to the duty of directors are, 
firstly, where the company is unable to obtain or to exploit the opportunity and, 
secondly, where the company has rejected the corporate opportunity and the director 
obtains the consent of the company or its directors to the utilisation of the opportunity 
for the director's own profit. 
' 6 See Simmah Timber Industries Sdn Bhd v David Low See Keat [ 1999] 5 MLJ 421 . 
" The decisions involving corporate opportunity have been said to have little value as precedent 
since the judiciary too often has been content with the invocation of a formula ("a fiduciary must 
not make a profit") or a conclusory statement ("the property, in equity, belonged to the 
company") in a manner that is unsat.isfactory for future reference. T?e case~ rarely advert to what 
the policy of the law ought to be wtth respect t~ the exten.t of fi?uctary duttes; Beck, S.M., 'The 
Saga of Peso Si lver Mines: Corporate Opportunity Reconstdered ( 1971) 49 Can Bar Rev 80, 86. 
58 [1980] 2 MLJ 136. 
59 See Austin, supra note 26, 152. 
64 
4.2.2.1 Where the company is unable to obtain or exploit the opportunity 
In a number of cases in which directors were alleged to have breached their duty not to 
make a profit from information or opportunities gained in relation to their positions, the 
directors attempted to raise as a defence the fact that the company would not have been 
bl b . h . 60 I . I a e to o tam t e opportumty, or a ternatlve y, was unable to exploit the 
opportunity. 61 
The courts have consistently taken a strict view of the fiduciary duty owed by directors 
and have concluded time and again that whether the company would have succeeded in 
securing the opportunity or could have exploited the opportunity is irrelevant.62 The 
duty not to make a profit is overriding and directors should not in any way be allowed 
to be in a position in which they could compromise the interests of the company in 
favour of their own gain.63 Permitting directors to take for themselves opportunities 
which the company cannot take may encourage and tempt directors not to develop the 
company, so as to be able to take more opportunities for themselves.64 
However, the courts have envisaged an exception to the rule, the exception being that a 
director may exploit for himself opportunities which the company could not or did not 
60 Industrial Development Consultants v Cooley [ 1972] 2 All ER 162; Hytech Builders Pte Ltd v 
Tan Eng Leong [!995] 2 SLR 795. 
61 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] I All ER 378; PJTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd v Roxy (M) 
Sdn Bhd [ !980] 2 MLJ !36. 
62 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] I Ali .ER 378; PJTV Denson (M) Sdn .Bhd v Roxy (M) 
Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 136; Furs Ltd v Tomkres [1936] 54 CLR 583 ; lndustnal Development 
Consultants v Cooley [ 1972] 2 All ER 162. . 
63 Furs Ltd v Tomkies [1936] 54 CLR 583; Austm, supra note 26,176-8. 
64 See Farrar, J.H. and Hannigan, B.M., Farrar's Company Law, (4th edition, 1998), 419; 
Brudney, v. and Clark, R.C., 'A new look at Corporate Opportunities', (1981) 94 Harvard Law 
Review 997, I 021. 
wish to exploit and which the company, in general meeting, consented to the director 
exploiting.65 
Along similar lines, it has been argued that where the opportunity is rejected bona fide 
by the board of directors on behalf of the company, the profit rule should not restrict a 
director from taking the opportunity for himself. 
4.2.2.2 Where the corporate opportunity is rejected 
As mentioned above, the exception to the no-profit rule allows directors to exploit 
opportunities rejected by the company in general meeting. However, there are 
significant cases in which opportunities were rejected by the board of directors instead 
of the general meeting. The question which arises is whether rejection by the board 
would be sufficient to allow the director to exploit the corporate opportunity without 
liability. 
A significant case which involved a finding that the board of directors had bona fide 
rejected the opportunity is Peso Silver Mines Ltd v Cropper. 66 The background facts to 
the case indicated that at that time the company had many mineral claims and strained 
financial resources. The acquisition of additional claims would have involved 
increased expenditure and the company neither needed nor wanted any more claims. 
As such, the claim in question was considered by the full board of directors and 
rejected before it was acquired by the respondent directors. The court based its 
decision on the hypothetical case stated by Lord Greene MR in the unreported 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in Regal (Hastings) as follows:-
65 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942]1 All ERJ78; PJTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhdv Roxy (M) 
SdnBhd[1 980] 2 ML1 136. 
66 ( 1966) 58 DLR (2d) I. 
66 
"To say that the Company was entitled to claim the benefit of those shares 
would involve this proposition: Where a Board of Directors considers an 
investment which is offered to their company and bona fide comes to the 
conclusion that it is not an investment which their Company ought to make, any 
Director, after that Resolution is come to and bona fide come to, who chooses 
to put up the money for that investment himself must be treated as having done 
it on behalf of the Company, so that the Company can claim any profit that 
results to him from it. That is a proposition for which no particle of authority 
was cited; and goes, as it seems to me, far beyond anything that has ever been 
suggested as to the duty of directors, agents, or persons in a position of that 
k. d ,67 m. 
The Supreme Court of Canada found the facts of Peso Silver Mines to be in all material 
respects identical with those in the hypothetical case stated by Lord Greene MR, and 
concluded that the directors in question were not liable for utilising the opportunity 
which had been rejected by the board of directors. 
A similar conclusion was reached by the Privy Council and the High Court of Australia 
in the Australian case of Queensland Mines Ltd v Hudson. 68 The company, Queensland 
Mines, was facing financial difficulties and lacked the resources to meet the obligations 
under a mining exploration licence which had recently been obtained. Mr Hudson, the 
director concerned, was then confronted with the difficult situation of immense 
obligations owed by him under the licence and no resources with which to fulfil such 
obligations. Mr Hudson then resigned as managing director of Queensland Mines so 
67 Ibid. 8-9; Although Lord Greene MR was subsequently found by the House of Lords to be in 
error in his decision, his hypothetical case was thought to have been reserved by Lord Russell's 
judgment in the House of Lor~s .. Lor~ Denning in Boardman v Phipps [ 1967] 2 AC 46 also 
afpeared to have entertained a similar view. 
6 (1978) 52 ALJR 399. 
that he could devote all his energy to this venture. Nonetheless, he never sought to hide 
anything from the company, and the board, fully informed and having renounced its 
interest in the licence, had assented to Mr Hudson 'going it alone'.69 
Their Lordships reached the conclusion in Queensland Mines that there was 'no real, 
sensible possibility of conflict of interest between Mr Hudson, and the company'.70 
And as Mr Hudson was left on his own with the licences with the fully informed 
consent of the Queensland Mines board, they held that Mr Hudson was not liable to 
account for his profit made from the licences. 
The Privy Council also considered the fact that the consent to Mr Hudson utilising the 
opportunity was given by the board of directors, rather than the shareholders of 
Queensland Mines. However, as both the shareholders were companies represented on 
the board of directors, the Privy Council held the view that both shareholders must have 
been aware of the situation. Consequently, the fact that there was no evidence of an 
express resolution by the shareholders approving Mr Hudson's utilisation of the 
opportunity was not regarded as an impediment to Mr Hudson's escape from liability. 
Both the decisions in Peso Silver Mines and Queensland Mines appear to be at odds 
with decisions such as Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver71 , P JIV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd v 
Roxy (M) Sdn Bhd, 72 which assert that a fiduciary who makes a profit for himself 
requires the consent of the company in general meeting, as opposed to merely the board 
of directors, in order to avoid liability. It is submitted that the approach of the Privy 
Council in Queensland Mines appears to be reconcilable with the Regal (Hastings) line 
69 The approach in Queensland Mines was affirmed in Pacifica Shipping Co Ltd v Andersen 
[ l986] 2 NZLR 328 by way of obiter dicta. 
70 ( 1978) 52 ALJR 399, 40 I. 
71 [ 1942) I AllER 378. 
72 [1980) 2 MLJ 136. 
68 
of decisions on the grounds that both shareholders, who were the only shareholders of 
the company, were represented on the board of directors. As both shareholders were 
corporate bodies, and as such, acted through their representatives, the decision of the 
directors representing the shareholders arguably binds the shareholders based on the 
principle in Re Duomatic Ltd73, although this argument was not raised in the judgment 
of the Privy Council. 
There are also a significant number of arguments as to why directors should not be 
allowed to exploit corporate opportunities merely because the opportunities were 
rejected by the board of directors. One of the major criticisms of allowing a director to 
take for himself opportunities which have been rejected by the board of directors is that 
it requires a detennination by the court as to whether the board's rejection of the 
opportunity was bona fide . 74 This is a matter the courts have been reluctant to delve 
into on the grounds that the courts are incapable of ascertaining the truth of the matter.75 
Moreover, the evidence which would establish the financial ability or inability of the 
company to take the opportunity and other reasons for the rejection is solely within the 
control of those who will benefit personally if the company decides to reject the 
opportunity. 76 It is argued that anything less than an absolute rule that a director may 
not make a profit from his position will tempt the directors to be less than totally 
committed to obtaining the opportunity on behalf of the company.77 Beck also queries 
whether it is possible for the courts to be entirely certain whether the disinterested 
directors are acting in the best interest of the company or of their fellow directors in 
rej ecting the opportunity, and reasons that it is:-
73 [ 1969] 2 Ch 365; See Brick & Pipe !~d~stries Ltd v ?ccidental Life Nominees Pty Ltd ( 1990) 
3 ACSR 649, in which the Duomatic pnnctple was applied. 
74 Farrar, supra note 64, 419. 7~ Regal (Hastings) Ltdv Gulliver [1942]1 AllER 378; Beck, supra note 57, 11 2. 
76 Farrar, supra note 64, 419. 
77 Ibid 
"safer for the courts to continue to make it clear to directors that if they are 
going to act in a situation in which their interest may conflict with their duty 
that they must seek the approval of fully informed shareholders. "78 
The decision in Peso Silver Mines has also been criticised on the conclusions drawn 
from the facts of the case. Beck argues that there was ample evidence that Peso was in 
exactly the same position as the Regal company, in that it wanted the property but could 
not finance the purchase.79 Accordingly, despite the rejection of the opportunity, a 
conflict of interest existed in Peso Silver Mines, as in Regal (Hastings). And where a 
conflict of interest exists, the fact that the fiduciary acted bona fide is irrelevant. Beck 
is also of the view that it is difficult to accept the court's finding of good faith rejection, 
in the light of the unsatisfactory evidence as to whether the full board of Peso 
considered the matter, and of the relatively short time thereafter that the director picked 
h I . 80 up t e c atms. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the above is that the issue as to whether a 
director can utilise for his own gain a corporate opportunity which has been rejected by 
the board of directors is far from settled. This is more so in the light of the recent cases 
of Guinness v Saunderi 1 and A-G for Hong Kong v ReicP, which herald the return to 
the position of the earlier cases that the profit rule must be strictly adhered to; the 
House of Lords in Guinness v Saunders taking the view that fiduciaries should not in 
any way be encouraged to put themselves in a position where their interests conflict 
with their fiduciary duties. 
78 Beck goes further to suggest that the principle in North Western Transportation Co v Beatty 
(1887) 12 App Cas 589, that a director may use his votes as a shareholder to ratify a contract in 
which he is interested, should not apply to cases where the taking of a corporate opportunity is 
being sanctioned. He opines that the court should insist that directors' acts be approved by a 
majority of disinterested shareholders; Beck, supra note 57, 113. 
70 
Nonetheless, the remarks of Deane J in the Australian case of Chan v Zacharii3 serve 
as a timely reminder of the need to allow flexibility in principles of equity in order to 
work justice in particular facts and changing circumstances.84 Deane J opined that 
over-enthusiastic statements of broad, general principles of equity in terms which are 
inflexible may destroy that which equity intends to promote. As a result, equity may be 
converted into an instrument of hardship and injustice. Quoting Lord Selbourne LC in 
B'arnes v Add/5, Deane J reiterated that: 
"There is no better mode of undermining the sound doctrines of equity that to 
make unreasonable and inequitable applications of them. ,,s6 
4.3 A Corporate Opportunity Doctrine? 
The above perusal of the cases relating to corporate opportunity reveals that there are 
varying approaches among Commonwealth jurisdictions. The issues faced by 
Commonwealth courts have similarly been encountered by the courts of the United 
States. In response, the courts and the legal fraternity of the United States have 
endeavoured to develop a corporate opportunity doctrine to deal with the specific 
controversies arising in the area of corporate opportunity. In particular, the American 
79 Beck, supra note 57, I 0 I. 
80 !d. 99. 
81 (1990)2 AC 663. 
82 [1994]1 AC 324. 
83 (1983-4)154 CLR 178. 
84 In that case, Deane J suggested that it may be arguable that the fiduciary should be permitted to 
obtain for himself benefits, which would usually be precluded by the no-profit rule, where it is 
plainly in the interests of the person to whom t.he fiduciary duty is owed for the fiduciary to 
obtain those benefits. He argued that the fiductary should not be required to account for his 
profit in such situations, notwithstanding decisions such as Rega~ (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver 
[1942]1 AllER 378 and Phipps v Boardman (1967] 2 AC 46. It IS noted, however, that these 
statements were made by way of obiter dicta. 
8~ (1874) LR 9 ChApp 244, 251. 
86 (1983-4)154 CLR 178, 205. 
Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendationi7 
has contributed to the needed clarification in this core area of fiduciary obligation by 
defining the parameters of the directors' duty in this context. 
4.3.1 The American Corporate Opportunity Doctrine 
Section 5.05 of the recommendations state the general rule on the taking of corporate 
opportunity as follows:-
"(a) A director or senior executive may not take advantage of a corporate opportunity 
unless:-
(1) The director or senior executive first offers the corporate opportunity to the 
corporation and makes disclosure concerning the conflict of interest and the 
corporate opportunity,· 
(2) The corporate opportunity is rejected by the corporation,· and 
(3) Either: 
(A) The rejection of the opportunity is fair to the corporation; 
(B) The opportunity .is rejected in advance, following such disclosure, 
by disinterested directors, (or, in the case of a senior executive who is 
not a director, by a disinterested superior,) in a manner that satisfies 
the standards of the business judgment rule,· or 
(C) The rejection is authorised in advance or ratified, following such 
disclosure, by disinterested shareholders, and the rejection is not 
equivalent to a waste of corporate assets. 
87 American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, 
( 1994). 
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(b) Definition of a Corporate Opportunity. For purposes of this Section, a corporate 
opportunity means: 
(I) Any opportunity to engage in a business activity of which a director or 
senior executive becomes aware, either: 
(A) In connection with the performance of functions as a director or 
senior executive, or under circumstances that should reasonably lead 
the director or senior executive to believe that the person offering the 
opportunity expects it to be offered to the corporation; or 
(B) Through the use of corporate information or property, if the 
resulting opportunity is one that the director or senior executive should 
reasonably be expected to believe would be of interest to the 
corporation; or 
(2) Any opportunity to engage in a business activity of which a senior executive 
becomes aware and knows is closely related to a business in which the 
corporation is engaged or expects to engage. " 
Some of the notable features of this rule are the fact that it distinguishes between 
directors who are also senior executives and directors who are not senior executives. 
The rule also permits a director to utilise an opportunity which has been rejected by the 
company. In addition, it sets the parameters as to when an opportunity is regarded as a 
'corporate opportunity'. Each of these features will be further discussed below. 
The American Law Institute's definition of 'corporate opportunity' distinguishes 
between directors who are executives and directors who are not executives. Both 
executive and non-executive directors are caught by the rule where the director 
becomes aware of the opportunity in connection with the performance of functions as a 
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director, or where the director should reasonably believe that the person offering the 
opportunity expects it to be offered to the corporation. Alternatively, both types of 
directors are caught by the rule when they become aware of the opportunity through the 
use of corporate information or property, if the resulting opportunity is one that the 
director should reasonably be expected to believe would be of interest to the 
corporation. 
However, only executive directors are required to disclose opportunities to engage in a 
business activity which they know is closely related to a business in which the 
corporation is engaged or expects to engage. 
Such a distinction between executive or full-time directors and non-executive or part-
time directors, has been advocated in the United States by Professors Brudney and 
Clark.88 Professors Brudney and Clark argue that a full-time or executive director 
should be prohibited from taking any other active business opportunities on the grounds 
that corporate executives are generally expected to devote their full working time to the 
affairs of the corporation. 89 Moreover, an executive director 's role is similar to that of 
a trustee and shareholders should be protected from the tendency of officers of the 
company to divert corporate opportunity.90 In contrast, a part-time director is generally 
not disentitled by reason of his commitment to the company from participating actively 
in other ventures. His limited role and commitment justifies allowing him more 
freedom for individual action and Professors Brudney and Clark argue that he should 
not be categorically denied participation in other ventures.91 Rather, subjecting a part-
time director to the limited restraint of a prohibition against the use of the corporation's 
88 Brudney, supra note 64,1042-5. 
89 !d. 1023-4. 
90 Ibid. 
91 !d. 1043. 
advance or ratified by disinterested shareholders,97 provided that the rejection is not 
equivalent to a waste of corporate assets. 
This proposed rule prescribes a much clearer standard of behaviour than the 'appalling 
muddle' of Commonwealth cases.98 Whilst the rejection of corporate opportunity by 
disinterested directors is more lax a standard than required by the Regal (Hastings) line 
of cases, it has been argued that the board of directors, excluding the affected directors, 
is an appropriate body for such assent, given that questions of business opportunity 
frequently involve matters of business judgment.99 The authorisation or ratification of 
the rejection by disinterested shareholders goes a step further than Regal (Hastings), 
which requires merely the approval of shareholders. 100 
The proposed rule also defines the parameters of a 'corporate opportunity'. Section 
5.05(b )(2) applies the approach known as the 'expanded line of business test' which is 
similar to the approach adopted in Industrial Development Consultants v Cooley. 101 In 
97 See Sections 1.16 and 1.23 of the American Law Institute's recommendations. A shareholder is 
regarded as being interested in a transaction if the shareholder or an associate of the shareholder 
is also an interested director with respect to the transaction; American Law Institute, supranote 
87, 20-2, 25-9. 
98 See Austin, supra note 26, 183. Nonetheless, it is noted that the rules provide for the rejection 
to be fair, or to be by disinterested directors or ratified or authorised by disinterested 
shareholders in the manner specified. It is submitted that this leaves ambiguity as to whether 
such 'fair rejection' should be by disinterested directors or shareholders and by what standards a 
rejection should be judged as fair or unfair. 
99 Austin, supra note 26, 184; Beck, however, notes that it may never be entirely clear whether 
disinterested directors are acting in the best interests of the company or of their fellow directors 
in rejecting a corporate opportunity; Beck, supra note 57, 113. In contrast, Professors Brudney 
and Clark argue that in public corporations, the substantive and procedural defects of corporate 
consent make it a poor filter for restraining improper diversion of corporate opportunities, and 
conclude that the absence of any compelling reasons to penn it 'proper' diversions emphasises the 
pointlessness of incurring such a cost; Brudney, supra note 64, I 034-5. 
100 According to North-West Transportation v Beauy (1887) 12 App Cas 589, the affected 
directors would have the right to vote as shareholders notwithstanding their interest in the 
transaction. Professor Austin and Beck both support the proposition that the affected directors 
should not vote as shareholders; Austin, supra note 26, 184; Beck, supra note 57,113; However, 
Berger recognises that the requirement of rejection may be manipulated by others in the company 
to extract some concession from a director; Berger, M., 'The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and 
Outside Business Interests', (1989) 56 University of Chicago Law Review 827, 851. See also 
Brudney supra note 64,1032-5. 
1o1 [ 1972,] 2 All ER 162; See Austin, supra note 26, 160. 
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essence, the expanded line of business includes opportunities which are closely 
associated with the existing and prospective activities of the corporation, including 
areas into which the corporation might naturally or easily expand. 102 Such an approach 
appears to be favoured over the broad factor-based evaluation of conduct such as was 
adopted in Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O'Malle/03 , one of the reasons being the need 
for certainty and predictability in the commercial arena. 104 Although it is conceded that 
each of these formulations of the corporate opportunity doctrine involves a degree of 
uncertainty, 105 the expanded line of business approach has the advantage of greater 
certainty as it utilises concepts which are indicative of the matters relevant to liability 
and sets a standard of behaviour. 106 
The corporate opportunity doctrine developed by the United States provides us the 
benefit of having confronted issues which have yet to be contested in our courts. 
Although there remains some disagreement as to various aspects of the doctrine, we can 
extract some guidance from the experience of the United States. The recommendations 
of the American Law lnstitute 107 are of particular value in this regard. Whilst the 
recommendations have been criticised as imposing a heavy burden on directors, 108 
102 Note, ( 1961) 74 Harvard Law Review 765, 768. 
103 ( 1973) 40 DLR (3d) 371; See Beck, S.M., 'The Quickening of Fiduciary Obligation: Canadian 
Aero Services v O'Malley', ( 1975) 53 Can Bar Rev 771 , 782-3. 
104 Austin, supra note 26, 161. 
105 Austin, supra note 26, 161 ; Beck, supra note 103, 782-3; Brudney, supra note 64, 1012-3; 
Professors Brudney and Clark observe that the process of identifying what is within the 
company's line of business involves empirical examination of comparable phenomena in similar 
businesses, which will inevitably permit some random or subjectively biased results. They 
suggest that the opportunity should be presumed to be within the company's line of business and 
the onus should be on the diverter to prove the contrary. 
106 Austin, supra note 26, 161-5; 
107 American Law Institute, supra note 87. 
10s Berger, supra note 100, 863. In contrast, O'Connor obs~rves that the language of the rule 
avoids the traditional use of vigorous moral language and falls to convey the spirit of the high 
standard of fidelity owed by directors, thereby weakening the socialising force of corporate law; 
O'Connor, M.A., 'How Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty? Directors' Conflict-of-Interest 
Transactions and the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance', ( 1993) 61 The George 
Washington Law Review 954. 
Norris JA's remark functions as an apt reminder of the need to protect the company 
from abuse by its fiduciaries:-
"With great respect, it seems to me that the complexities of modern business 
are a very good reason why the rule should be enforced strictly in order that 
such complexities may not be used as a smoke-screen or a shield behind which 
fr d . h b d "109 au mzg t e perpetuate . 
It is unlikely that Commonwealth law will be able to move from its present state of 
chaos to such a structure by the process of judicial decision. 110 Legislative intervention 
may be necessary to enable the courts to 'wipe the slate clean and start building 
again'.111 
4.4 Conclusion 
It is apparent from the examination of case law earlier in this chapter that the Malaysian 
case law, as with the Commonwealth case law, relating to the no-profit rule is in a fairly 
unsettled and disorderly state. In addition, the Malaysian legislative provision, namely 
Section 132(2) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) provides little clarification to the 
situation. 
Section 132(2) deals with information acquired by a director but does not include 
corporate opportunity and corporate property. Arguably, corporate opportunity may be 
the result of acquiring corporate information. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that 
109 Peso Silver Mines Ltd v Cropper ( 1966) 56 DLR (2d) 117, 154-5. 
110 Austin, supra note 26, 184. 
Il l Ibid. 
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the same should be clearly specified in legislation. 112 The Section also does not define 
what the phrase 'improper use' of infonnation entails. It also does not address the 
possibility of rejection of opportunities by the company. It is submitted that directors 
should be allowed to use corporate infonnation or opportunity where the consent of the 
general meeting has been obtained, along the lines of the equitable no-profit rule. 
Similarly, it has been suggested that the Section should require full disclosure of 
material facts of the transaction and the conflict of interest, if any .113 
Section 132(2) also fails to deal specifically with issues discussed Section 4.2 above, 
such as the uncertainty in the fonnulation and ambit of the no-profit rule and the 
connecting link between profit and the fiduciary office. Unless such issues are 
addressed, the confusing state of the Malaysian and Commonwealth case law is likely 
to remain as a thorn in the flesh of corporate players. And where such uncertainty in 
the law prevails, injustice is likely to result even where conscientious efforts to abide 
by the law have been made. 
The inadequacies of the current statutory regime have been acknowledged by the 
Finance Committee on Corporate Governance in a recent report.11 4 The Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance has recognised a need to clarify the 
responsibilities of directors such that they will be readily understood, envisaging that in 
some circumstances it may involve codification of directors' duties. A number of 
suggestions were made, including two pertinent recommendations which relate to 
corporate opportunity taken by directors. The first was a suggestion that the 
authorisation of disinterested directors should be obtained in respect of such 
transactions, after full disclosure of the conflict of interest and the material facts of the 
112 Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, Report on Corporate Governance, (February 
1999), 124. 
11 3 Ibid. 
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transaction. 115 Secondly, the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance 
recommended that even where the transaction has been approved by disinterested 
directors, the court should have the ability to enquire as to the fairness of the 
transaction at all times. 116 This addresses issues pertinent to the Malaysian corporate 
scene in which it is common for so-called independent members of the board of 
directors to be friends and invitees of a controlling shareholder. 117 
These recommendations generally parallel the position taken by the American Law 
Institute as well as legal scholars. 118 Another notable point is that the recommendations 
for reform are primarily targeted at public listed companies. 119 This, too, is in line with 
the views of Professors Brudney and Clark that stricter rules are required to regulate the 
behaviour of directors of public companies. 120 They reason that this is necessary due to 
the limited capacities of the shareholders of public companies to select and monitor 
fiduciaries to whom they have entrusted their capital. 121 
Apart from the need for clarification of the no-profit rule, the enforcement of the rule is 
also beset by practical difficulties and complications. One of the difficulties facing 
shareholders of the company has its source in the separation of ownership and control 
of the company. As shareholders are frequently not involved in the day-to-day 
114 /d. 123. 
II$ !d. 125. The Finance Committee on Corporate Governance also recommended that the 
disinterested directors should be informed in respect of the matter to the extent that such directors 
reasonably believe to be appropriate in the circumstances. In addition, the disinterested directors 
should rationally believe that the decision to allow the taking of corporate opportunity is in the 
best interests of the company. 
116 !bid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Austin, supra note 26, 184; Beck, supra note 57, 113. Note, however, that Professors 
Brudney and Clark take a di fferent view. ~ey reject the exploitation of corporate opportunity by 
directors even with the consent of fellow directors on the grounds that the shareholders of public 
companies have limited capacities to select and monitor fiduciaries. Brudney, supra note 64, 
103-',-5. 
11 9 The issue of whether stricter rules should be imposed on public companies than on private 
companies is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
120 Brudney, supra note 64, I 002-6. 
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management of the company, they may be unaware of the taking of profit by directors, 
unless the same is disclosed. Such infonnation is likely not to be readily available to 
those not involved in running the company. As such, shareholders would frequently be 
dependent on directors' transparency in disclosing these details. And in situations 
where there is failure to make such disclosure, the shareholders may remain ignorant of 
such breaches of directors' duties. 
A further complication arises from the increased complications in the corporate 
structures of recent times. Large conglomerates, in particular, are often found to have 
complicated shareholding structures. Directors may at times have a stake in the 
subsidiary companies. Consequently, in dealings between related companies, the 
directors would at times make an indirect profit through their shareholding in one of the 
companies involved in the transaction. Similarly, a director may hold shares in a 
company which enters into a transaction with the company of which he is a director. It 
is arguable that a strict interpretation of the no-profit rule would require the directors to 
account for any profit made. However, in an era where it is not uncommon for a person 
to hold shares in a large number of companies, requiring the director to account for 
profit made indirectly by virtue of his shareholding in a company which enters into 
such a transaction would open up the floodgates to claims for an account for profit. In 
addition, directors are likely to be significantly restricted in the transactions they enter 
into on behalf of the company, in order to avoid liability to themselves. 
Some of these recommendations, particularly those highlighted in the Finance 
Comm ittee's Report on Corporate Governance, are currently being studied with a view 
to implementation of the same. The process is likely to be fraught with challenges, 
given the delicate balance which needs to be maintained between investor protection on 
121 Ibid. 
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the one hand, and excessive regulation which may stifle corporate activity on the other 
hand. In reformulating the rules applicable to corporate opportunity, it should be borne 
in mind that the rules of other jurisdictions may need to be recast so as to be 
contextualised to the needs of the corporate situation in Malaysia. 122 The economic 
crash of 1997 was a timely reminder of the need to strengthen investor protection in 
Malaysian capital markets. 123 And the same, once again, reinforces the importance of 
the fiduciary principle which requires high standards of fidelity of directors in whom 
the confidence of the investors is reposed, protecting investors from abuse by the 
fiduciaries. 
122 See Koh, P.T.N., 'Company Ownership Disclosure and Liabilities in Malaysia', (1992] 2MLJ 
li , lxviii . 
123 Ali Abdul Kadir, 'The Corporate Governance Trend in Malaysia: February 1999 Finance 
Committee Report on Corporate Governance', Corporate Governance Conference for Nominee 
Directors of PNB, Kuala Lumpur 20 August 1999. 
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CHAPTER 5- STATUTORY REGULATION OF SPECIFIC TRANSACTIONS 
AND ARRANGEMENTS1 
The fiduciary duties imposed on directors by equity have been supplemented by 
statutory provisions. These provisions are contained in the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 
125). In Chapter 3, Section 131 ofthe Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125), which requires 
disclosure of conflicts of interest, was examined. In addition, in Chapter 4, it was noted 
that the rule that a director should not make a profit from infonnation acquired by 
virtue of his position has been incorporated into the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). 
Apart from the aforesaid provisions, a number of specific transactions and 
arrangements involving self-dealing by directors are regulated by the Companies Act, 
1965 (Act 125). 
The legislative purpose behind these statutory provisions is to reinforce the general 
fiduciary duties of directors.2 Although one cannot prevent dishonesty by legislation, 
these provisions are nonetheless intended to minimise the possibility of shareholders' 
investments being eroded by directors' self-dealing.3 This is accomplished firstly, by 
prohibiting certain director-related transactions unless the approval of the general 
meeting is obtained. Secondly, specific transactions are prohibited absolutely. Thirdly, 
disclosure is required of specific interests. Provision is also made for various civil 
1 Parts of this chapter have been published by the author in a paper entitled 'Directors' Self-
Dealing and the Malaysian Companies Act, 1965' . This paper was published at the II lh 
Corporate Law Teachers ' Association Conference, t:tel?oume, Aus~alia ll-13th February 2001. 
The consent of Professor Dato' P. Balan to the pubhcat10n of the sa1d paper was duly obtained 
prior to such publication. 
2 Loh, S.C., Corporate Powers:Controls, Reme?ies and Dec~sion-mak!ng, (1996), 273-4. 
J Parliamentary Debates, Dewan Rakyat, Official Report, Eighth Parliament, Second Session, 20 
July, l992, 57-8; Koh, P.T.N., 'Principles, Pr.actice and Prospects of Corporate Governance: The 
Malaysian Legal Framework', [ 1994] 3 MLJ IX, x. 
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consequences and remedies, as well as criminal penalties, in the event of infringement 
of the statutory provisions. 4 
Most of the provisions of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) which regulate 
transactions involving self-dealing by directors are based on provisions which are, or 
which were at some time, found in the companies legislation of Australia and the 
United Kingdom. Nonetheless, these provisions of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) 
bear a greater resemblance to older provisions of the companies legislation of these 
jurisdictions. They do no incorporate some of the more recent amendments to the 
companies legislation of Australia and the United Kingdom. 
The first part of this chapter deals with the sections of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 
125) which prohibit specific transactions and arrangements which involve an element 
of self-dealing by directors. In the second part of this chapter, the statutory provisions 
requiring disclosure of directors' interests and dealings with the company will be 
examined. Lastly, developments in statutory provisions which regulate self-dealing by 
directors in Australia and the United Kingdom will be considered. 
5.1 Prohibited Transactions and Arrangements 
The Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) sets out a number of categories of transactions and 
arrangements which are prohibited. These are generally regarded as transactions and 
arrangements which involve or potentially involve self-dealing. Among these 
transactions and arrangements are loans to directors and persons connected with 
directors. These are dealt with in Sections 133 and 133A. Substantial property 
transactions involving directors are regulated by Section 132E. In addition, Section 
4 Loh, supra note I, 273-4. 
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132G prohibits transactions involving substantial shareholders and directors which fall 
within the ambit of Section 132G. Some of these transactions and arrangements are 
prohibited absolutely. Others are made subject to the approval of the company in 
general meeting. 
The effect of requiring the approval of shareholders in respect of these transactions and 
arrangements is to reduce the power of directors over matters which are likely to 
involve self-dealing, shifting the power to shareholders instead. This addresses the 
issue of the increased potential for self-dealing resulting from the separation between 
the ownership and control of companies. By shifting the authority to approve such 
transactions from directors to shareholders, the control over such transactions is 
restored to the owners of the company. This arguably has the effect of reducing the 
potential for self-dealing by directors who would otherwise have control over the 
company's assets relatively free from the scrutiny of shareholders. 
These statutory provisions recognise that self-dealing by directors may at times involve 
persons other than directors. Instead of dealing directly with the company, a director 
may wish to structure his dealings such that he deals indirectly with the company 
through nominees. Accordingly, Sections 133A, 132E and 132G also deal with 
arrangements and transactions involving persons deemed to be connected with 
directors. 
Section 122A of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) names four categories of persons 
who are deemed to be connected with a director. They are, firstly, a member of that 
director's family, which includes the director's spouse, parent, child or sibling. 
Secondly, a body corporate which is associated with that director is deemed to be 
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connected with him. 5 Also included is a trustee of a trust under which that director or a 
member of his fam ily is a beneficiary. Fourthly, a partner of that director is deemed to 
be a person connected with that director. Similarly, a partner of a person connected 
with that director is also a person connected with that director. 
5.1.1 Loans to Directors and Persons Connected with Directors- Sections 133 and 
133A 
5.1.1.1 Section 133 
Section 1336 prohibits companies7 from making a loan to a director of the company or 
of a related company. The word 'loan' is not defined by the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 
125). In essence, a loan of money is the payment of a sum of money on condition that 
an equivalent amount would be repaid at a future time.8 In addition, the Section also 
prohibits the entry into any guarantee and the provision of any security by the company, 
in connection with a loan made to a director of the company or a director of a related 
5 Section !22A(3) sets out a number of situations in which a body corporate is associated with a 
director. This includes a body corporate that is accustomed to act in accordance with the 
director's instructions and a body corporate in which the director has a controlling interest. In 
addition, it includes a body corporate of which he controls the exercise of fifteen per centum or 
more of the votes. 
6 Section 13 3 (I) states that:-
"A company (other than an exempt private company) shall not make a loan to a director 
of the company or of a company which by virtue of section 6 is deemed to be related to 
that company, or enter into any guarantee or provide any security in connection with a 
loan made to such a director by any other person but nothing in this section shall apply -
(a) subject to subsection (2), to anything done to provide such a director with funds to 
meet expenditure incurred or to be incurred by him for the purposes of the company or 
for the purpose of enabling him properly to perform his duties as an officer of the 
company; 
(b) to anything done to provide such a director who is engaged in the full-time 
employment of the company or its holding company, as the case may be, with funds to 
meet expenditure incurred or to be incurred by him in purchasing or otherwise acquiring 
a home; or 
(c) to any loan made to such a director who is engaged in the full-time employment of the 
company or its holding company, as the case may be, where the company has at a 
general meeting approved of a scheme for the making of loans to employees of the 
company and the loan is in accordance with that sch~m_e: " . 
7 Exempt private companies are exempted from the prohibitiOns of SectiOn 133 . 
s Re Securitibank Ltd (No. 2), per Richardson 1 [1978] 2 NZLR 136, 137; applied by Ormiston J 
in Brick & Pipe Industries Ltd v Occidental Lfe Nominees Pty Ltd & Ors ( 1991) 9 ACLC 324, 
357. 
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company. It would appear that in each of the aforesaid categories, the substance of the 
transaction would be more important than the form or label given to it by the parties.9 
Certain exceptions to the prohibitions are set out in Section 133(1 ). In particular, the 
Section permits the company to provide directors with funds to meet expenditure 
incurred or to be incurred for the purpose of the company. The Section also permits the 
company to provide funds to the director to enable the director to properly perform his 
duties as an officer of the company. In addition, the Section allows companies to 
provide full-time directors with funds for acquiring a home. Nevertheless, the approval 
of the company at a general meeting must be obtained in respect of these excepted 
transactions in accordance with Section 133(2). Otherwise, the loan must be repaid, or 
the liability under the guarantee or security discharged, within the time stipulated in 
Section 133(2). In addition to the excepted transactions mentioned above, companies 
may also grant to directors any loan in accordance with an employee loan scheme 
approved by the company in general meeting. 
As for the consequences of contravention of Section 133, Section 133( 4) clearly 
provides that any director who authorises the prohibited transaction shall be guilty of an 
offence against the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). The wording of the Section 
appears to indicate that a director would be strictly liable, without recourse to any 
defence, for authorising such a transaction. In contrast, the equivalent statutory 
provisions in Australia and the United Kingdom stipulate that it would be a defence if 
the director proves that he had no knowledge of the relevant circumstances constituting 
9 Chow Yoong Hong v Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory [1962] MLJ 74. The facts of this case 
involved post-dated cheques w~ich .allegedly amounted to a money-lending transaction. ~ord 
Devl in remarked that in such SJtuatwns the court should look at the nature of the transaction. 
And · f the court comes to the conclusion that the form of the transaction is only a sham and that 
what 
1
the parties really agreed on was a loan which they disguised, then the court will call it by its 
real name and act accordingly. 
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the contravention at the time the transaction was entered into.Io It is suggested that 
such a defence would be fairer to a director who may be unaware of the contravention 
due to no fault of his own. Where the director who benefits from the transaction fails to 
disclose the facts leading to the contravention, the fault would appear to lie with that 
director, rather than the other directors. 
Where Section 133(1) is contravened, 133(3) further stipulates that the directors who 
authorise the making of the transaction shall be jointly and severally liable to indemnify 
the company against any loss arising from the transaction. II It is worth noting that the 
Section does not specify that the obligation to indemnify the company arises whenever 
there is a contravention of the Section. Rather, it is worded such that the obligation to 
indemnify the company arises where the company's approval is not given. This appears 
to be a reference to the excepted transactions set out in Section 133(1) which require 
I . I2 the approval of the genera meetmg. Hence, it appears that the obligation to 
indemnify the company does not extend to other transactions made in contravention of 
Section 133(1). Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of the company, an indemnity by the 
directors would be equally desirable in relation to transactions entered into in blatant 
. f h s . IJ contraventiOn o t e ect10n. 
Apart from stipulating that the directors shall be made liable on contravention of 
Section 133, the Section also provides for a restitutionary remedy for the company. 
10 Section 234 of the Corporations Law {Australia) and Sections 341 and 342 of the Companies 
Act 1985 (UK). Section 234 of the Corporations Law {Australia) has since been repealed and 
replaced by Chapter 2E of the Corporations L~w (Australia). 
11 As above, it is similarly suggested that a dtrector should have recourse to the defence that he 
did not have any knowledge of the circumstances leading to the contravention at the time of the 
transaction. 
12 Section 133(2). 
IJ An indemnity which covers transac~ions e~tere~ into in ~ontra~ention of the section, and not 
merely where the company's approval Is not given .Is found m SectiOn 234(~) of the Corporati?ns 
Law (Australia) and Section 341 of the. Comp~Ies Act 1985 (UK). It ts noted that SectiOn 
234(5) of the Corporations Law (Australia) has smce been repealed and replaced by Chapter 2E 
of the Corporations Law (Australia). 
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Section 133(5) allows the company to recover the amount of any loan or amount for 
which it becomes liable under any guarantee or security given in contravention of 
Section 133. 
5.1.1.2 Section 133A 
Section 133A 14 is similar to Section 133, except that instead of directors, it deals with 
persons connected with a director of the company or of its holding company. Section 
133A(l) prohibits the making of a loan and the giving of any guarantee or security for 
the benefit of any person connected with a director of the company or of its holding 
company. 
An exception to the prohibition would be a loan made, or a guarantee or security 
provided, for the benefit of a related company.15 In addition, companies whose 
ordinary business includes the lending of money are excepted from the prohibition in 
Section 13 3 A( 1 ), as long as the loan is made or the guarantee or security is given in the 
ordinary course of business.16 A company may also make a loan to a person connected 
with a director, if the director is engaged in full-time employment with the company or 
its related company. As in Section 133, such a loan must be for the purpose of 
acquiring a home or in accordance with an employee loan scheme approved by the 
shareholders. 17 
In the event of a contravention of Section 133A, subsection (4) stipulates that any 
director who authorises the transaction would be guilty of an offence. However, 
' 4 Section I33A was inserted into the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) by the Companies 
(Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act 657), s II. 
15 Section 133A(2)(a). 
16 Section 133A(2)(b). 
17 Section 133A(2)(c). 
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Section 133A does not provide for any indemnity by such directors. 18 Nonetheless, as 
in Section 133, a company is allowed to recover the amount of any loan, guarantee or 
security provided in contravention of Section 133A. 19 
5.1.1.3 The validity of a contract made in breach of Section 133 
A controversial issue concerning Section 133 is whether a contract entered into in 
contravention of Section 133 is valid. This issue would similarly apply to a contract 
entered into in contravention of Section 133A. The cases in which this issue has arisen 
have, however, only concerned Section 133. 
It is clear that the company may recover the amount of any loan or amount for which it 
becomes liable under any guarantee entered into or security given contrary to Section 
133.20 Nevertheless, the Section does not expressly state whether a contract which 
contravenes Section 133 is valid. 
This issue of the validity of such a contract was canvassed in a series of cases 
beginning with the case of Che Wan Development Sdn Bhd v Co-operative Central 
Bank Bhd.21 In Che Wan, N. H. Chan J (as he then was) found that a charge transaction 
entered into in contravention of Section 133 was illegal and hence, void and 
unenforceable. In considering the applicable law, N. H. Chan J noted that the intention 
behind the statutory prohibition on loans to directors is the protection of the company's 
assets from being depleted through misuse by its directors. Having considered Section 
133(5), he took the view that the subsection does not affect any defence of illegality 
available to the company. Accordingly, where Section 133 is contravened, the 
1s As with Section 133, it is submitted that a director should be required to indemnifY the 
company in the event that Section !33A is. contravened. This should be subject to the defence 
that he did not have any knowledge of the ctrcumstances. 
19 Section 133A(3). 
20 Section 133(5). 
21 [1 990] 2 ML1 365. 
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company would be able to rely on the defence of illegality to avoid transactions, and 
prevent its assets from being depleted. 
The issue has not been regarded as settled by the decision in Che Wan, as various 
subsequent judicial decisions indicate. For instance, the court in the case of Co-
operative Central Bank Bhd v Syarikat Bukit Tingg/2 declined to follow Che Wan. 
Nevertheless, in Co-operative Central Bank Ltd v Feyen Development Sdn Bhc/, 23 the 
decision in Che Wan was followed by the High Court 
The issue came before the Federal Court on appeal in the case of Co-operative Central 
Bank Ltd v Feyen Development Sdn Bhd. 24 In Feyen, the Federal Court overruled the 
decision in Che Wan. The facts of Feyen involved charges which were given by the 
company as security for a loan. The borrower was said to be a director of the company. 
However, it was the company which ultimately received the loan. Thus, there was no 
question of the assets of the chargor company being depleted through misuse. Rather, 
the position was quite the opposite. The chargor sought to get back its property free of 
the charges as well as to avoid repayment of the loan. 
The Federal Court expressed its unwillingness to lend its aid to the chargor company in 
taking advantage of its own wrong. Edgar Joseph FCJ took the view that:-
"to admit the defence of illegality ... would .. . provide 'a windfall gain' to the 
chargor company and others in a similar position. In consequence, such a 
result would impose substantial hardship upon the chargee society. 25 
22 [1991] I CLJ 590. 
23 [1994] I MLJ 75. 
24 (1995]3ML1313. 
25 /d. 329. 
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In delivering the judgment of the Federal Court, Edgar Joseph FCJ found that Section 
133(5) had in effect impliedly validated all transactions prohibited by subsection (!). 
Edgar Joseph FCJ also took into account the recent trend in common law jurisdictions 
against finding contracts void due to a contravention of legislative provisions. His 
Lordship concluded that no civil consequences flowed from the breach of Section 
133( 1 ), and consequently, no voidness or unenforceability attached to the loan or the 
charge transactions. 
Notwithstanding that Feyen was a decision of the Federal Court, instead of settling the 
issue, it appears to have attracted much controversy. The decision has been lauded,26 
criticised, 27 and in Harta Empat Sdn Bhd v Koperasi Rakyat Bhd, 28 was brushed aside 
as obiter by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal's treatment of Feyen in the case 
of Harta Empat invited a stinging rebuke by the Federal Court, that the Court of Appeal 
'flew in the face' of established principles of precedent.29 
With respect, it is noted that neither of the judgments in the above cases appear to have 
taken into account relevant provisions of the Contracts Act, 1950 (Act 136). In 
particular, Section 24 of the Contracts Act, 1950 (Act 136) in effect provides that where 
the object of an agreement is forbidden by law, the agreement is void. This provision 
was considered by the Supreme Court in Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd v Hotel Rasa Sayang 
Sdn Bhd.30 In Chung Khiaw Bank, one of the issues before the court was whether an 
agreement which was made in contravention of the prohibition in Section 67 of the 
Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) was valid. It was argued before the Supreme Court 
that the trend in common Jaw jurisdictions that courts should be slow in striking down 
26 Datuk Tan Leng Teck v Sarjana Sdn Bhd [1997] 4 MLJ 329. 
21 Sangha, 8., 'Co-operative Central ~ank Ltd v Feyen Development Sdn Bhd - A Step in the 
Wrong Direction?', (1996] 2 MLJ lXXXI. 
28 [1 997]1 MLJ 381. 
29 [ 1997] 2 MLJ 829, 837. 
92 
illegal contracts should be followed. This same argument that was put before the 
Federal Court in Feyen. However, the Supreme Court held in Chung Khiaw Bank that 
Section 24 of the Contracts Act, I 950 (Act 136) overrides the common law. Hence, 
according to this view, a contract entered into in contravention of Section I 33 would be 
void. 
It is submitted that even if Section 24 of the Contracts Act, 1950 (Act I36) had been 
applied in Che Wan, the court would probably have reached the same conclusion. The 
court found the contract void in Che Wan, although Section 24 of the Contracts Act 
' 
I 950 (Act I36) was not discussed in the judgement. The decision in Feyen, however, is 
quite the opposite from the outcome of Section 24 of the Contracts Act, I 950 (Act 136). 
With respect, it is submitted that the Federal Court erred in its decision in Feyen. 
Firstly, one of the grounds for the Federal Court's decision was the trend in the common 
law. The common law would not be applicable, in view of the overriding statutory 
provision in Section 24 of the Contracts Act, 1950 (Act 136).31 
In addition, the wording of Section 133(5) is similar to the wording of Section 67(6) of 
the Companies Act, 1965 (Act I 25) at the time the decision in Chung Khiaw Bank was 
made.32 In Chung Khiaw Bank the Supreme Court noted that the object of Section 
67(6) was to protect the company and no one else. The Section was designed to prevent 
the assets of the company from being misused. As such, the Supreme Court did not 
accept the contention that the company's liability to third parties remained unaffected 
30 [1990]1 MLJ356. 
31 Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd v Hotel Ras_a Sayang Sdn Bhd [ 1990] I MLJ 356. 
J2 Prior to the decision in Chung Khraw Bank Ltd v Hotel Rasa Sayang Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 MLJ 
356, Section 67(6) ofthe Companies Act, 196~ (Act 125) all?wedthe company to re~over inter 
alia the amount of any Joan made in contravention ofthe ~ectlon. Subsequently, Section 67(6) of 
the Companies Act !965 (Act 125) was amended by Sectton 13 of the Companies (Amendment) 
(No. 2) Act, !992 (Act A836). The amendment exp~essly pennits the co~pany as well asany 
person to recover such amounts. Howe~er, as SectiOn 133(5) has remamed unchanged, it is 
submitted that the reasoning in Chung Kh1aw Bank Ltd v Hotel Rasa Sayang Sdn Bhd [ 1990] 1 
MLJ 356 is applicable to Section 133(5). 
93 
by the prohibition contained in the Section. Similarly, it is argued that the object of 
Section 133 would be to protect the company's assets from being depleted through 
misuse. In Che Wan, N.H. Chan J adopted a similar line of reasoning. By concluding 
that the company would be able to rely on the defence of illegality to avoid 
transactions, N.H. Chan J reasoned that the company would then be able to prevent its 
assets from being depleted. In contrast, the finding in Feyen that Section 133(5) had in 
effect impliedly validated all transactions prohibited by subsection (I) would result in 
the company being unable to prevent its assets from being depleted. This result would 
appear to be contrary to the object of Section 133. 
Thirdly, from the judgement in Feyen, it appears that one of the major considerations 
which led the Federal Court to its decision was the court's reluctance to lend its aid to 
the company's efforts to take advantage of its own wrong. With respect, it is submitted 
that even if the transaction had been found to be void, Section 66 of the Contracts Act, 
1950 (Act 136) may have operated to prevent the company from taking advantage of its 
own wrong. Section 66 of the Contracts Act, 1950 (Act 136) stipulates that when an 
agreement is discovered to be void or becomes void, any person who has received any 
advantage under the agreement is bound to restore it or to make compensation for it. 
However, this remedy would only be available to a party who did not know of the 
illegality from the beginning of the transaction.33 
As such, in Feyen, Section 66 of the Contracts Act, 1950 (Act 136) would have 
operated to prevent the company from carrying out its plan to take advantage of its own 
wrong, unless the lender was aware of such illegality from the beginning. From the 
facts set out in the judgment, it is not clear whether the lender was aware of the 
illegality of the transaction. If the lender had not been aware of the illegality, it would 
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be arguable that the Section would have required the company to repay the loan in order 
to get back its property free of the charges. 
The decision in Feyen has also been criticised by Sangha. In particular, she argues that 
the Federal Court's decision that Section 133(5) impliedly validated all transactions 
prohibited by Section 133(1) was based on a fundamental misinterpretation of the 
legislation. 34 
The conflicting decisions on the issue reflect the limitations of the judiciary in 
attempting to resolve the issue. As Feyen is a decision of the Federal Court, this further 
suggests that the uncertainty surrounding this issue would be more effectively resolved 
by legislative intervention. 35 
It is noted that subsequent to the decision in Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd v Hotel Rasa 
Sayang Sdn Bhd,36 Section 67(6) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) was amended 
to provide for recovery of loans or any other sums by any person.37 The reason for the 
amendment was to prevent companies from taking advantage of the technicalities of 
Section 67 so as to avoid their contractual obligations.38 This is similar to the concerns 
expressed by the Federal Court in Feyen. Such legislative action is likely to be more 
effective than judicial decisions in resolving the uncertainty of the issue of the validity 
of contracts which contravene Sections 133 or 133A. 
33 Ahmad bin Udoh v Ng Aik Chong [1970] I MLJ 82; Yeep Mooi v Chu Chin Chua [1981]1 
MLJ 14. 
34 Sangha, supra note 27, xc-xcv. 
D Ibid. 
36 [1990]1 MLJ356. 
37 c · (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1992 (Act A836). 
ompan1es ffi . 1 R E' h Js Parliamentary Debates, Dewan Rakyat, 0 ICia eport, 1g th Parliament, Second Session, 20 
July, 1992, 46-7. 
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However, it should also be borne in mind that an amendment to the effect of the 
amendment made to Section 67(6), allows any person to recover a loan made in 
contravention of the Section. This may have the undesirable result of pennitting the 
company's assets to be depleted. Ironically, this, in tum, would appear to be contrary to 
the purposes of Sections 133 and 133A. 
The debate concerning the validity of contracts made in contravention of Section 133, 
as reflected by the case law, appears to be centred mainly around the issue of who 
should bear the loss caused by such a transaction. Similarly, the legislative amendment 
discussed above also addresses similar concerns. Essentially, this question, as to who 
should bear the loss resulting from transactions in breach of Sections 133 or 133A, 
would seem to be a question of policy. It would seem appropriate for such a question to 
be dealt with by Parliament. 
5.1.2 Substantial Property Transactions- Section 132E 
5.1.2.1 The prohibition 
Section l32E(l)39 prohibits a company from entering into any arrangement or 
transaction to acquire any non-cash assets of the requisite value from a director of the 
company.40 It similarly prohibits the disposal by the company of any non-cash assets of 
39 Section 132E( I) provides that:-
"Subject to Section J32F, a company shall not enter into any arrangement or transaction 
with a director of the company or its holding company or with a person connected with 
such a director to acquire from or dispose to such a director or person any non-cash 
assets of the requisite value unless the arrangement or transaction is first approved by a 
resolution of the company in general meeting and also, if the director or connected 
person is a director of its holding company or person connected with such a director, by 
a resolution of the holding company in general meeting." 
Section 132E was inserted into the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) by the Companies 
(Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act 657), s I 0, and subsequently amended by the Companies 
(Amendment) Act, 1992 (Act A836). . . 
40 Section 132E( 1) is pari materia to Sect1on 320(1) of the Compan1es Act, 1985 (UK). Section 
320( 1) of the Companies Act, 1985 (UK) read~ as follows:- . . 
"With the exceptions provided by the section next followmg, a company shall not enter 
into an arrangement-
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the requisite value to a director. Apart from prohibiting such transactions and 
arrangements with directors, the subsection also prohibits such transactions and 
arrangements made with a person connected with a director. In addition, the 
prohibition in Section 132E(l) also extends to such transactions with directors of the 
holding company and persons connected with them. 
The prohibition in Section l32E( l) is not an absolute prohibition. Consequently, such 
transactions may be entered into where the approval of the company in general meeting 
is obtained.41 The Section is founded on the belief that the members of the company 
provide a more effective check on directors' self-dealing than the board of directors, 
who may themselves be distracted by conflict of interest.42 
Some of the key phrases in Section 132E( I) are the phrases 'non-cash assets' and 
'requisite value'. Both of the phrases are defined in the Section. Subsection (7) defines 
'non-cash assets' as meaning any property or interest in property other than cash. Cash 
is specifically defined to include foreign currency. The definition of the phrase 
'requisite value' is more complex. A non-cash asset is defined as being of the 'requisite 
value' if its value is 'not less than ten thousand ringgit but (subject to that) exceeds two 
hundred and fifty thousand ringgit or ten per centum of the company's asset value', at 
(a) whereby a director of the company or its holding company, or a person connected 
with such a director, acquires or is to acquire one or more non-cash assets of the 
requisite value from the company; or 
(b) whereby the company acquires or is to acquire one or more non-cash assets of the 
requisite value from such a director or a person so connected, 
unless the arrangement is first approved by a resolution of the company in general 
meeting and, if the director or connected person is a director of its holding company or a 
person connected with such a director, by a resolution in general meeting of the holding 
company." . . 
41 Where the transaction or arrangement concerns a director of the holdmg company, or a person 
connected with a director of the holding company, the approval of the holding company in 
general meeting is required. · · 
42 Loh, supra note 2, 636; Davies, , P.L., Gower's Principles of Modem Company Law, (6th 
edition, 1997), 636. 
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the time of the arrangement or transaction.43 The definition is rather ambiguous. The 
subsection does not make it clear whether the threshold value is RMlO,OOO or 
RM250,000. The words 'or ten per centum of the company's asset value' add further 
confusion as to which amount should be taken as the threshold. 
Loh Siew Cheang opines that Section 132E(5) should be read as meaning that a non-
cash asset is of the requisite value if it exceeds RM250,000, or 10% of the company's 
asset value, whichever is the lesser.44 Loh further suggests that the 10% of the 
company's asset value should be subject to a minimum amount of RMl0,000.45 
Accordingly, where I 0% of the company's asset value exceeds RM250,000, the 
requisite value would be RM250,000. Where I 0% of the asset value of the company is 
less than RM250,000, the requisite value is I 0% of the company's asset value. If, 
however, I 0% of the company's asset value is less than RM I 0,000, the requisite value 
would be RM 10,000. However, as the legislation itself is ambiguous, it is submitted 
that legislative amendment is necessary to clarify the issue. 
Another key phrase in Section 132E( I) is the phrase 'any arrangement or transaction'. 
The word 'arrangement', in particular, is reflective of the intention that Section 132E 
43 Section !32E(5). The subsection reads as follows:-
"For the purposes of subsection (1), a non-cash asset is of the requisite value if, at the 
time of the arrangement or transaction for the acquisition or disposal of the asset, its 
value is not less than ten thousand ringgit but (subject to that) exceeds two hundred and 
fifty thousand ringgit or ten per centum of the company's asset value, that is-
(a) except in a case falling within paragraph (b), the value of the company's net assets 
determined by reference to the accounts prepared and laid under Part VI in respect of the 
last financial year prior to the arrangement or transaction; or 
(b) where no accounts have been so prepared and laid before that time, the amount of the 
company's called-up share capital." . . 
« Loh s pra note 1 278. In Joint Receivers and Managers of NIItan Carson Ltd v Hawthorne 
[ 1988] B~LC 298, 3'20-1 , Hodgso~ J held that . t~e words 'whic~ever the le_sser' o~ 'w~ichever the 
greater' should be read into the equivalent provisiOn of the English compames legtslatwn. 
45 Loh, supra note I, 278. 
98 
should catch a wide range of transactions other than direct contracts between the 
company and a director.46 
A wide meaning was accorded to the phrase 'any arrangement or transaction' in the case 
of MUI Plaza Sdn Bhd v Hong Leong Bank Bhd.47 In MUI Plaza, Kalamanathan 
Ratnam JC took the view that unity of purpose is required to constitute an 'arrangement 
or transaction' for the purposes of Section 132E. In this case, six tenancies were found 
to constitute an 'arrangement or transaction'. Although the tenancies were to commence 
on different dates, the landlord was the same party, the tenant was the same party and 
the premises were all within the same building. Moreover, the reason for entering into 
the tenancies appeared to be identical. As such, it was found that there was a clear 
unity of purpose, sufficient to constitute an 'arrangement or transaction' within the 
meaning of Section 132E. 
A number of exceptions to the prohibition in Section 132E(I) are listed in Section 
!32F. These include transactions entered into between related companies48 and 
d. fb . ~ transactions made in the or mary course o usmess. 
5.1.2.2 Consequences of contravention 
Section !32E provides for various consequences of a contravention of subsection (I). 
Firstly, the arrangement or transaction is voidable at the instance of the company. 5° 
Nonetheless, if the company in general meeting should choose to ratifY the arrangement 
or transaction, it may do so within a reasonable period.51 This would serve to protect 
the company's interests, as the company may choose to ratifY the arrangement or 
46 Farrar, J.H. and Hannigan, B.M., Farrar's Company Law, (4th edition, 1998), 410. 
47 [1998]6 MLJ 203 . 
-
48 Section 132F(a). 
49 Section 132F(c). 
50 Section 132E(2). 
51 Ibid. 
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transaction if it considers the same to be beneficial. Alternatively, the company may 
avoid any arrangement or transaction which would be detrimental to its interests. 
Secondly, subsection (3) stipulates that the director and the person connected with that 
director who entered into the arrangement or transaction with the company will be 
liable to account for any profits made from the arrangement or transaction. In addition, 
the director and the person connected with him will also be liable to indemnify the 
company for any loss or damage resulting from the arrangement or transaction. The 
subsection also provides that any director who authorised the arrangement shall also be 
liable to the company in the same manner. 
In addition to the civil liability provided for in subsection (3), subsection (6) provides 
for criminal penalties for the contravention of Section 132£. The director, the person 
connected with him and the directors who authorised the arrangement or transaction 
will also be criminally liable for the contravention of Section 132£. 
There appear to be no defences to liability under subsections (3) and (6). The 
equivalent provision in the companies legislation of the United Kingdom makes 
provision for two defences. The first defence applies to situations where C:m 
arrangement is entered into by the company and a person connected with a director. 
That director will not be liable if he can show that he took all reasonable steps to secure 
the company's compliance with Section 132£. The second defence applies to the 
person connected with the director and other directors who authorised the transaction. 
Both these categories of persons can avoid liability by showing that they did not know 
the relevant circumstances constituting the contravention, at the time the arrangement 
was entered into. 
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As noted in Section 5.1.1.1, under Section 133, directors similarly do not have any 
recourse to defences. As with Section 133, it is submitted that such defences would be 
in the interest of justice. The penalties for the contravention of Section l32E are fairly 
severe, particularly as criminal penalties are involve.d. Moreover, persons connected 
with directors may at times be unaware of arrangements made by directors. Similarly, 
other directors who do not benefit from the transaction and who merely authorise the 
transaction at a board meeting may be unaware of the director's interest in the 
transaction, if the defaulting director fails to disclose the true situation. It would seem 
rather harsh to impose criminal penalties on persons such as these. The defences 
provided for by the companies legislation of the United Kingdom would serve to 
protect parties who may be innocently unaware of the contravention from penalties 
which would appear to be undeserved. 
Lastly, Section l32E also allows any member of the company to apply to the courts to 
restrain the company from entering into an arrangement or transaction in contravention 
of Section l32E(l).52 The wording of subsection (4) appears to indicate that the 
application should be made to the courts before the company has entered into the 
arrangement or transaction. Hence, preventative action can be taken to prevent the 
assets of the company from being depleted by errant directors. However, in order to 
take action before the company has entered into the arrangement, the shareholders 
would need to be in a position to discover such a proposed arrangement at an early 
stage. Not all shareholders may have such access to infonnation on the company's 
proposed dealings at a sufficiently early stage. 
The recourse to the courts provided for by subsection ( 4) is particularly beneficial to 
minority shareholders. Although the general meeting is given the power to avoid or to 
52 Section 132E(4). 
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affirm the arrangement or transaction, there may be situations in which minority 
shareholders may envisage that the general meeting would not protect their interests. 
This is particularly so, as the director involved in the transaction may vote as a 
shareholder despite his interest in the transaction. 53 
One of the criticisms of Section 132E is that it is ambiguous in various respects. As 
mentioned above, the definition of the phrase 'requisite value' requires clarification. In 
addition, the Section is also ambiguous as to whether it precludes the board of directors 
from executing a conditional agreement. 54 It is essential that the law laid down by 
Section 132E should be clear and certain, particularly as the penalties for the 
contravention of the Section include criminal penalties.55 As with Section 133, 
legislative intervention for the purpose of addressing these issues would appear to be 
advantageous. 
5.1.3 Transactions Involving Directors and Substantial Shareholders- Section 
132G 
Section !32G56 prohibits specified arrangements and transactions involving the interests 
of directors and substantial shareholders 57 of the company. There is a degree of overlap 
53 Guyler Magruder v Creative Solutions (M) Sdn Bhd [1994] MLJU 107; North-West 
Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty (1877) 12 AC 589. 
54 Koh, supra note 3, xvi; Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, Report on Corporate 
Governance, (February 1999), 159. 
55 The penalties for contravention of Section 132E are imprisonment for five years or thirty 
thousand ringgit or both. The Finance Committee on Corporate Governance suggests that such 
penalties should be substantially increased; Finance Committee on Corporate Govemance,supra 
note 53, 160-1. 
56 Section 132G(l) reads as foilows:-
"Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 132C and 132£, a company shall not enter 
into any arrangement or transaction to acquire the shares or assets of another company 
in which a shareholder or director of the acquiring company, or a person connected to 
such shareholder or director has a substantial shareholding as defined in section 69D 
whether or not for the benefit of such shareholder, director or connected person or for 
any other person unless the arrangement or transaction was entered into three years after 
such shareholder, director or connected person as the case may be, first held shares in 
that other company or after the assets were first acquired by the said company, as the 
case may be. " 
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between the transactions prohibited by Section 132E and those prohibited by Section 
132G. Section 132E came into force on 1 February 1987. Whilst Section l32E helped 
in curbing self-dealing by directors, it was inadequate to restrain the abuse of the 
company's resources by directors and shareholders for personal gain.58 As noted 
earlier, the check imposed on self-dealing by directors by Section l32E, namely the 
approval of the company in general meeting, is not foolproof. Directors, who are 
frequently also shareholders in the company, may use their voting power as 
shareholders to approve a wide range of transactions for their own benefit. 59 
Subsequently, Section 132G was enacted specifically for the protection of the minority 
shareholders.60 Section l32G61 came into force on 10 September 1992. The Section 
covers a wider range of arrangements and transactions. It also contains an absolute 
prohibition against specified transactions. Accordingly, such arrangements and 
transactions cannot be entered into even with the approval of the company in general 
' 
meeting. Subsection ( 1) also specifically asserts the supremacy of Section 132G over 
Section 132E. 
5.1.3.1 The prohibition 
The prohibition in Section 13 2G( 1) essentially involves three entities. The first two 
entities involved are companies. Section 132G( 1) prohibits a company from acquiring 
the shares or assets of another company. For the purposes of this chapter, the first 
company will be referred to as the 'acquiring company'. The second company will be 
51 The phrase 'substantial shareholding' is defined in Section 69D of the Companies Act, 1965 
(Act 125). 
58 Loh, supra note 2, 282-3. 
59 Guyler Magruder v Creative Solutions (M) Sdn Bhd [1994] MLJU I 07; North-West 
Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty (187!). 12 AC 589. The limits as to what may be ratified or 
approved are discussed in greater detali m Chapter 7. 
60 Parliamentary Debates, Dewan Rakyat, Official Report, Eighth Parliament, Second Session, 20 
July, 1992, 52. 
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referred to as the 'target company'. The third entity is the person who links the 
acquiring company to the target company. 
In order to come within the ambit of Section 132G, there must be a substantial 
shareholder or director of the acquiring company who has a substantial shareholding in 
the target company. This also includes persons connected with a substantial 
shareholder or director of the acquiring company, who have a substantial shareholding 
in the target company.62 Thus, the third entity is the substantial shareholder or director 
of the acquiring company, or a person connected with either of them, who has a 
substantial shareholding in the target company. For the purposes of this chapter, this 
person will be referred to as the 'related person'. Each of these three entities must be 
separate entities.63 The case of Actacorp Holdings v Anor64 confirms that Section 132G 
would not cover a situation where the related person is also the acquiring company. 
Subsection (I) prohibits the acquiring company from entering into any arrangement or 
transaction to acquire the shares or assets of the target company, where the related 
person has a substantial shareholding in the target company. The rationale behind this 
prohibition is aptly described by Abdul Aziz Mohamad J:-
"The evil to be avoided by Section 132G is not merely that the first entity 
acquires shares from the second entity. The evil is that the acquisition is at the 
time when there was such a said connection. The mischief arises from such a 
61 Section 132G was inserted into the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) by the Companies 
(Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1992 (Act A836), s26. The Section was subsequently amended by the 
Companies (Amendment) Act, 1993 (Act 845). 
62 Subsection (4) specifies that a person connected with a shareholder or director shall have the 
same meaning as in Section 122A. However, a reference to a member of the shareholder or 
director's family is limited to the spouse and child of the shareholder or director. 
63 Loh, supra note I, 285. 
64 (1993) 3 MSCLC 91 ,010. 
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connection, something which puts a question mark on the integrity of the 
transaction and results in a possible conflict of interests situation. ,,6s 
The prohibition is an absolute prohibition. It is not subject to the approval of the 
general meeting. In addition, this prohibition operates regardless of whether the related 
person obtains any benefit from such an arrangement or transaction. 
The consequences of contravening Section 132G are both civil and criminal in nature. 
Firstly, the arrangement or transaction made in contravention of the Section is void.66 
Subsection (2) also specifies that any consideration given for the shares or assets shall 
be recoverable by the company. Criminal penalties also follow the contravention of 
Section 132G. Subsection (5) stipulates that the acquiring company and every director 
of the acquiring company shall be guilty of an offence. 
It is noted that by virtue of Section 132G(5), every director of the acquiring company is 
criminally liable upon contravention of the Section. This goes further than Sections 
l32E which imposes criminal liability only on the directors involved in the transactions 
and the directors who authorised the impugned transactions.67 Section 132G also does 
not provide for any defences which a director can rely on to avoid liability under 
subsections (2) and (5). This is similar to the criminal liability of directors under 
Section 132E and Section 133, to which there is also no defence. 
5.1.3.2 Exceptions to the prohibition 
The prohibition in subsection (I) does not apply to two categories of arrangements and 
transactions. The first of these is set out in subsection (I). Where an arrangement or 
65 !d. 91 ,021. 
66 Section 132G(2). 
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transaction is entered into 3 years after the related party first held shares in the target 
company, or 3 years after the assets were first acquired by the target company, the 
arrangement or transaction will ,not be caught by the prohibition. 
The time period of 3 years is imposed for the purpose of deterring get-rich-quick 
schemes by directors and substantial shareholders.68 The issue of the computation of 
the 3 year period in relation to the acquisition of shares was considered in Actacorp 
Holdings v Anor.69 The court considered whether the 3 year period should be 
calculated from the time any shares were first held or from the time the substantial 
shares were first held. Abdul Aziz Mohamad J held by way of obiter dicta that the 
period of 3 years should commence from the date on which the substantial shares were 
first held. 
The second category of exceptions is provided for in subsection (6). This subsection 
sets out a number of arrangements and transactions which are exempted from the 
prohibition of Section 132G( 1 ). These include the subscription of new shares in a 
company for cash consideration.70 Also included are arrangements or transactions for 
the acquisition of shares or assets entered into between a holding company and its 
wholly-owned subsidiary.71 The acquisition of any asset, other than shares, in the 
ordinary course of business is also exempted.72 
67 As with Section 132E, Section 133 imposes criminal liability only on directors who approved 
the impugned transactions. 
68 Loh, supra note I, 283. 
69 (1993) 3 MSCLC 91 ,010. 
70 Section 132G(6)(a). 
71 Section 132G(6)(b). 
72 Section 132G(6)(c). 
5.1. 3. 3 Critique 
Section l32G is riddled with difficulties of interpretation.73 Some of the difficulties 
frequently encountered are the scope to be attributed to the phrases 'the shares', 'the 
assets of another company' and 'first held the shares'. These complications are said to 
have had the effect of thwarting some corporate deals.74 In addition, assistance cannot 
be drawn from the companies legislation and case law of Australia and the United 
Kingdom, as the equivalent of Section !32G is not found in their past or present 
legislation. 
Although the cost of transactions has been raised by the statutory prohibition, it has not 
been demonstrated whether there are gains to be made by this provision. 75 The 
prohibition in Section !32G is essentially a prohibition against a certain form of 
arrangement and transactions. Although the intention behind the Section may have 
been to curb abuse of the company's assets and resources by those in control of 
companies, Section 132G makes no mention of the spirit of the law. Instead, it focuses 
on the form of the arrangement or transaction, rather than the substance of it. 
As a consequence, various schemes have been devised by corporate players and their 
legal advisers in order to circumvent the prohibition in Section 132G. For instance, 
parties may attempt to circumvent Section 132G by entering into arrangements or 
transactions through a number of layers of nominees. Whilst these schemes may 
comply with the letter of the law, they may nonetheless contain the essence of what was 
intended to be prohibited, namely the abuse of the company's resources by directors and 
substantial shareholders. 
73 Koh, supra note 2, xvi. 
74 Ibid. 
7~ !d. xvii. 
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On the other hand, it has also been acknowledged that the absolute prohibition with 
respect to Section 132G transactions can sometimes have the effect of capturing 
genuine transactions.76 Thus, it has been suggested that the necessity of the absolute 
prohibition contained in the Section should be reviewed. 
The Australian companies legislation deals with financial benefits to related parties in 
Chapter 2E of the Corporations Law (Australia). In contrast to Section 132G, it is 
expressly stated in Chapter 2E that the economic and commercial substance and effect 
of what the entity has done is to prevail over its legal form. Thus, Chapter 2E focuses 
on the spirit of the law rather than on the form of the transaction. 
ft is suggested that this emphasis on prohibiting the substance of self-dealing rather 
than the form of the transaction may be more effective in deterring self-dealing by 
directors. This would also prevent directors from devising schemes to circumvent the 
prohibition in order to escape from liability. However, it is conceded that an emphasis 
on substance rather than form may leave some uncertainty as to when a transaction 
would fall within the prohibition. 
5.2 Disclosure of Dealings by Directors 
In addition to prohibiting specified transactions, the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) 
also requires the disclosure of specified information by the company or its directors. 
These disclosure requirements exist for a number of reasons. One of the commonly 
cited reasons is the preservation of the integrity of companies and their directors.77 
Disc losure is seen to operate as a deterrent against directors' abuse of their positions. 
Another reason is to provide the public with adequate information about the affairs of 
76 F' C ·tt on Corporate Governance, supra note 53 , 158. 
mance omm1 ee 
the company in order to enable them to make informed decisions about investing in the 
company.78 
As seen in Chapter 3, directors are required to disclose conflicts of interest under the 
common law and Section 131 of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). In addition, the 
disclosure of specified interests is also required under Sections 134, 135, 137 and 169 
. of the Companies Act, I 965 (Act 125). Each of these provisions will be examined in 
greater detail below. 
5.2.1 Sections 134 and 135 
Sections 134 and 13 5 essentially require the disclosure of directors' interests in the 
company. As mentioned in Chapter 3, it is recognised that directors may hold shares in 
the company. Nevertheless, where a director holds shares in the company, there arises a 
possibility of a conflict between his fiduciary duty to the company and his interest as a 
shareholder. In Raja Nong Chik v Public Prosecutor,79 Raja Azlan Shah J (as he then 
was) explained the implica~ions of this potential conflict:-
"The commercial morality expected of company directors is too well-known to 
be reiterated. Directors are expected to observe a high standard of conduct in 
connection with dealings with their own shares. They may buy or sell shares in 
the company in the ordinary course and the fact that they usually know more 
about their company than the other party to the transaction is no bar,· but when 
they do buy or transfer shares, they have to notify the company in writing 
77 !d. 143. 
78 Ibid. 
79 [1 97 1]1 MLJ 190. 
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Section 134( 1) provides that the nature and extent of the directors' interests are required 
to be shown in the register. This includes the number and description of the interests. 87 
The price or other consideration for the transaction as well as the date of the agreement 
for the transaction must also be shown in respect of interests acquired after the director 
accepted the office of a director.88 
The register is to be open for inspection at the registered office of the company. 89 The 
Registrar of Companies as well as any person may request the company for a copy of its 
register.90 The company is also required to produce its register at each annual general 
meeting.91 
The consequences of contravention of this Section are severe. Where the company 
defaults, the company and every officer of the company who is in default are criminally 
liable.92 
5.2.1.2 Section 135 
Section 135 is an essential supplement to Section 134. Section 134 requires the 
company to show the interests of the directors in a register. However, the company 
would not be able to show such interests unless the director makes the particulars 
known to the company. Hence, Section I 35 imposes a duty on directors to notify the 
company in writing of such particulars as are necessary for the company to comply with 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Section 134(5). 
88 Ibid. 
89 Section 134(8). . . . 
90 Section 134(9) and ( 1 0). It is to be noted that a copy of th~ reg1ster w11l be furn1shed to 
persons other than the Registrar subject to the payment of a prescnbed fee. 
91 Section 134( II ). . h . . . . 
92 Section 134( 14 ). The penalty for failure to comply w1t SectiOn 134. IS 1mpnsonmen~ :or t~ree 
years or fifteen thousand ringgit. The penalty for the breach of the eqUivalent UK proVISions 1s a 
fine, rather than imprisonment. 
has been suggested that disclosure should also be made of interests held by directors' 
spouses and children. 102 
5.2.2 Section 137 
5.2.2.1 The rule in Section 137 
Section I 3 7(1) makes unlawful various payments made to directors. 103 Firstly, it makes 
any payment to a director for loss of office or retirement unlawful. Secondly, it also 
makes unlawful any payment to a director made in connection with the transfer of the 
undertaking or property of the company. The rule is conditional. It allows such 
payments to be made on the condition that the particulars concerning the proposed 
payment have been disclosed to the members of the company. In particular, the amount 
of the payment must be disclosed. Further, the proposed payment must have been 
approved by the company in general meeting before such payment can be made. 
The definition of 'director' for the purposes of this Section is wider than the definition 
of 'director' in Section 4 of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). Section 137(7) 
specifies that the term 'director' for the purposes of Section I 37 includes any person 
who has at any time been a director of the company or of a related company. It is also 
to be noted that the duty of disclosure under Section 137 is in addition to the equitable 
duty of disclosure. 104 
The fi rst category of unlawful payments under Section 137(1) is payments made to a 
director by way of compensation for the loss of office as an officer of the company or a 
102 F' C 'tt on Corporate Governance, supra note 53, 157. It is noted that Section mance ommr ee . . 
156 f h C · Act (Cap 50) (Singapore) and Sectton 328 of the Companies Act, 1985 
o t e ompames d h'ldr . dd ' . . (UK) provide for disclosure of interests held by spouses an c 1 en, m a Jtton to disclosure of 
interests held by directors. · . 
1o3 s· .1 . . ~ound 1·n Sections 312 and 313 of the Compames Act, 1985 (UK) un1 ar provisions are 11 • 
104 Section 13 7( 6). 
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subsidiary. Payments made to a director as consideration for, or in connection with his , 
retirement from such office are also included in this category of payments. 
The making of such payments by the board of directors to one of the directors is 
potentially affected by a conflict of interest. Directors could easily be tempted to 
compromise the interest of the company in the hope that they would themselves receive 
such benefits in the future. In view of this potential conflict of interest, the rule against 
making such payments, unless the approval of the members is obtained, appears to be a 
prudent safeguard of the company's interest. 
Not every payment made to a director upon cessation of his employment with the 
company would fall within the Section. 105 Severance benefits may be given to a 
director as part of his remuneration package. Such benefits are paid as part of the 
director's remuneration rather than with the object of compensating the director for loss 
of office or as consideration for his retirement. Accordingly, the benefits would not 
come within Section 137(1). 106 
The second category of unlawful payments under Section 13 7( 1) is the payment to any 
director of the company made in connection with the transfer of the whole or any part 
of the undertaking or property of the company. In negotiations for the sale of the 
company's undertaking or property, it is essential that directors should act solely in the 
interest of the company. If directors were permitted to receive payment from the 
purchaser in relation to such a sale, directors may be tempted to act in their own interest 
rather than in the interest of the company. 
10s Grinsted v Britannia Brands (Holdings) Pte Ltd [1996] 2 SLR 97; Lincoln Mills (A ustralia) 
Ltd v Gough (1964] VR 193. 
106 Ibid 
It is noted that the rule appears to extend to payments made by any person or entity. 
What is essential is that the payments should be made to a director of the company in 
connection with the transfer of the company's undertaking or property. As with the first 
category, the rule is conditional. Thus, if details of the proposed payment are disclosed 
to shareholders of the company and approved, such payments can be made to the 
director. It is assumed that such disclosure to shareholders would deter directors from 
preferring their own interest over the interest of the company. 
If any payment is made to a director contrary to Section 137(1), the payment is deemed 
to be received by that director in trust for the company. 
5.2.2.2 Exceptions to the rule 
Various payments are excluded from the rule in subsection ( 1 ). These exclusions are 
set out in subsection (5). Payments which are permitted include any bona fide payment 
107 by way of damages for breach of contract. A company may also make payments to 
directors under an agreement, provided that particulars of the same have been disclosed 
to the members and approved by special resolution. 108 Bona fide payments by way of 
· f · 1 · 1o9 pension or lump sum payment m respect o past services are a so permitted. 
However, the value of the pension or payment must not exceed the total emoluments of 
the director within the 3 years immediately preceding his retirement. 11 0 In addition, 
payment may also be made pursuant to an agreement made prior to the director 
becoming a director of the company. This payment should form part of the 
. d' II I 
consideration for the director agreemg to serve as a 1rector. 
101 Section 137(5)( c). A similar exception is found in Section 316(3) of the Companies Act, 1985 
(UK). 
108 Section 137(5)(b). . 
109 A . .
1 
· · ~ound in Section 316(3) of the Compames Act, 1985 (UK). Simi ar exceptiOn IS t' 
11 0 Section 137(5)(d). 
11 1 Section 137(5)(e). 
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First of all, the directors' report should contain particulars of the directors interests in 
accordance with the register kept pursuant to Section 134. 115 The report should reveal 
the total number of shares and debentures of the company, or a related company, which 
have been bought or sold by the director during that year. 1 16 
Secondly, where the company is a party to any arrangement with the object of enabling 
a director to acquire any benefit to shares or debentures of the company, or any other 
body corporate, disclosure must be made of the arrangement. 117 This includes 
situations where the benefit to the shares or debentures may be held by nominees of 
directors. 
The third category of interests would be the benefits received by directors by reason of 
a contract with the company or a related company. 118 This also includes benefits which 
directors are entitled to receive by reason of such a contract. These contracts need not 
be made directly with the directors. Contracts made with a firm of which the director is 
a member, or a company in which he has substantial financial interests, must also be 
made known . The directors are required to state the general nature of the benefit 
conferred by the contract in their report. Nonetheless, benefits such as emoluments or 
salary received by the directors which are shown in the accounts need not be disclosed. 
Disclosure must also be made in the profit and loss accounts of various interests. In 
particular, the amounts of fees and other emoluments paid to directors by the company 
or its subsidiaries as remuneration must be stated in the profit and loss accounts. 119 
11 s Section 169(6)(g). A similar provision is found in Sect~on 234 of the Companies Act, 1985 (UK) which is read together with Schedule 7 of the Compames Act, 1985 (UK). 
116 Section 169(6)(g)(iii). 
11 7 Section 169(6)(t). 
11 8 Section 169(8). -
11 9 Items ( o ), Ninth Schedule, Companies Act, 1965 (Act 12) ). 
Any compensation paid to directors for loss of office and any pension should also be 
included. 120 
Where benefits are given to directors otherwise than in cash by the company or a 
subsidiary, the estimated money value of these benefits should also be stated in the 
profit and loss accounts. 
Lastly, amounts paid to a third party in respect of services provided by a director to the 
company or a subsidiary must also be disclosed. 121 This requirements also extends to 
services provided by a past director of the company. 
5.2.4 Tlte Effectiveness of Disclosure 
As seen above, the Companies Act, 1965 (Act I 25) requires disclosure of various 
interests of directors which may potentially give rise to conflicts of interests. These 
disclosure requirements are based on the notion that transparency promotes fidelity. 
Disclosure is seen to operate as a deterrent against directors breaching their fiduciary 
duties to the company. 
Disclosure by itself is not sufficient to prevent misconduct by directors. What is 
equally crucial is the information which is required to be disclosed. The information 
that directors should disclose should be information that would expose any infidelity of 
directors towards the company. Disclosure of information which is irrelevant for these 
purposes is as good as non-disclosure. On the other hand, requiring disclosure of 
excessive information may incur substantial costs. The optimum position would be to 
120 Ibid . 
121 Item (p), Ninth Schedule, Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). Similar provisions are found in 
Section 232 and Schedule 6 of the Companies Act, 1985 (UK). 
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require disclosure of relevant information, that is, disclosure of information that would 
be likely to curb abuses by directors. 
It remains to be seen whether the disclosure requirements of the Companies Act, 1965 
(Act 125) fall within this optimum position. It is noted, however, that the disclosure 
provisions of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange listing requirements have recently 
been amended so as to enhance disclosure in respect of related party transactions. 122 
Perhaps it would be prudent to similarly examine the effectiveness of the disclosure 
requirements under the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) in order to ensure that they will 
produce the optimum result. This is so, particularly in view of the increasing separation 
between the ownership and control of the company. In a substantial number of 
companies, shareholders frequently have little knowledge of the day to day dealings of 
the company. 123 Hence, there is a need to require disclosure of the company's dealings, 
so as to enable shareholders to exercise some measure of informed control of the 
company. 
rt is also noted that the penalties for non-compliance of these disclosure requirements 
are essentially criminal. 124 Accordingly, there is no provision for civil consequences, 
even where there is intentional or reckless failure to disclose. Similarly, there are no 
civil consequences for misleading or deceptive statements. It has been suggested that 
civil consequences should follow the failure to comply with disclosure requirements in 
such circumstances.125 In particular, it is submitted that shareholders should be allowed 
122 Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and Price Waterhouse Coopers, Comorate Governance: 1998 
Survey of Institutional Groups, ( 1998), 35. 
123 Brudney, v., Clark, R.C., 'A New Look at Corporate Opportunities', (1981) 94 Harvard Law 
Rev iew 997, I 003 . . . 
124 There are only criminal penalties for breaches of SectiOns 134, 135 and 169. Section 137, 
however, provides that any amounts pai~ i~ contra:ention of. Section 137are ?eemed to be held 
by the director on trust. Hence, limited CIVIl remedies are available under Section 137. 
125 Finance Committee on Corporate Gove~~ce, supra ?ote 53, 147. The Australian Senate 
St d. C mmittee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs has also recommended that civil an mg o . 1 . l' penalties be provided for in the companies legis atwn tOr breaches of directors' duties. The 
to recover damages against directors where the directors' misleading or deceptive 
statements have resulted in loss. 126 Such civil liability may also result in stricter 
policing by shareholders of the directors' compliance with the disclosure requirements. 
It would also operate as an incentive to directors to ensure that the disclosure 
requirements are complied with. 
5.3 The Companies Legislation of Australia and the United Kingdom 
A perusal of the companies legislation of Australia and the United Kingdom reveals 
that the provisions of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) have a narrower ambit than 
the provisions regulating self-dealing by directors in Australia and the United Kingdom. 
In particular, the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) fails to cover a number of transactions 
involving directors' self-dealing. 
The Companies Act, 1985 (UK), for instance, restricts transactions such as quasi-
loans 127 and credit transactions, 128 in addition to loans. It also deals with arrangements 
which circumvent the prohibition on the making of loans to directors. 129 For example, a 
company must not arrange for the assignment to it, or the assumption by it, of any 
rights, obligations or liabilities under a transaction which would have been prohibited if 
it had been entered into by the company.13° Companies are also prohibited from taking 
part in any arrangement in which another person enters into a transaction which would 
Committee recommended that in appropriate circumstances, people suffering loss as a result of 
the breaches should be allowed to bring claims for damages; Australian Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, The Cooney Report, (November 1989); Sheikh, 
s. and Chatterjee, s.K., 'Perspectives on Corporate Governance', In Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, (Ed. Sheikh, S. and Rees, W.), (1995), 52· 
126 Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, supra note 53, 147. 
127 Section 330(3) of the Companies Act, I 985 (UK). 
128 Section 330(4) of the Companies Act, 1985 (UK). 
129 Sections 330(6) and (7) of the Companies Act, I 985 (UK). 
130 Section 330(6) of the Companies Act, 1985 (UK). 
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have been a prohibited loan, quasi-loan, credit transaction, guarantee, security or 
assignment, if it had been entered into by the company. 131 
Australia has in Chapter 2E of the Corporations Law (Australia) also introduced 
provisions prohibiting the giving of financial benefits to related parties of public 
companies. Section 243H(I) 132 prohibits the giving of financial benefits to related 
parties, except as permitted by the legislation.133 As such, it catches not merely a few 
specified transactions, but rather all such transactions which are not expressly excluded. 
This is clearly a much wider provision than the existing provisions of the Companies 
Act, 1965 (Act 125). 
Apart from including directors and persons connected with directors, Chapter 2E 
defin es related parties as including entities who were related parties at any time within 
the previous 6 months.134 Entities likely to become a related party at a future time are 
also related parties.135 In addition, the definition of related parties also includes entities 
act ing in concert with the recipient of the benefit in respect of the giving of the 
fi nancial benefit. 136 Thus, the definition of related parties under Chapter 2E of the 
Corporations Law is much wider than the equivalent definition under Section 122A of 
the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). This wider definition of related parties is likely to 
131 Section 330(7) of the Companies Act, I985 (UK) .. 
132 Section 243 H(I) of the Corporations Law (Australia) reads as follows:-
"A public company must not give a financial benefit to a related party except as permitted 
by Division 4 or 5." . . 
IJ3 It is noted that Part 9.48 of the Corporations Law (Australia). prov1des for specified civil 
consequences of contravention of Section 243H( I) of the CorporatiOns ~aw (Australia). These 
include pecuniary penalties to be paid to the Commonw~alth, compensat1~n to the ~ompany for 
I d Suffiered. Section I 3 I 7HA CorporatiOns Law (Australia). Sectwn I 317HD any oss or amage , · . . 
·d c nt to the company for any profit gamed by the person m breach. It is to be prov1 es 10r an accou . . . . 
noted that these consequences are in add1t10n .to and not m der?gatwn of any other rule of law 
I . d. S tl'on I 3 I 7HE CorporatiOns Law (Australia). re atmg to 1rectors; ec . 
134 Section 243F(2) of the Corporations Law (Austrai~a). 
m Section 243F(3) of the Corporations Law (Australia) .. 
136 Section 243F(5)(b) of the Corporations Law (Australia). 
be more effective in dealing with transactions made by directors through layers of 
nominees. 
Section 243G( 1) of Chapter 2E of the Corporations Law (Australia) also states that the 
prohibition against the giving of financial benefits is intended to operate broadly. The 
giving of financial benefits is expressly stated to include financial benefits given 
indirectly. Examples of financial benefits include the forgiving of a debt, the leasing of 
assets, services given or acquired, the issuance of securities and the granting of 
• 
137 h h 'I . b options. T e Chapter com pre ens1ve y covers vanous enefits and the ways in 
which benefits may be conferred. Further, the economic and commercial substance and 
effect of what the entity has done is to prevail over its legal form. 138 Such a provision 
deals with the spirit of the law. Consequently, it leaves little room for manipulation of 
transactions in order to circumvent the prohibitions on self-dealing. Nevertheless, such 
a provision arguably provides less clear parameters within which directors can operate, 
as compared with the existing Malaysian statutory provisions. It is also arguable that 
such a provision may at times catch transactions which were not calculated to grant a 
benefit to a director or a party related to him. 
1t is submitted that the provisions of Chapter 2E of the Corporations Law (Australia) 
are more effective in curbing self-dealing by directors than the existing provisions of 
the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). In particular, Chapter 2E deals not only with self-
dealings that are obviously in breach of fiduciary duties, but also with the more subtle 
schemes which enable directors to procure benefits for themselves. 
137 Section 2430( 4 ). In addition, Section 243G(3 ~ expressly mentions that benefits that do not 
· 1 h t f oney can still be financial benefits for the purposes of Chapter 2E as mvo vet e paymen o m , 
long as the benefit confers some financial advantage. 
138 Section 2430(2). 
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The comparison with provisions of the companies legislation of Australia and the 
United Kingdom reveals that the Companies Act, 1965 (Act I 25) fails to deal with 
many forms of indirect self-dealing. A shrewd director may not be deterred by the 
prohibitions and restrictions contained in the Companies Act, 1965 (Act I25). He may, 
instead, resort to various schemes to circumvent these prohibitions and restrictions. As 
a consequence, directors may indirectly be encouraged to disguise breaches of fiduciary 
duty such that they are more difficult to detect. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the purpose of the prohibitions and 
disclosure requirements of the Companies Act, I 965 (Act I 25) is the reinforcement of 
fiduciary principles. These objectives can be said to have been achieved if the 
provisions of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) have contributed to the deterrence of 
misconduct on the part of directors. However, if errant directors are merely encouraged 
to disguise their self-dealing and make such self-dealing harder to detect, the objective 
of the provisions is undeniably defeated. 
This is a result which is opposed to the purpose of the statutory provisions relating to 
directors' self-dealing. It calls for a re-examination of the provisions of the Companies 
Act, 1965 (Act 125) with a view to addressing the weaknesses of the provisions. The 
need for re-examination is especially pertinent with regard to the provisions prohibiting 
or restricting various transactions and arrangements involving self-dealing. Such need 
for legislative reform to address the gaps in the existing statutory provisions has been 
139 
recognised by the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance. 
139 . C orate Governance, supra note 53, 121-2. mm1ttee on orp 
5.4 Proposals for Legislative Reform 
In its Report on Corporate Governance issued in February 1999, the Finance Committee 
on Corporate Governance noted various instances of corporate abuse, which were 
observed particularly during the recent economic crisis. They included related party 
transactions, asset shifting as well as blatant and abusive conflict of interest 
transactions without proper disclosure by directors. 140 The Committee attributed these 
corporate abuses partly to ineffective corporate governance structures. 141 
Similar observations have been made by the Australian Companies and Securities 
Advisory Committee in respect of the Australian corporate scene. In July 1991, the 
Companies and Securities Advisory Committee acknowledged in its report that the lack 
of specific provisions in the Corporations Law (Australia) had allowed corporate 
controllers to abuse their positions of trust. 142 This, too, was done by various means of 
shifting of assets away from companies into their own hands. It was also noted that at 
that time, these arrangements and transactions were not specifically regulated by the 
C . 1. ) 143 orporatwns Law (A ustra 1a . 
As a result the Australians repealed Section 234 of the Corporations Law 
' 
(Australia), 144 which is pari materia to Sections 133 and 133A of the Companies Act, 
I 965 (Act 125), in 1994. In addition, Chapter 2E of the Corporations Law (Australia) 
was enacted. The basic principle of Chapter 2E is that 'uncommercial' transactions with 
related parties should be referred to disinterested shareholders before the transactions 
140 ld 42-3. 
141 Ibid . 
142 C . d S ·t 'es Advisory Committee, Report on the Reform of the Law Governing ompan1es an ecun 1 
Corporate Financial Transactions, July 1991 · 
143 lb'd 
144 
1
. · th C orations Law (Australia) at the relevant time did not contain the It IS noted that e orp . _ 
. . 132E and I32G ofthe Companies Act, 1965 (Act 12)). equivalent of Sectwns 
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take place.145 As discussed above, Chapter 2E catches a much wider range of 
transactions, including those from which directors derive benefit through indirect 
means. Such provisions appear to be more effective in reinforcing fiduciary principles 
than the present provisions of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). 
Notably, however, the Australian reforms apply only to public companies. Hence, a 
higher standard is required of public companies than private companies in Australian 
company law. This leads to the question as to whether there are valid reasons for 
imposing higher standards on public companies with regard to self-dealing. 
5.4.1 Public Companies v Private Companies 
An examination of whether there is a greater need for stricter regulation of self-dealings 
in public companies is facilitated by a brief comparison between public and private 
companies. Public companies generally have larger numbers of shareholders than 
private companies. 146 A significant number of Malaysian public companies are 
companies listed on the stock exchange. Public listed companies frequently have fairly 
large numbers of shareholders, many of whom regard their shareholding as 
investments, 147 leaving the management of the company to others. Hence, in these 
situations, there would be a separation between the ownership and the control of the 
145 The Explanatory Memorandum for the Corporate Law Reform Bill I 992 (Aus~alia), para 2 I 3. 
146 A . ·s restri'cted to a maximum of fifty shareholders by Section 15(1) of the pnvate company 1 
Companies Act, I 965 (Act 125). . . , 
147 Griffiths, A. , 'Shareholding and the Go~emance of Pubhc Companies, In C~morate 
G d C 
ate Control, (Ed. Sheikh, S. and Rees, W.), (I 995), 59; Miles, L., 
overnance an ornor . · d' 1 "M" ~ · , 
P G 
'U · shareholders in pubhc companies: 1a tOr motivate?, (2000) 21 
roctor, ., nrespons1ve 
The Company Lawver 142, I42-3. 
148 
company. The control of the company would frequently be exercised by a few 
substantial shareholders. 149 
In contrast, the number of shareholders of private companies is restricted. 150 In 
addition, many shareholders would often be involved in managing the company, 151 or 
would have the means of monitoring the dealings of the company .152 Hence, in private 
companies ownership and control are far more closely linked than in public 
companies. 153 Nonetheless, despite these differences between private and public 
companies, company law imposes the same requirements on both types of companies 
with regard to self-dealing. 
It is submitted that there is a greater need for regulation of self-dealing in public 
companies, in view of the greater separation between ownership and control in public 
companies. In particular, shareholders in public companies are less likely to be 
involved in the management of the company. Consequently, they may not be aware of 
transactions involving self-dealing. Even where they might suspect that a transaction 
involves self-dealing, they may not have access to sufficient information to verify their 
148 Pennington notes that it is rare for a director of a public company to hold a majority of its 
issued share capital; Pennington, R.R. , Company Law, (7th edition, 1995), I 024. 
149 Farrar, supra note 45 , 9; Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, supra note 53, 62. 
1 ~ 0 Section 15( 1) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). 
1 ~ 1 Griffiths, supra note 146, 58-59. Pennington, supra note 147, 1025; Miles, supra note 146, 
142. 
1 ~ 2 According to Professors Brudney and Clark, investors in private companies are fairly small in 
number and tend to know one another. They are likely to be active participants rather than mere 
passive contributors of funds, and are likely to be more familiar with the affairs of the company 
and have better access to information. They can consent in a more meaningful way to diversions 
of corporate assets by fellow participants, and accordingly have less need of restrictions on such 
diversions· Brudney supra note 122, 1022; Miles, supra note 146, 142. 
13 ' ' 3 Miles, supra note 146, 142. 
suspicions. As such, they would be unable to ascertain whether there has been self-
dealing and to seek redress for their grievance. I 54 
The increase in separation between ownership and control coupled with the 
development of increasing elaborate structures among modern companies also arguably 
increases the potential for self-dealing. As mentioned in Chapter 2, these 
conglomerates, which are commonly found among public companies, often engage in 
transactions within the conglomerate. These transactions at times involve tenns more 
favourable to a party than ordinary 'arm's-length' commercial transactions for the reason 
that the parties are frequently related companies. The complex relations between 
companies in a conglomerate may often create difficulty for shareholders attempting to 
monitor the company's transactions. Transactions involving self-dealing by directors 
may slip by unnoticed among these transactions. 
These issues would seem to indicate that there is a greater potential for self-dealing to 
remain undetected in public companies. Accordingly, there would be a greater 
necessity for regulation of self-dealing in relation to public companies. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the developments in the modern company call for the adaptation of the 
directors' duties to the changing needs of the company. As seen above, the public 
company bears a greater similarity to the modern company discussed in Chapter 2. In 
contrast, the private company would appear to be more similar to the traditional 
company. 
154 Professors Brudney and Clark opine that the ability of shareho~ders of. public com~a_nies to 
monitor the behaviour of the officers of the company is nearly as meffective as the ability of a 
beneficiary to monitor the trustee. Consequently, the rules needed .to protect dispersed 
shareholders of public companies against the te~d~ncy o.f officers t? divert corporate assets 
should be as rigorous as those that protect beneficiaries agamst trustees efforts to make personal 
us o£ tn Kt l:~~tJ: ' Bmdnev. s.u"'r-""a""'n..,.,Qt=e....:.l.::..22....:.._1_02_3_. -~------------------
Nonetheless, the differences between public and private compames are further 
complicated by the fact that public companies frequently have subsidiaries which are 
private companies. And it is through these private company subsidiaries that public 
companies often conduct a substantial part of their business. As such, although these 
private companies may have few shareholders, they operate as an extension of the 
public companies. Thus, shareholders of the public companies which have private 
company subsidiaries would still encounter the same problems of separation of 
ownership and control highlighted above. It is, therefore, submitted that the same need 
for regulation of self-dealing arises with these subsidiaries of public companies. 155 
From the above, it is evident that there are significant differences between public and 
private companies. Nonetheless, the provisions of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) 
relating to sel f-dealing by directors apply uniformly to both public and private 
companies despite pertinent differences between the two types of companies. It would 
appear that the provisions of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) should be re-examined 
in view of the significant practical differences between public and private companies. 
5.5 Conclusion 
It is submitted that the inadequacies of the existing statutory provisions governing self-
dealing by directors warrant legislative reform in order to address these issues. As seen 
in earl ier chapters, the legislative provisions do not provide clarification to the 
ambigui ties of the equitable no-conflict and no-profit rules. Other inadequacies of the 
statutory provisions have been highlighted earlier in this chapter. One of the most 
155 It is noted that Section 243 H(2) of the Corporations Law (Australia) prohibits the giving of a 
financia l benefit by a child entity of a public company to a related party. The Section states the 
fo llowing:-
"A child entity of a public company must not give a financial benefit to a related party of 
the public company except as permitted by Division 4 or 5. ': . . . 
Hence, it recognises that pub lic companies also act through the1r subsJdianes. 
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pertinent of these is that the statutory provisions prohibiting specified transactions and 
arrangements involving self-dealing fail to deal with various schemes, allowing 
directors to engage in self-dealing indirectly. 
In addition, the problems raised by the separation of ownership and control, particularly 
in relation to public companies and their subsidiaries, heighten the need for legislative 
reform. The increase in separation between ownership and control in public companies 
and their subsidiaries calls for greater disclosure of dealings by those in control of the 
company. It also warrants stricter regulation of self-dealing than in traditional private 
companies, as there is a greater potential for self-dealing. 156 
Nonetheless, in considering a reform of legislative provisions relating to self-dealing, a 
number of factors should be borne in mind. Firstly, the trend in Australia and the 
United Kingdom 157 towards stricter regulation of self-dealing has reflected a shift in 
power from directors to shareholders. By shifting the responsibility for such 
transactions to shareholders, shareholders are indirectly cajoled into behaving more like 
156 It is subm itted that the need for greater regulation of public companies and their subsidiaries 
in relation to se lf-dealing has been recognised by the Securities Commission. Chapter 20 of the 
Policies and Guidelines on Issue/Offer of Securities issued by the Securities Commission imposes 
additional requirements on listed public companies and their subsidiaries in relation to related-
party transactions. These include disclosure of details of the transaction including particulars of 
the nature and extent of the interest of the related party in the transaction, an independent 
valuation of the assets involved and an opinion by an independent corporate adviser as to whether 
the transaction is fa ir and reasonable so far as the shareholders of the company are concerned. 
The sanctions which may be imposed on directors for failure to comply with the provisions are 
caution letters, reprimands, prohibition of dealing in the company's securities held by the relevant 
director, recommendation that the director be removed from office, and prosecution under the 
provisions of the Securities Commiss ion Act 1993 {Act 498) or the Securities Industry Act 1983 
(Act 280). It is noted that these sanctions do not include restitutionary remedies which may be 
pursued by the company against errant directors. In contrast, the remedies provided for by 
existing statutory provisions relating to self-dealing include ~ndemnities to the company for any 
loss (Section 132E(3) and Section 133(3) of the Compan1es Act, 1965 (Act 125)), for the 
transaction to be avoided (Section J32E(2) and Section 132G( I) of the Companies Act, 1965 
(Act 125)) and for recovery of the amount of the loan, guarantee or security made in 
contravention of the provisions (Section 133(5) and Section I33A(3) of the Companies Act, 1965 
(Act 125)). Hence, it is subm itted that legislative reform along the lines of Chapter 20, but 
providing for wider remedies such as those available under the Companies Act, 1965 {Act 125), 
should be considered. 
157 Griffiths, supra note 146, 69-7 1. 
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the owners of private property. 158 This appears to deal with the issue of separation 
between the ownership and control of companies. This also arguably has the effect of 
reducing the potential for self-dealing by directors who would otherwise have control 
over the companies' assets relatively free from the scrutiny of shareholders. 
However, shifting the power to authorise these transactions from directors to 
shareholders is not a panacea. In public companies, shareholders are unlikely to act as 
a cohesive body.159 As a consequence, shareholders who own a controlling stake in the 
company may be able to determine the outcome of the general meeting. Shareholders 
owning small stakes in the company may be unable to exercise significant influence 
through their votes in such circumstances. As the directors are often likely to be the 
nominees of controlling shareholders, the shift of power to shareholders may not prove 
to be a deterrence against self-dealing. 
In addition, the company is an entity with an infinite life-span. Its shareholders are 
likely to be motivated by shorter-term considerations, and may not attach significant 
value to profits arising in the distant future .160 Hence, although shifting the power to 
authorise transactions involving potential self-dealing may lessen the potential for 
directors to appropriate company's property for themselves, it raises other problems. 
Secondly, it should also be borne in mind that greater restrictions on corporate 
transactions may have the effect of stifling corporate entrepeneurship and activity.161 It 
is essential that a healthy balance should be maintained between regulations aimed at 
1 ~ 8 /d. 71. 
1 ~9 Ibid. 
160 /d. 73. For this reason, Griffiths argues that more is required that merely regulating the 
ex isting system of governance, or shifting the balance of power within companies. He argues that 
alternative governance structures should be considered, and that the company should not be 
treated as a permanent and unchangeable fixture, but should be reviewed as an integral part of the . 
corporate governance problem. 
161 Barrock, L. , 'The unfortunate minorities', The Edge, 18 September 2000. 
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deterring abuse of position by directors on the one hand, and the encouragement of 
corporate activity on the other hand. 
Thirdly, in considering the regulations of other jurisdictions with a view to amending 
our local regulations, it should be borne in mind that the local culture and corporate 
conditions may vary from the conditions in other jurisdictions. Accordingly, what is 
appropriate for other jurisdictions may not necessarily be appropriate to our local 
conditions. 
In conclusion, it is evident that the current statutory provisions governing self-dealing 
are in need of reform. Nevertheless, it is equally important that any statutory 
amendments be carefully considered in the light of the considerations mentioned above. 
In particular, care must be taken to avoid over-regulation and the stifling of corporate 
entrepeneurship and activity. And given that our local corporate conditions may differ 
from that of other jurisdictions, the more recent developments in the statutory 
provisions of other jurisdictions should not be adopted without first carefully 
considering the applicability of such restrictions to the Malaysian corporate scene. 
11 1 
CHAPTER 6 - CASE STUDIES 
Controversies involving the issue of directors' self-dealing were the focal point of much 
discussion during the economic downturn of 1997. Self-dealing by directors continues 
to be an issue frequently debated. It is now recognised that some measures must be 
taken to address the problem of self-dealing in order to promote investor confidence in 
Malaysian companies.' Generally these measures include greater corporate governance 
and more disclosure and transparency in corporate dealings.2 In earlier chapters, a 
number of specific issues concerning the law relating to self-dealing have been 
canvassed. 
Various corporate transactions have attracted criticism on the grounds that they have 
involved self-dealing by directors. A few examples of these transactions will be 
examined below in the light of the law governing self-dealing by directors. It is in 
examining these transactions that some of the shortcomings of the fiduciary duties and 
legis lation discussed in earlier chapters are brought to light. Similarly, the examination 
of these situations illustrates and emphasises the need for reform of the existing rules 
on self-dealing. 
6.1 A Berhad 's Acquisition of the Shares of B Berhad 
The fi rst example to be examined involved the acquisition by A Berhad of a substantial 
num ber of the shares of B Berhad. Among the controversial aspects of the transaction 
were the fact that B Berhad was, at the time of the acquisition, a major shareholder of A 
1 Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, Report on Cornorate Governance, (February 
1999), 43; Wong, S.N., 'Ensuring A Sustainable Economic Recovery: The Role of the Capital 
Market', Forum Ekonomi Bersama Tenaga Pengajar Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur 26 July 
2000. 
2 Ibid. 
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Berhad. Accordingly, the transaction was perceived as a bailout of a major shareholder 
at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Significantly, one of the directors of B Berhad was also a director of A Berhad. This 
director also had a substantial shareholding in B Berhad. Hence, the issue of self-
dealing arose. Notably, the acquisition was made on the open market. As such, it 
appeared unlikely that such a transaction would come within the ambit of Sections 
132E and 132G of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). Section 132E regulates 
transactions where the company purchases property from a director or a person 
connected with a director. In the case of Section 132G, the provision also extends to 
purchases from a company in which a director or substantial shareholder or persons 
connected with them have substantial shareholdings. A purchase on the open market 
would be unlikely to be caught by these provisions, without evidence of purchase from 
such persons. 
The fiduciary no-profit rule and no-conflict rule are, however, wider than the legislative 
provisions. As regards the no-profit rule, it would need to be shown that the director 
concerned obtained a profit by virtue of his position as a director. Arguably, the 
director concerned may be seen as having obtained an indirect profit or benefit through 
the acquisition, as it would have had a positive influence on the market price of the 
shares in B Berhad. Nevertheless, the profit accrued to the director was indirect, and it 
is questionable how direct the profit should be for the purposes of this rule. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, there remains some uncertainty as to whether the stricter 
construction of the no-profit rule should be applied or the more liberal approaches. As 
regards the issue of how direct the profit should be in order to attract the application of 
the rule, again there does not appear to be any hard and fast rule. Case law on the no-
profit rule has generally concerned profit obtained directly, such as purchases made by 
the company from a director which resulted in him obtaining a profit. However, the 
limits as to how direct the profit should be does not appear to have been clearly defined. 
Th is appears to highlight the ambiguity or uncertainty of the fiduciary principles, which 
are generally wider in ambit than the legislative provisions, but less precise. 
As for the no-conflict rule, fiduciary principles preclude directors from acting in a 
manner which will bring their personal interest into conflict with the company's 
interest. Case law indicates that the rule will apply to a possible conflict that is real and 
sensible, rather than theoretical and abstract.3 As with the no-profit rule, there arises 
the issue of how direct a personal interest the director should have in the matter before 
he can be said to have a conflict of interest with the company. 
6.2 C Berhad's Disposal ofD Sdn Bhd 
Another example of a controversial corporate transaction involved the disposal by C 
Berhad of 0 Sdn Bhd. The entire share capital of 0 Sdn Bhd, consisting of a few 
million shares of RMI each, was sold by C Berhad for the sum of RMl. This value 
was said to have been arrived at after considering 0 Sdn Bhd's financial position at the 
time. 
Nonetheless observers noted that 0 Sdn Bhd had several lucrative businesses. The sale , 
was made to a company connected to a former director of C Berhad. Notably, this 
director had resigned from C Berhad shortly before the transaction took place. 
Accordingly, the transaction was perceived as a 'golden handshake' to the former 
director. 
3 Boardman v Phipps [ 1967] 2 AC 46; Queensland Mines Ltd v Hudson (1978) 18 ALR I. 
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A perusal of the legislative provisions on self-dealing would reveal that this transaction 
was unlikely to have been caught by the provisions of the Companies Act, 1965. As the 
fonner director was no longer a director of the company at the time of the transaction, 
Section 132E would not be applicable. The Section deals with disposals made to 
directors of the company, and does not include persons who were recently directors of 
the company.4 
Section 13 7 would also not apply to this transaction as the Section deals with payments 
made to a director. Although, subsection ( 4) refers to any valuable consideration given 
to a director, it appears to apply only to situations where a director's office is abolished 
or he retires in connection with a transfer of all or any of the shares of the company as a 
result of an offer made to shareholders. 
As for the fiduciary rules, whether the no-profit rule would extend to this situation 
would depend on how the rule is interpreted. If the stricter interpretation for which 
Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver5 has been cited as authority is followed, arguably this 
transaction would not be caught by the no-profit rule. The person in question here was 
no longer a director at the time of the transaction. Accordingly, the implied temporal 
limitation of the no-profit rule espoused in Regal Hastings would relieve the fonner 
director from the obligation to account for a profit, as he had resigned from the 
fiduciary office prior to the time of the transaction.6 However, according to the more 
liberal interpretations of the no-profit rule as reflected in the cases of Industrial 
Developmenr Consultants v Coole/ and Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O'Malley, 8 the 
former director may arguably be required to account for any profit made. Once again, it 
4 In contrast, the Australian provisions include perso~s who were direc~ors at any time within the 
previous six months; Section 243F(2) of the CorporatiOns Law {Australia). 
s [1942] I AllER 378. . . . ~ 
6 Ford, H.A.J. and Austin, R.P. , Principles ofCorporattons Law, (7th edttiOn, 199:>), 320. 
7 [1972] 2 All ER 162. 
----------------------------------------------------------1 ~--------~ 
is shown that the uncertainty surrounding the application of the fiduciary principle 
causes difficulty both for the shareholders as well as the fiduciary in discerning the 
limits of their respective rights and obligations. 
6.3 E Berhad's Acquisition of Land from F Sdn Bhd 
Another transaction involved the acquisition of land by E Berhad from F Sdn Bhd. The 
land was purchased by E Berhad for a few million ringgit. Both companies had 
common directors. The sale was subsequently aborted. 
One of the grounds on which the transaction was criticised was that it could have been 
construed as a loan to one of the directors. It was noted that an unusually large 
proportion of the purchase price was paid to F Sdn Bhd as a deposit for the purchase. 
Further, despite the fact that the deal was subsequently aborted, F Sdn Bhd was unable 
to repay most of the deposit to E Berhad. A loan had also been made by F Sdn Bhd to 
one of the directors. Consequently, the transaction was alleged to be a camouflaged 
loan to the director. 
The concern over self-dealing arose mainly in relation to E Berhad, E Berhad being the 
public company with minority shareholders. However, E Berhad encountered a number 
of obstacles in pursuing remedies against its directors. 
As regards the statutory provisions on self-dealing, the transaction would not come 
within the ambit of Sections 133 and !33A of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). 
Both the Sections apply to loans to a director or persons connected with a director. 
They also include the givi ng of guarantees or securities in connection with a loan made 
8 (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 371. 
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to such persons. However, these Sections are unlikely to be construed as including 
arrangements which amount to indirect loans to directors or persons connected with 
directors, such as the alleged loan in question. 
In order for the transaction to be caught by Section 132E of the Companies Act, 1965 
(Act 125), the property must be of the requisite value. As the land was purchased for a 
few million ringgit, the property was of the requisite value. This is regardless of which 
of the amounts stated in Section 132E(5) is taken as the threshold amount. The 
purchase price of the land clearly exceeded RM250,000 and 10% of E Berhad's asset 
value. 
Further, in order to be caught by Section 132E, it must be shown that F Sdn Bhd was a 
body corporate connected with a director ofE Berhad. This may be shown in a number 
of ways. The first method would be to show that the director had a controlling interest 
in F Sdn Bhd at the time of the transaction. Alternatively, it may be shown that F Sdn 
Bhd was accustomed to act in accordance with the directions of a director of E Berhad. 
The third alternative would be to show that the director or persons connected with him 
were entitled to exercise the votes of not less than 15% of the votes in F Sdn Bhd. 
However, it appears that such information may not be readily available to shareholders 
who are not involved in the management of the companies concerned. 
As for Section I32G it is difficult to ascertain whether the Section is breached without 
' 
information relating to the length of time that F Sdn Bhd had held the land in question. 
Similarly, information regarding the shareholding of the directors in F Sdn Bhd would 
be essential in proving a breach of Section I32G. However, information of this kind 
may often not be readily available to the public. Considerable efforts may often have to 
be made in order to procure such particulars. 
------------------------------------------------------~1 ]1~------~ 
Nevertheless, the no-conflict rule is likely to preclude the directors from acting in a 
manner which will bring personal interest into conflict with that of the company. As 
seen in Guinness v Saunders,9 the no-conflict rule is applied strictly. In this situation, 
there was a director of E Berhad who was also a director and substantial shareholder of 
F Sdn Bhd at the time of the transaction. In addition, F Sdn Bhd had given him a loan. 
Accordingly, there would appear to be a real and sensible possibility of conflict 
between the interest of E Berhad and the director's personal interest. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The examination of the above transactions illustrate some of the shortcomings of the 
rules regulating self-dealing by directors. Firstly, the fiduciary duties were wide 
enough to catch various situations of self-dealing that were not caught by statute. 
However, the uncertainties in the interpretation and application of the fiduciary 
principles gave rise to problems. It remains relatively uncertain how strictly the rules 
should be construed and how wide or narrow the ambit of the rules are. 
' 
The statutory provisions, on the other hand, are specific and certain. The disadvantage 
of these provisions is that in being specific, they fail to address various situations of 
self-dealing, such as where the director has recently retired, or where other forms of 
consideration, besides monetary payments, are given to a director upon his retirement. 
A further problem encountered in examining transactions potentially involving self-
dea ling by directors is the difficulty of procuring the necessary information to ascertain 
whether the directors' duties have been breached. Some information is not readily 
9 
[ 1990] 2 WLR 324. 
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available to the public or those not involved in the management of the company. 10 This 
includes information such as the net tangible asset value of the company, and the length 
of time property has been held by companies, or whether the relevant persons hold the 
requisite shareholdings. Some of these details may be determined if additional 
measures are taken or investigations are conducted to procure information, such as 
searches on companies. However, the trouble of taking such measures, coupled with 
the ignorance of many shareholders on the legal rules governing self-dealing may result 
in dissatisfied shareholders selling their shares instead of confronting the directors with 
their breaches of duty. 
fn addition to the above, another obstacle faced by aggrieved shareholders, particularly 
by minority shareholders, is the ratification of transactions involving self-dealing by 
directors. This issue will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 7. 
Finally, shareholders, especially minority shareholders, are hindered from enforcing 
their rights against errant directors by the rule in F ass v Harbottle.11 This rule requires 
actions against errant directors for breaches of directors' duties to be brought by the 
company. This issue will also be examined in greater detail in Chapter 8, together with 
the discussion on the remedies available for breaches of directors' duties. 
10 Shareholders may at times need to run an audit of the company in order to prov~ breaches of 
duty; Barrock L. 'The un fortunate minorities', The Edge, 18 September 2000. It ts also noted 
that some im,pro~ rieties have been highlighted. by the Securities C~mmission or the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange, who issued public repnmands of the comp~mes ~oncerned. Howe:er, 
even with these public reprimands, some of which included penalties paid by the companies, 
-----------------------------------------------------------1 ~ 0'--------~ 
further information on the self-dealing by directors was not readily available to facilitate action 
against them by dissatisfied shareholders. 
II (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
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CHAPTER 7- RATIFICATION 
In previous chapters, the liability of directors in respect of self-dealing has been 
discussed. This liability stems from equitable fiduciary principles as well as from 
statute. As regards the fiduciary principles, it is recognised that directors may be 
released from the fiduciary obligations owed to the company.' The authority to grant 
such a release is vested in the company. This release of a director from fiduciary 
obligations is known as ratification.2 
Ratification of a director's actions may be made either prospectively or retrospectively.3 
Accordingly, the company may approve or ratify in advance the actions of directors 
which would amount to a breach of fiduciary obligations to the company. 
Alternatively, ratification of the directors' actions may be made after such a breach has 
occurred. Whether ratification is made before or after the event, the result of such 
ratification is to release or absolve the director from liability for his breach of fiduciary 
duty. 
The essential elements of ratification are, firstly, the adoption by the company of the 
transaction which is entered into in breach of fiduciary duties. Secondly, in ratifying 
the breach, the company must have knowledge of the relevant facts surrounding the 
breach.4 Accordingly, ratification of directors' breaches of fiduciary duty would only 
be perm issible subject to the condition that full and frank disclosure of the material 
facts is made to the company in advance of the decision to ratify the breach. 
5 
1 Davies, P.L., Gower's Princi ples of Modem Com pan~ Law, (6th editio~ : 1997), 644-5. 
2 Ford, H.A.J. and Austin, R.P., Principles of Corporations Law, (5th edmon, 1990), 4~9. 
3 P JTV Denson (M} Sdn Bhd v Roxy (M} Sdn Bhd [ 1980] 2 MLJ 136; Regal (Hastmgs} Ltd v 
Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378. 
4 Goh Kim Hai Edward v Pacific Can Investment Holdings Ltd [ 1996] 2 SLR I 09, 135. 
~ Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad v Lorrain Esme Osman [ 1987] I MLJ 502. 
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Ratification by the company of the actions of its directors has a twin effect. In Fang 
Poh Yoke v The Central Construction Company (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd,6 it was remarked 
that ratification causes the company to be bound by the transaction which would 
otherwise be voidable due to the breach of the director's duty.7 Secondly, ratification 
operates to release the directors from their liability for breach of fiduciary duty.8 
Apart from the basic principles outlined above, the issue of ratification involves various 
complexities. Hence the ratification of breaches of directors' duties has been described 
as one of the most difficult legal issues. 9 For instance, where directors are in breach of 
their fiduciary duties, it is clear that the company is the appropriate body to ratify the 
actions of the directors. However, the issue as to who should represent the company as 
regards such ratification is fraught with difficulty. 
7.1 Who Can Ratify? 
7.1.1 The General Meeting 
The company in general meeting is usually regarded as having the authority to ratify 
breaches of fiduciary duty by directors.10 Where the general meeting acts unanimously, 
it is clear that they can ratify breaches of fiduciary duty. 11 It is not as clear whether the 
general meeting can by a simple majority ratify such breaches. This issue is 
complicated by the general principle that a director can vote as a shareholder even in 
6 [1998] MLJU 478. 
7 See also Ford, supra note 2, 485. . 
8 Fang Poh Yoke v The Central Construction Company (Malaysta) Sdn. Bhd [1998] MLJU 478; 
P JTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd v Roxy (M} Sdn Bhd [ 1980] 2 MLJ 136; Davies, ;u~ra note I, 64~ . 
9 Ne ilson, F. and Goodman, D., Liabil ity of Comorate Of~cers , ,(1988), J8, Beck, S.M., The 
Saga of Peso Silver Mines: Corporate Opportunity Reconsidered ( 1971) 49 Can Bar Rev 80, 
11 4. 
10 PJTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd v Roxy (M} Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 136; Regal (Hastings) Ltd v 
Gulliver [ 1942] I All ER 378. 
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matters in which the director has an interest. 12 Hence, if a breach may be ratified by a 
simple majority of the general meeting, directors commanding more than 50% of the 
votes in a company would be able to ratify their own breaches of duties to the company. 
This would permit the wrongdoers to absolve themselves of liability for their 
wrongdoing, which is a rather unsatisfactory position. 13 
The issue of ratification of transactions involving directors' interests was canvassed 
briefly in Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd. 14 The court appeared to indicate that a 
simple majority of the general meeting can ratify these matters. However, this is 
subject to the condition that the majority shareholders do not take advantage of their 
voting powers and grant themselves benefits in complete disregard of the interest of 
other shareholders. 
Such a situation was encountered in Cook v Deeks.15 In Cook v Deeks, resolutions were 
passed approving a transaction which was entered into by some of the directors in 
breach of the no-profit rule. This transaction involved an appropriation of a corporate 
opportunity for the benefit of some of the directors. The resolutions in question were 
passed by the company, owing to the voting power held by the directors who were in 
breach of their fiduciary duties. Hence, the resolution was approved by the company 
despi te the objections of the minority. 
11 Farrar, J.H. and Hannigan, B.M., Farrar's Company Law, (4th edition, I998), 424; New 
Zealand Netherlands Society 'Oranje' Inc v Kuys [I973] 2 All ER I222; Parker v McKenna 
(1874) 10 Ch App 96. 
12 Tuan Haji Ishak bin Ismail v Leong Hup Holdings Berhad [ I996] I MLJ 66I ; ?uyler 
Magruder v Creative Software (M) Sdn Bhd [I994] MLJU 107; North West Transportatron Co 
Ltd v Beatty ( I887) I2 App Cas 589. . 
13 Fa II 424· Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industrres Ltd (No. 2) per rrar, supra note , , 
Vinelott J [1980] 2 All ER 84I, 862. 
14 [1976] I MLJ 59. 
l j [1916] AC 554. 
The Privy Council, however, disallowed such resolutions. In the judgment delivered by 
Lord Buckmaster, his Lordship remarked the directors holding a majority of shares 
would not be permitted to make a present to themselves, as this would allow the 
majority to oppress the minority. 
From the above, it would appear that there is some support for the proposition that 
ratification of breaches of fiduciary duty may be made by a majority of shareholders, 
with the directors who are in breach exercising their voting rights as shareholders to 
ratify such breaches. Nonetheless, this is subject to the condition that the majority 
shareholders should not take advantage of their voting power to grant benefits to 
themselves in complete disregard of the interest of other shareholders. 
7.1.2 The Board of Directors 
It is even more doubtful whether the board of directors can ratify breaches of fiduciary 
duty by a director. 16 Even if the directors in breach of fiduciary duty abstain from 
voting, it is foreseeable that the other directors may be tempted to take a more lenient 
view of the breach than shareholders would. This is so, particularly as these directors 
may be hoping for similarly lenient treatment if they should breach their duties at a 
future time. 
The case of Queensland Mines Ltd v Hudson 17 may arguably be regarded as a decision 
in which the board of directors ratified a breach of the no-profit rule. In Queensland 
Mines the director who made a profit by exploiting a corporate opportunity was held 
not liable for breach of fiduciary duty. There was no shareholder approval or 
16 Cranston, R. , 'Limiting Directors' Liability: Ratific~ti~n, Exe~ption and Indemni~cation', 
[1992] Journal of Business Law 197, 202; Yeung, K., D1sent~nghng the Tangled Sk~m: The 
Ratification of Directors' Actions', ( 1992) 66 AU 343, 356-7; Wmthrop Investments v Wmns Ltd 
[1975] 2 NSWLR 666, per Mahoney 1. 
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ratification of the breach of duty. Instead, the board of directors had renounced the 
company's interest in the venture and assented to the director's exploitation of the 
opportunity. The Privy Council held that the director was not liable for any breach of 
fiduciary duty, despite the fact that there was no ratification by the shareholders 
approving the breach of the no-profit rule. 
A similar decision was reached in Peso Silver Mines Ltd v Cropper. 18 However, these 
decisions may be regarded as part of the law peculiar to corporate opportunity. It is 
possible that there was no breach of fiduciary duty in those cases as the company had 
rejected the corporate opportunities. 19 Alternatively, the approval of the board of 
directors in Queensland Mines could also be seen as the unanimous approval of 
shareholders, as both shareholders were represented on the board of directors. 20 
7.1.3 Should Directors be Allowed to Vote at General Meetings to Ratify their 
Breaches? 
As mentioned earlier one of the issues which is the cause of much dissatisfaction is the 
' 
issue of a director exercising his vote as a shareholder to ratify his breach of fiduciary 
duty. The general principle is that votes are proprietary rights, and consequently, a 
shareholder may exercise his voting rights in any way he wishes. 21 This includes voting 
in his self-interest, even if it is opposed to the company's interest. Clearly, this is 
problematic where the breach of directors' duties is concerned, especially if a company 
can ratify directors' breaches of duty by a simple majority. In such a situation, directors 
17 
( 1978) 52 ALJR 399. 
18 
( 1966) 58 DLR (2d) I. 
19 Cranston, supra note 16, 202-3 ; Farrar, s~pra note II , 425. 
20 This is discussed in greater detail in SectiOn 4.2 of Chapter 4. 
21 Tuan Ha'i Ishak bin Ismail v Leong Hup Holdings Berhad (1996) I MLJ 661; ?uyler 
A .Ia d ~C . S ,litw t A.(l Sdn Bhd (1994) MLJU I 07; North West Transportation Co 
tv/. gru er v reatlve o1• are 11Y1; .. Ltd v Beatty ( 1887) !2 App Cas 589; Northern Counties Secunt1es Ltd v Jackson & Steeple Ltd 
[1 974) I WLR 11 33. 
------------------"."'-------
holding the majority of votes could absolve themselves of liability for breach of duty to 
the company. 
Not surprisingly, there have been suggestions that directors should be prevented from 
voting in relation to breaches of their duties. The Australian Companies and Securities 
Law Review Committee took the view that directors should not vote to ratifY breaches 
of their duties. 22 The Committee reasoned that fairness requires that the person who 
will be relieved should not consent to his or her wrong. Section 243ZF of the 
Corporations Law (Australia) disqualifies directors from voting at a general meeting to 
ratifY transactions from which they would receive a financial benefit. A similar view 
has been adopted by various commentators, who have suggested that it is better to 
require an independent or disinterested group of shareholders to ratifY breaches of 
directors' duties. 23 
In Malaysia, the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance has similarly suggested 
that statutory provisions should be enacted to address the issue of directors voting as 
shareholders. In the Report on Corporate Governance, the Committee proposed that 
statutory provisions should be enacted to provide that directors interested in the subject 
matter of the resolution should refrain from voting as shareholders in respect of that 
resolution. 24 
It appears to be prudent to disallow directors' votes in favour of resolutions which 
relieve directors from liability. It is clear that where a resolution to absolve a director 
from liabili ty is involved, the director would vote in his self-interest to absolve himself 
22 Companies and Securities Law Review Committee, Discussion Paper No. 9: Company 
Directors and Officers : Indemnification, Relief and Insurance, .1989. , , 
23 Baxt R 'J d · Th · Own Cause: the Ratification of Dtrectors Breaches of Duty, ( 1978) 
, ., u ges m e1r 
5 MonLR 16; Beck, supra note 9, 119. · 
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from liability. Allowing such directors to vote in relation to resolutions to affirm 
impugned transactions is akin to allowing such directors to bind the company to the 
impugned transaction, regardless of whether the same is beneficial to the company. 
Such a resolution could impose hardship on the company, and be prejudicial to the 
interest of the company. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of setbacks to disallowing directors from voting to 
ratify their breaches of duty. Firstly, where the directors hold the majority of votes, a 
blanket prohibition on directors voting as shareholders in such matters would empower 
the minority to dictate the company's actions despite the majority's preferred course of 
action. 25 Further, restricting directors from voting as shareholders would be difficult to 
reconcile with the fundamental principle that shareholders' voting rights are proprietary 
rights, which may be exercised in any way the shareholders wish.26 Clearly, the issue 
of whether directors should be entitled to vote to ratify their breaches of duty is one 
which requires careful consideration. As such, this issue will be further discussed in 
Section 7.4 be low. 
7. 1.4 Minority Shareholders: Practical Considerations 
Underlying the ratification of directors' breaches of duty is the basic principle that all 
shareholders who have voting rights attached to their shares would generally have the 
right to vote at a general meeting. Nonetheless, there are practical considerations which 
hinder shareholders from exercising their voting rights. These impediments are likely 
to be of particular signi ficance to minority shareholders of public companies. 
24 F1· C . C rporate Governance Report on Corporate Governance, (February nance omm1ttee on o ' 
1999), 154. 
2$ lb 'd 
26 It ~ · d . A stralian support for the proposition that shareholders should be 
IS note that there 1s some u 
governed by a duty to act fo r proper purposes; Ngurli Ltd v McCann (1953) 90 CLR 425. 
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As discussed in earlier chapters, the separation between ownership and control is 
especially marked in minority shareholders of public companies. Minority shareholders 
are frequently excluded from the management of the company, and have limited access 
to information on the company's dealings. 27 Details regarding the breach of directors' 
duties that is sought to be ratified may not often be readily available.28 The only 
information readily available may be the information which the directors choose to 
disclose at the general meeting. Many of these shareholders hold shares as part of a 
diversified portfolio. Hence, they may be disinclined to take the trouble of seeking out 
the details of the transaction, and may consider the benefit of becoming informed as 
minimal. 29 As such, these minority shareholders may be disinclined to exercise their 
voting rights. 
A further reason why minority shareholders would be disinclined to vote would be the 
perception that in many situations, the minority shareholders' votes would make little 
difference to the outcome of the resolution.30 The controlling shareholder may have 
garnered enough votes to secure the necessary approval.31 Moreover, in order for the 
other shareholders to make a difference, there may need to be collective action among 
the minority shareholders. 32 This may be difficult to obtain, particularly in large public 
27 Miles, L. and Proctor, G., 'Unresponsive shareholders in public companies: dial "M" for 
motivate?', (2000) 21 The Company Lawyer 142, 143 . 
28 Professor Farrar observes that the suspect transactions are often of a complicated financial 
nature which the shareholder cannot easily unravel. It may be difficult to establish precisely what 
the transaction involves and who are the beneficiaries. The board would also usually refuse to 
disc lose in formation when questioned at the general meeting; Farrar, supra note II , 429. 
29 Whincorp, M.J., 'An Economic Analysis of the Criminalisation and Content of Directors' 
Duties' (1996) 24 Australian Business Law Review 273, 277. 
30 Griffiths, A., 'Shareholding and the Governance of Public Companies',. In Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Control, (Ed. Sheikh, S. and Rees, W.), ( 1995), 61; Miles, supra note 
27, 143. 
31 See for instance Lee, S.L., Taing, A., 'Showdown at UEM', The Edge, 9 February. 1998, where 
the minori ty shareholders were of the o~inion .that the outco~e of the Extraord.m~. G,eneral 
Meeting was a fo regone conclusion. Similarly, m Barrock, L. , The unfortunate mmont1es , The 
Edge, 18 September 2000, it was remarked that sometimes it is obvious that at a general meeting 
of shareholders the maiori ty shareholders can bulldoze proposals through. 
J2 , ~ 
Gri ffiths, supra note 30, 61. 
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companies which have large numbers of minority shareholders, each with small 
shareho !dings. 33 
Given the practical difficulties in influencing the shareholders' resolution, minority 
shareholders who are dissatisfied with the company's dealings are likely to resort to 
selling their shares instead.34 Nevertheless, shareholders are able to influence the board 
of directors and the management of the company through their ability to sell their 
shares. In particular, the sale of shares can affect the company's share price, with 
consequent adverse publicity.35 This power to sell one's shares is seen as an important 
counter-balance to the discretionary power of the management of a public company, 
and is known as the 'market in corporate control'.36 
7.2 What Can Be Ratified? 
Not all breaches of fiduciary duty are ratifiable by the company. Identifying the limits 
to the shareholders' power to ratify breaches of fiduciary duty is not a simple task. A 
frequently accepted principle is that shareholders may not misappropriate the 
company's property for themselves.37 The company's property is held in common by all 
shareholders of the company. As such, the majority cannot take the company's property 
in disregard of the other shareholders' interest in the property. It follows that breaches 
33 Ibid. 
34 Miles, supra note 27, 143. 
35 Griffiths, supra note 30, 62. 
36 !d. 61. See for example Long, H.C., 'UEM Fined RMI 00,000 over Renong purc~ase', Ne':" 
Straits Times, 19 February 1998, in which it was reported that shareholders ~old their shares m 
reaction to the perceived bai lout at the expense of minority shareholders, causmg the stockmarket 
to react badly. . 
37 Cranston, supra note 16, 200; Ford, supra note 2, 489; Davies, supra note I, 646. 
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which are generally regarded as being non-ratifiable are breaches which involve a fraud 
on the minority or misappropriation of the company's property.38 
A case which involved misappropriation of the company's property is R Rosen 
Engineering B. V. v Siow Yoon Keong.39 In Rosen Engineering, a director used the 
company's funds to invest in shares. When he realised that he was about to incur a loss, 
he arranged for the company to ratify the transaction, on the ground that the 
investments were made by him on behalf of the company. The court held that the 
ratification did not make his unauthorised use of the funds .proper. Notwithstanding the 
ratification, he was found to be in breach ofhis fiduciary duties. 
Where directors procure the ratification by the company of excessive remuneration for 
directors, such ratification may also be invalid. This is because excessive remuneration 
may constitute misappropriation of the company's property or fraud on the minority.40 
In Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Mirlj Sdn Bhd,41 it was remarked that a court would not 
normally interfere with directors' fees and bonuses fixed by the general meeting. 
Nonetheless, where excessively high amounts are approved by the majority 
shareholders at a general meeting in disregard of the interest of other shareholders, the 
court may intervene, despite ratification by the general meeting. The court remarked 
that majority shareholders should not take advantage of their voting powers to fix high 
bonuses for themselves as directors. 
In Yuki/on Manufacturing Sdn Bhd v Dato' Wong Gek Meng (No. 4), 42 some of the 
directors diverted the business of Company A to Company B, which was owned by 
38 Ibid. 
39 [1 997] I CLJ 137. 
40 Cranston, supra note 16, 20 I 
41 [1 976] I MLJ 59. 
42 [1 998] 7 MLJ 55 1. 
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them personally. They then proceeded to stop Company A's manufacturing operations 
in breach of their fiduciary obligations to Company A. The directors procured a 
resolution of Company A in general meeting, ratifying Company A's cessation of 
manufacturing operations. Nevertheless, the purported ratification was found to be 
ineffective. Arguably, the directors' breach of duties amounted to a fraud on the 
minority, and the diversion of business was a misappropriation of the company's 
business. 
Similarly, Cook v Deeks43 was a case in which the exploitation of corporate opportunity 
by directors was found to be non-ratifiable. In Cook v Deeks, the Privy Council took 
the view that the directors holding the majority of votes would not be permitted to make 
a present to themselves, as it would allow the majority to oppress the minority. Thus, a 
resolution that the rights of the company should be disregarded in the matter would 
amount to forfeiting the interest and property of minority shareholders in favour of the 
majority.44 This would amount to a fraud on the minority, and would thus be non-
ratifiable.45 
In contrast to Cook v Deeks and Yuki/on , the courts have considered the exploitation of 
corporate opportunity by the directors in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver46 and P JTV 
Denson (M) Sdn Bhd v Roxy (M) Sdn Bhd'7 to be ratifiable. The cases of Cook v Deeks 
and Regal Hastings have been acknowledged as being difficult and perhaps even 
impossible to reconcile.48 It has been suggested that a distinction may be made between 
misappropriation of the company's property and merely making an incidental profit for 
43 [1 916] AC 554. 
44 Th' · · 1 l'ed 1·n Ng Pak Cheong v Global Insurance Co Sdn Bhd [1995] I MLJ IS pnnc1p e was app 1 
?54 cook v Deeks [ 1916] AC 554; Menier v Hooper's Telegraph Works (1874) LR 9 Ch 350. 
46 [1 942] I All ER378. 
47 [1980] 2 MLJ 136. 
48 Davies, supra note I, 64 7. 
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which the directors are liable to account to the company.49 Cook v Deeks would come 
within the first category. It has been suggested that the directors in Regal (Hastings) 
did not misappropriate any property of the company but merely made an incidental 
profit from the information acquired as directors. 50 
Arguably, a corporate opportunity is part of the property of the company. Accordingly, 
based on that reasoning, the taking of a corporate opportunity would amount to a 
misappropriation of property belonging to the company. The main difference between 
the facts in Cook v Deeks and Yuki/on on one hand, and Regal (Hastings) and P JTV 
Denson on the other hand, appears to be the fact that in Cook v Deeks and Yuki/on, the 
companies wanted the opportunities, whereas in Regal (Hastings) and P JTV Denson, 
the companies could not exploit the opportunities. As seen in Chapter 4, the inability of 
the company to exploit a corporate opportunity does not preclude a director's 
exploitation of that opportunity from being a breach of fiduciary duty. Perhaps the 
distinguishing factor is the lack of bona fides on the part of the directors in Cook v 
Deeks and Yuki/on. This, in turn, appears to be reflective of the basic fiduciary 
principle that a director should act bona fide for the benefit of the company, and not for 
an improper purpose. 
Where tangible property is misappropriated by directors who are also the majority 
shareholders, such misappropriation is likely to be a fraud on the minority, as it would 
deprive the other shareholders of the property. With intangible property, such as 
information or corporate opportunity, the use of the same by directors may not always 
be detrimental to the minority. 51 Perhaps the dividing line between ratifiable and non-
ratifiable breaches should be drawn so as not to exclude misappropriation of property 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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per se from ratification. Instead, it is suggested that the deciding factor should be the 
misappropriation of the company's property where the same is made mala fide or in 
disregard of other shareholders' interests in the property. 
7.3 Ratification of Breaches of Statutory Duty 
Aside from equitable fiduciary duties, directors are also subject to statutory duties 
relating to self-dealing. Accordingly, the question also arises as to whether breaches of 
statutory duty by directors can be ratified. Generally, it is conceded that breaches of 
statutory duty cannot be ratified at common law in the same manner as breaches of 
fiduciary duty. 52 However, ratification would be possible where the statutory provision 
breached provides for ratification of actions in breach of the statutory duty. 
Such ratification is provided for in Section 132E of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). 
Section I 32E(2) stipulates that an arrangement or transaction entered in contravention 
of Section I 32E( I) may be ratified by the company in general meeting. As a 
consequence of such ratification, the arrangement or transaction which is voidable as a 
result of the contravention will be binding on the company. In addition, subsection (2) 
also requires ratification by a resolution of the holding company in general meeting 
where the arrangement or transaction is for the transfer of an asset to or by a director of 
the holding company. 
Breaches of statutory duty can also result in criminal liability for directors. The cases 
of Yeow Fook Yuen v Regina53 and Public Prosecutor v Yeah Teck Chye & Lim Hong 
5 ' PJTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd v Roxy (M) Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 136; Regal (Hastings) Ltd v 
Gulliver [ 1942] I AllER 378. 
52 Cranston, supra note 16, 20 I. 
53 [ 1968] 2 MLJ 80. 
153 
. Peng v Public Prosecutor54 make it clear that a director cannot be released from 
criminal liability by ratification by the company of such a breach. 
It would seem to be rather incongruous that breaches of fiduciary duty may be ratified, 
but liability under statute should remain in respect of the same matter. Consequently, 
even where the company has absolved its directors of their breaches of fiduciary duty to 
the company, the directors may be liable to statutory penalties in respect of the same 
acts. In certain situations, the company may choose to ratify a director's breach of duty 
on grounds that he may have been acting honestly. However, under the statutory 
provisions, even where a director may have been honest and unaware of the 
contravention due to no fault of his own, the director may nevertheless be subject to 
crimina) penalties. 55 
Despite the incongruous result, there is arguably at least one positive effect of the 
anomaly discussed above. Ratification of breaches of fiduciary duty may at times have 
the effect of trivial ising fiduciary duties, particularly where wrongdoers ratifY their own 
breaches. The fact that wrongdoers cannot absolve themselves of liability under statute 
would counter that effect of ratification. Consequently, the statutory penalties may 
operate to lessen abuse by wrongdoers of their voting rights. This is due to the fact that 
their attempts to ratifY their wrongs would often not absolve them of liability arising 
under statute. 
54 [1981] 2 MLJ 176. 0 
55 s '" · S 0 132E and Section 133 of the Compames Act, 1965 (Act 125). This ee 10r mstance ecuon 
was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
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7.4 Concluding Remarks 
Directors' fiduciary duties seek to prevent directors from dealing with the company's 
property as if it were their own property. Inherent in these principles is the recognition that 
the property of the company belongs to the company as a whole. The company, in turn, is 
owned by the shareholders collectively. These principles operate for the protection of the 
shareholders who are not represented on the board of directors, and in particular, the 
minority shareholders. 
The question as to whether the fiduciary ptinciples effectively protect the interests of these 
shareholders is significantly influenced by the issue of ratification. If wrongdoers are able to 
ratify their wrongs by exercising the majority of voting rights in the company, this would 
erode the protection afforded by fiduciary ptinciples to the shareholders as a whole. Those 
particularly affected would be the minority shareholders. 
A certain degree of protection is given to these shareholders by the principle that a fraud on 
the minority cannot be ratified. However, challenging a resolution which has been passed by 
the company, on the ground that it amounts to a fraud on the minority, is likely to be 
cumbersome as well as costly for minority shareholders. Allowing wrongdoers to vote at a 
general meeting to ratify their breach of duty, except where such a breach amounts to a fraud 
on the minority, places the burden of proving fraud on the minority and enforcing fiduciary 
principles on the minority shareholders. These minority shareholders are generally at a 
greater disadvantage in proving fraud on the minority, especially as they are frequently not 
privy to infonnation on the internal workings of the company. 
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Instead, it is submitted that the burden of showing that there has been no fraud on the 
minority should be placed on the directors, who are in control of the company, and hence, 
have greater access to information concerning the company. Further, since the directors' 
breach of fiduciary duties is in question, it would seem fair to require these directors to prove 
that their breach does not also amount to a fraud on the minority. 
Consequently, it is submitted that where directors wish to vote as shareholders to ratify their 
own breach of duty, they should first show that the breach does not amount to a fraud on the 
minority.56 Otherwise, they should not be pennitted to vote. (For the purposes of this 
Section, the shareholders who are also the directors in breach of their fiduciary duties shall 
be refened to as "shareholder-directors".) This proposition has similarities to the various 
suggestions, discussed in Section 7.1.3, that shareholder-directors should not be permitted to 
vote to ratify breaches of their duties, and that ratification of breaches of directors duties 
should be by an independent group of shareholders. As mentioned, there are two objections 
to the proposition that breaches of directors duties should be ratified by independent 
shareholders. The first objection is the established principle that shareholders' voting rights 
are proprietary rights. And the second objection is that this may result in rule by the minority 
instead. 
Nonetheless, the suggestion that shareholder-directors should first show that the breach does 
not amount to a fraud on the minority, before being permitted to vote, is not an absolute 
prohibition. As long as they can show that there has been no fraud on the minority, they will 
be permitted to vote. Hence, this lessens the likelihood of rule by the minority. The 
56 'Fraud on the minority' involves the majority of me~bers in a comp.any exercising th,eir voting power 
beyond the scope of that power in such a way so as etther to expropnate. the company s property or 
members'property. The essence of the matter seems to be an abuse or mtsuse of power to benefit 
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principle that shareholders' voting rights are proprietary rights, which may be exercised in 
any way the shareholders wish, is however, a greater obstacle. It is arguable that although 
voting rights are proprietary rights, nonetheless they may not be abused to ratify a fraud on 
tl1e minority. Requiring the shareholder-directors to show that there is no fraud on the 
minority, as a prerequisite to their voting, is arguably an extension of that argument. 
A related issue is the question of whether the prerequisite of showing that there has been no 
fraud on the minority should be limited only to shareholder-directors. In some cases, the 
directors may not themselves be shareholders. Instead, tlley may be nominees of corporate 
bodies who are shareholders. At times, the benefit of the transactions which are in breach of 
fiduciary duty may be confened on a related party, who may also be a shareholder. It is 
questionable whether these other parties should also be precluded from voting to ratify the 
breaches of fiduciary duty, unless they can show that there is no fraud on the minority. Also 
related to this issue is the question of whetller the criteria for determining whether 
shareholders are interested in the breach of duty should be based on relationship witll the 
director in breach or benefit from the transaction, or both. 
It may be fairly easy to identify the shareholder-directors who are in breach of fiduciary 
duties and prevent them from voting. Identifying the other categories of shareholders is 
likely to be more difficult. It may be possible to identify whether a director is a nominee of 
a shareholder or a group of shareholders. Nevertheless, it is likely to be less obvious who 
related parties are, particularly to a minority shareholder who may not have access to much 
information concerning the company and its shareholders. Similarly, identifying the persons 
themselves at the company's expense; per Megarry V -C in Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v Greater 
London Council [ 1982] 1 WLR 2. 
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who benefit from the transaction may be difficult, especially where the transaction is made 
through layers of nominees. 
There is yet another weakness to the proposition that shareholder-directors should first show 
that there is no fraud on the minority before being permitted to vote. This arises from the 
fact that merely requiring these shareholder-directors to prove to the general meeting that 
there has been no fraud on the minority may not be much of a detenent against abuse. In 
Particular, where the shareholder-directors are aware that the minority shareholders have little 
ability to enforce their rights, the shareholder-directors may pay little attention to the 
requirement. One means of givii1g such a requirement greater weight would be to provide 
for statutory penalties for contravention. As discussed in Section 7.3, statutory provision of 
penalties would appear to have the effect of reducing the potential for abuse. 
ln conclusion, restricti11g tl1e voting rights of shareholder-directors appears to be an 
important ru1d necessary means of ensuring that fiduciary duties maintain their effectiveness. 
However, as mentioned earlier, this runs counter to the established principle that voting 
rights are proprietary rights, and shareholders should essentially be entitled to vote in any 
way they wish. Further, there appears to be some hesitance in restricting the voting rights of 
shareholder-directors for the reason that Article l3(1) of the Federal Constitution preserves 
the right to property. 57 As such, despite the need for the restriction of voting tights, 
overcoming the reluctance to interfere with voting rights may prove to be ratl1er problematic. 
Arguably, the wording of Article 13(1 ), 58 may allow for a statutOiy amendment which 
-7 
Theca e of c;01·emment of Malaysia v Selangor Pilot Association (J 946) [ 1 977] 1 MLJ 133 
uggest that negative or re trictive provisions can deprive a person of property for the purposes of 
Article 13( 1) of the Federal onstitution; A.J. , Harding, 'Property Rights under the Malaysian 
on titution', In on tit ti n fMala ia · F rth r Per ectives and Develo ments, (Ed. Harding, 
~.A. and Lee, H.P.), (1986). . . 
Article 13( 1) tate that " 0 person shall be deprived of property save m accordance w1th law". 
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restricts shareholder~directors from voting in situations which would amount to an abuse of 
voting rights. However, it remains to be seen whether this fundamental tight to property will 
be regarded as being so unshakeable as to prevent any restrictions or conditions to the 
exercise of voting rights in order to prevent abuse of voting rights. 
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CHAPTER 8- RELIEF AND REMEDIES 
8.1 Relief 
As seen in Chapter 7, directors may seek to be relieved from liability for breaches of 
their fiduciary duties through ratification of the breach by the company. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 7, not all breaches of directors' duties may be ratified. One type of 
breach which cannot be ratified by the company is a breach of statutory duties. In such 
situations, the directors may seek relief from liability under Section 354(1) of the 
Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). 
Relief from liability under Section 354(1) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) is not 
confined on ly to liabili ty for breaches of statutory duties. Directors who have breached 
their fiduciary duties may also apply for relief under this Section. Pursuant to this 
Section, the courts have power to grant to directors relief from liability. The power to 
grant relief is exercisable on three requirements being met. It appears that the burden of 
. . I 
provmg these three req uirements falls on the d1rector. 
These th ree requirements are, firstly, that the director must have acted honestly. 
Secondly, the di rector must show that he acted reasonably. Thirdly, it must be shown 
that he ought fa irly to be excused, having regard to all the circumstances of the case. 
Whether a di rector has acted honestly and reasonably is a question of fact. 2 
Accord ingly, these issues shou ld not be detennined summarily. Justice requires that the 
1 
Simmah Timber Industries Sdn Bhd v David Low See Keat [1999] 5 MLJ 42 1, 437; Woon, W., 
~pany Law, (2nd edition, 1997), 314. 
Yeng Hing Enterprise Sdn Bhd v Datuk Dr Ong Poh Kah [ 1988] 2 MLJ 60; Tay Beng Chuan v 
Official Receiver and Liquidator [ 1987] 2 MLJ 419. 
opportun ity should be given to the directors at a full trial to prove that these 
requirements have been met.3 
As regards the first requirement, where a director has acted dishonestly, there is clearly 
no relief available to him under Section 354(1) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). 
The case of Hytech Builders Pte Ltd v Tan Eng Leonl is an example of such a 
situation . In Hytech Builders, the director diverted a corporate opportunity to a 
company which he controlled. He also received payments which should have been held 
for the benefit of the company. He concealed both the diversion of corporate 
opportunity and the payments from the company. The director was held to be liable to 
account to the company for breach of the no-profit rule. He applied for relief under the 
Section 39 1 ( I) of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 1994 Ed) (Singapore) which is pari 
materia to Section 354( 1) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). The court found that 
the director's conduct was dishonest. Accordingly, the court refused to grant relief to 
the director. 
Where the director has acted honestly, there is a need to determine whether the second 
requirement has been met. This second requirement is whether the director has acted 
reasonably. In Re Duomatic,5 Buckley J considered the test to be applied in order to 
ascertain whether the requirement of having 'acted reasonably' is satisfied. The test is 
how a person, who was dealing with his own affairs with reasonable care and 
circumspection, could reasonably be expected to act in such a case. This approach was 
accepted in the case of Simmah Timber Industries Sdn Bhd v David Low See Keat.6 The 
J--------------------
4 Tay Beng Chuan v Official Receiver and Liquidator [I 987] 2 MLJ 4 I 9. 
, [I 995 ] 2 SLR 795. 
6 [I969] 2 Ch 365. [I 999] 5 MLJ 42 1. 
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test appears to be semi-subjective, as the court will take into account the experience and 
qualifications of the person in question in detennining if he acted reasonably.7 
The question of whether directors should be granted relief arose in Selangor United 
Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No. 3).8 The directors who were seeking relief had 
carried out the instructions of the majority shareholders who had nominated them, 
without considering the interests of the minority shareholders. They had disposed of 
virtually the whole of the company's assets blindly. The court remarked that their 
breach could be said to be dishonest because they put themselves at the disposal of the 
majority shareholders. However, even if their breach was not dishonest, by blindly 
carrying out these actions, the directors had not acted reasonably. 
Similarly, in In re Kie Hock Shipping (1971) Pte Ltd,9 the director who sought relief 
argued that he had no power to prevent the breaches of fiduciary duties by his uncle, the 
managing director of the company. Nonetheless, the director was the executive director 
of the company. He had taken no action to recover enormous debts owed to the 
company, and had deprived the company of all possibility of recovering the debts owed. 
The court found that the argument that the director was powerless to prevent the 
breaches of fiduciary duty was not a sufficient reason for him to be relieved from 
liability. The director was found not to have acted honestly and reasonably in his 
discharge of duties as a director. The court concluded that the director ought not to be 
excused under Section 3 54( I) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). 
The third requirement is that the director must show that he ought fairly to be excused, 
having regard to all the circumstances of the case. This requirement was considered 
7 Woon, supra note I, 314, citing as an example the case of Re Haji Ali bin Haji Mohd Noor 
(1933] MLJ 135. 
8 (1 968] I WLR 1555. 
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briefly in Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No. 3) .10 As mentioned 
earlier, the case concerned the directors' disposal of virtually the whole of the 
company's assets, without any regard for the minority shareholders. They had acted 
blindly at the behest of the majority shareholder. In addition to being unreasonable, the 
court also considered that the acts of the directors were such that they should not fairly 
be excused. 11 
In contrast, in Re D'Jan of London Ltd, 12 the director's breach of duty was considered to 
be inadvertent. The court remarked that his inadvertence was the kind of thing which 
could happen to any busy man. Accordingly, the court found that the director ought 
fairly to be excused for some of his liability. However, it is noted that in this situation, 
the director had breached his duty of care, rather than his fiduciary duty. 
Another example of a fiduciary's behaviour which has been regarded as excusable is 
found in the case of Re Ena Jainab Abdeen, Deceased, Juliah Amma/. 13 The facts 
concerned a breach of trust rather than directors' fiduciary duties. Nonetheless, the 
criteria for relief of the trustee is similar to the criteria for relief set out in Section 
3 54( I) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). The trustees in this case were said to 
have acted reasonably. There was also evidence that adult beneficiaries had been 
consulted and had agreed to the arrangement in question. Hence, the court found that 
trustees' actions ought to be excused. 
9 (1985] I MLJ 411. 
10 (1968] I WLR 1555. 
11 Similarly, for a fiduciary to stand by and do nothing while property is being dissipated by a co-
fiduciary would also be regarded as being unreasonable behaviour that should not fairly be 
excused; Woon, supra note I, 314-5; Syed Mohamed bin Ali A/sagoffv Farrer [1934] SSLR 
177; Chng Joo Tuan Neoh v Khoo Tek Keong [1932) SSLR 100. 
12 [1994) I BCLC 561. 
13 (1930) SSLR 212. 
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director of the company would be guilty upon contravention of Section 132G by the 
company, regardless of whether the director concerned had authorised the transaction. 
Nevertheless, it is argued that such directors may be able to obtain relief under Section 
354(1) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125), if they had acted honestly and 
reasonably. 
The second situation, namely, the circumstances in Re Ena Jainab, concerned actions 
of fiduciaries which were reasonable and had been agreed to by beneficiaries. 
Arguably, the facts of Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver14 and PJTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd 
v Roxy (M) Sdn Bhd15 may have fallen within such parameters. In both Regal Hastings 
and P JTV Denson, the companies were unable to complete the transactions, and the 
directors' intervention by providing personal funds could be said to be reasonable in the 
circumstances. In Regal Hastings it was acknowledged that the directors could have 
obtained ratification by the company of their breach of the no-profit rule. However, 
they neglected to obtain the ratification of their breach. The directors were also acting 
honestly and reasonably in the situation. Arguably, this may be a situation in which the 
directors ought fairly to be excused under Section 354(1) of the Companies Act, 1965 
(Act 125), if it could be shown that the company would have ratified the breach. 16 
In contrast where a breach of directors' equitable duties cannot be ratified for the 
' 
reason that it amounts to a fraud on the minority, a director would not be able to obtain 
relief under Section 354(1) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). Such a breach 
would not be honest or reasonable, and could not fairly be excused. 
14 [1942] I AIIER378. 
15 [1980]2 MLJ 136. . 
16 It is noted that this argument was not considered m PJTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd v Roxy 
(Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [ 1980] 2 ML1136. 
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In conclusion, relief can only be obtained in limited situations of breaches of directors' 
duties. Directors must first show that they have acted honestly and reasonably before it 
can even be considered whether they can fairly be excused. Unlike ratification, relief 
under Section 354(1) cannot be manipulated by directors to shirk their responsibilities. 
Requirements of honesty and reasonableness would serve as a safeguard against such 
manipulation. Further, the court has a discretion as to whether the director should fairly 
be excused. Relief may be granted in whole or in part, as the court deems fit, with 
regard to the circumstances of the case. 
From the viewpoint of the company, these requirements serve to protect the company's 
interests. The company would not be deprived of remedies against a director who is in 
breach of his duties except in situations where the court considers that it is fair. The 
company is also ensured that unless the breach was also honest and reasonable, Section 
354(1) would not relieve a director of liability, and deprive the company of recourse 
against its director. 
8.2 Remedies 
In previous chapters, the rules relating to self-dealing by directors have been discussed. 
These rules include equitable fiduciary principles as well as the statutory provision in 
the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). As seen in Chapter 5, the statutory provisions 
governing self-dealing by directors provide for various remedies against the directors in 
situations where directors have contravened the statutory rules. These statutory 
remedies have been detailed in Chapter 5. Where directors are in breach of the 
equitable fiduciary rules, civil remedies are also provided for under the general law. 
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These remedies are in many ways an application of broader principles of equitable 
relief. 17 
These equitable remedies are available to the company regardless of whether the 
directors have acted honestly. 18 The remedies which are available for a breach of 
fiduciary duty are largely dependent on the circumstances surrounding the breach. 19 
Such circumstances include the nature of the relationship, the context in which the 
fiduciary relationship exists, and the context in which the breach of fiduciary obligation 
occurs.2° For instance, where a contract is entered into in breach of fiduciary duty, the 
natural remedy would be rescission of the impugned contract. Likewise, where the 
director has made a personal profit through a breach of fiduciary duty, the remedy 
against the director would be for an account of that profit. 21 
8.2.1 Rescission 
In circumstances where the director has entered into a contract with the company in 
breach of his fiduciary duty, the company will have the right to rescind the contract.22 
The company may elect to affirm the contract, but unless it affirms the contract 
subsequent to the discovery of the breach of fiduciary duty, the contract may be 
rescinded by the company. Affirmation of the contract must be made with knowledge 
of the breach and of the company's right to rescission.23 Affirmation should also be 
made by the company in general meeting, not acting in fraud of the minority. 
17 Ford, H.A.J. and Austin, R.P., Principles of Corporations Law, (7th edition, 1995), 338. 
18 PJTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd v Roxy (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 136; Regal (Hastings) 
Ltdv Gulliver [I967] 2 AC I34. 
19 Ford, supra note I 7, 338. . . , . . . , . 
2o Kearney, J.B., 'Accounting for a Fiduciary s Gam m Commercial Contexts, In Egu1ty and 
Commercial Relationships, (Ed. Finn, P.D.), (1987), I87. 
21 Ibid 
22 Lim Koei lng v Pan Asia Shipyard & Engineering Co Pte Ltd [I 995]1 SLR 499. 
23 Ford, supra note 17, 339. 
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The right to rescind the contract may also be lost if the company delays unduly after 
learning of the breach of duty. In addition, the right to rescission will be lost if 
restitutio in integrum is impossible.24 
Where a contract is entered into between the company and a third party, the situation is 
not as simple. The right to elect to avoid the contract may be lost if the rights of 
innocent third parties have intervened.:!s This is in turn dependent on whether the third 
parties knew or ought to have known of the directors' breach of duty in procuring the 
company to enter into the transaction. 26 A transaction is voidable only where the third 
party knew or ought to have known of the director's breach of duty. 
ln general a third party or outsider need not inquire whether the directors are acting for 
an improper purpose.27 Nonetheless, the outsider or third party may be put on notice of 
the breach of fiduciary duty. Such notice may be imputed from the nature of the 
transaction itself. If the outsider has notice of the breach, whether actual or 
constructive, the company will be have the option of rescinding the contract. 28 
Nonetheless, as regards constructive notice of the breach, it has been suggested that the 
doctrine of constructive notice should only be applied to commercial dealings with 
caution. 29 Walter Woon opines that: 
"Where parties are acting at arm's length, the fact that the seller is getting a 
good deal from the company should not invariably raise the presumption that 
24 In re Leeds & Hanley Theatres of Varieties Ltd [ 1902] 2 Ch 809. 
25 Ibid 
26 Transvaal Lands Co v New Belgium (Transvaal) Land and Development Co [I 9 I 4] 2 Ch 488. 
27 Royal British Bank v Turquand (I 856) 6 El & 81 327; Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) v 
British Steel Corp [I 986] Ch 246. 
28 Executive Aids Sdn Bhd v Kuala Lumpur Finance Berhad [ 1992] I MLJ 89; Rolled Steel 
Products (Holdings) v British Steel Corp [I 986] Ch 246. 
29 Woon, supra note I, 297. 
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he knew of a breach of duty on the part of the directors. The law should not 
penalize a businessman for driving a hard bargain. It is only where the 
transaction appears to be clearly against the company's interests and the 
director appears to be benefitting that an imputation of constructive knowledge 
should be made. ,,Jo 
As for the statutory provisions discussed in Chapter 5, a similar remedy is provided for 
by Section 132E of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). Section 132E(2) provides that 
an arrangement or transaction entered into in breach of Section 132E(l) will be 
voidable at the instance of the company. The company may, however, ratify the 
arrangement and transaction within a reasonable period. Nonetheless, the Section does 
not specify whether the factors of restitutio in integrum and the intervention of third 
party rights would affect the company's right to avoid the arrangement or transaction. 31 
The other statutory prohibitions on self-dealing, namely Sections 131, 132G, 133 and 
133A of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125), do not provide for any similar remedy. 
8.2.2 Account of Profits 
As discussed in Chapter 4, fiduciary principles require that a director should not make a 
personal profit from his fiduciary position. It follows that where a director makes a 
profit in breach of his fiduciary duties, he is liable to account to the company for the 
profit made. Similarly, where the director obtains a benefit or profit in circumstances 
where there was a conflict of interest and duty, the director will be liable to account for 
the benefit or profit. 32 The profit is recoverable by the company regardless of whether 
30 Ibid 
31 It is noted that the equivalent provision in the UK statute provides for rescission along the lines 
of equitable rescission, taking into account restitutio in integrum and the intervention of third 
party rights. d . 
32 Heydon, J.D., Gummow, w.M.C. and Austin, R.P., Cases an Matenals on Equity and Trusts, 
(4th edition, 1993), 230. 
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the company has suffered any loss.33 It is also irrelevant that the profit which is sought 
to be recovered from the directors was not available to the company.34 
In Ave/ Consultants Sdn Bhd v Mohamed lain Yuso!/ 5 the rule that a director must 
account for profits made from his fiduciary position was applied. The directors 
diverted the business of the company to their own firm in breach of the no-profit rule. 
As a result, they were required to account for all income or profit made in respect of the 
business which was diverted. 
Similarly, in PJTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd v Roxy (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd/6 the directors 
were required to account for the profit made as a result of them exploiting a corporate 
opportunity. This was so, even though the company itself could not have exploited the 
opportunity due to the lack of funds. The account of profits was required despite the 
fact that the company did not suffer loss as a result of the directors' breach of duty. 
[n Simmah Timber Industries Sdn Bhd v David Low See Keat/7 the first defendant, a 
director, obtained profits for himself by means of an arrangement involving the 
company. This arrangement involved the transferring of the company's assets to the 
second defendant. The assets were then leased back by the company. The company 
paid for the lease of these assets. Through this arrangement, the first defendant 
obtained various profits, namely payments and a substantial number of shares. The 
arrangement was in effect a scheme to deplete the company of its assets, whilst 
providing various benefits to the first defendant. Consequently, the first defendant was 
required to account for all the profit he received under the arrangement. 
J3 PJTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd v Roxy (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 136; Regal (Hastings) 
Ltdv Gulliver [1 967] 2 AC 134. 
34 Ibid 
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Nonetheless, there can be no accountability for profit in situations where a director has 
improperly sold his property to the company at an overvalue. In such circumstances 
' 
the company can avoid the contract and recover the purchase money. However, the 
company may not affirm the contract and claim an account ofprofit.38 By affirming the 
contract, the company would waive its right to claim an account of profits from the 
directors. 
In addition to the equitable remedy of an account of profits, Section I32(3) of the 
Companies Act, 1965 (Act I 25) also provides that a director shall be liable to the 
company for any profit made by him as a result of a breach of the statutory duty to act 
honestly and to use reasonable diligence as contained in Section 132(1 ). 
Similarly, Section I32E(3)(a) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act I25) provides that a 
director or persons connected to that director shall account to the company for any gain 
made directly or indirectly from the arrangement or transaction. It is worth noting that 
an account of profits is not available for a breach of Sections I3 I, I32G, I33 or I33A 
of the Companies Act, I965 (Act I25). 
8 . .2.3 Damages or Compensation 
In situations where the directors' breach of fiduciary duty causes loss to the company, 
• 
39 Th f . the company can recover equitable monetary compensatiOn. e purpose o equttable 
35 [1985] 2 MLJ 209. 
36 [1980] 2 MLJ 136. 
37 [1999] 5 MLJ 421. 
38 Burland v Earle [ 1902] AC 83. 
39 F d 17 340. Tavistock Holdings Pty Ltd v Saulsman (1990) 3 ACSR 502; Nocton or , supra note , , 
v Lord Ashburton (1914] AC 932. 
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compensation or damages is not to punish the director, but to compensate for any loss 
or damage suffered as a result of failure of some equitable duty. 40 
The equitable principle that the director who breaches his fiduciary duties should 
compensate the company for loss suffered is seen in a number of cases. In Bank 
Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad v Lorrain Osman, 41 Lorrain, who was found to be in 
breach of his duty as the chairman of the board of directors, was held liable for all loss 
suffered by the company as a result of his breach of duty. Along similar lines, the 
directors in Ave/ Consultants Sdn Bhd v Mohamed lain Yusol2 were also required to 
pay damages to the company for their breach of fiduciary duty, in addition to 
accounting for the profit made from their diversion of the company's business. 
In H Rosen Engineering B. V v Siow Yoon Keong, 43 the director, upon learning that his 
personal investments were about to incur substantial losses, arranged for the company 
to absorb the losses. As a result, the company was unable to meet its financial 
obligations and judgment was made against the company for its default in certain 
payments to third parties. The court ordered the director to pay the judgment debt, in 
view of the director's breach of fiduciary duty.
44 
Where there is a breach of the statutory duty to act honestly, Section 132(3) of the 
Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) also provides for a similar remedy. Section 132(3) 
stipulates that a director shall be liable to compensate the company for any damage 
suffered as a result of a breach of the duty to act honestly and to use reasonable 
diligence in accordance with Section 132(1). 
40 Vyse v Foster (1872) LR 8 ChApp 309,333, per James LJ. 
41 [1985] 2 MLJ 236. 
42 [ 1985] 2 MLJ 209. 
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Along similar lines, Sections 132E(3)(b) and 133(3) provide that the directors involved 
in the transaction, as well as the directors who authorised the transction, shall 
indemnify the company for any resulting loss or damage. The indemnity in Section 
13 2E(3 )(b) also extends to persons connected with directors who enter into the 
transaction or arrangement with the company. 
8.2.4 Constructive Trust 
Where the directors' breach involves improper use of the company's property, and the 
director retains some asset representing that item, the director is a constructive trustee 
of the asset. As such, the company has a proprietary claim to that asset. 45 In addition, 
even where the company is not deprived of an asset, but the director makes a profit 
from his fiduciary position, such profit obtained by the director is held by him as a 
. 46 
constructive trustee. 
8. 2. 4. I Third parties 
The company can also trace such assets into the hands of third parties who have 
knowledge of the relevant circumstances.47 The first way in which a third party may 
become a constructive trustee of the company's property is where a third party receives 
some part of the company's property with knowledge of the breach of duty. This 
includes actual knowledge as well as wilfully shutting one's eyes to the obvious. It also 
includes wilfully or recklessly failing to make inquiries which an honest and reasonable 
~3 (I997J I CLJI37. . . . 
44 Although the judge did not discuss principles of equitable monetary compensatiOn, the effect of 
the decision was to compensate the company for the loss caused by the director's breach of 
fiduciary duty. . 
4' Ford, supra note I7, 340; Paul A Davies (Aust) Pty Ltd v Davres ( I983) 8 ACLR I. 
46 Keith Henry & Co Pty Ltd v Stuart Walker & Co Pty Ltd ( I958) I 00 CLR 342; Heydon, supra 
note 3I, 230. . · 
47 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan Kok Mmg [I995] 3 MLJ 74; Selangor United Rubber 
Estates Ltdv Cradock (No.3) [1968] I WLR 1555· 
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person would make.48 The second way in which a third party may become liable as a 
constructive trustee is where the third party dishonestly assists the directors in some 
dishonest and fraudulent breach of their duty.49 In this second category, the third 
party's state of mind is crucial. It does not matter if the director is not fraudulent, as 
long as the third party had dishonest intent. 5° 
In Simmah Timber Industries Sdn Bhd v David Low See Keat/ 1 it was alleged that the 
second defendant had received monies which he knew, or ought to have known, 
belonged to the plaintiff company. As a consequence, the plaintiff claimed that the 
second defendant was a constructive trustee of the monies. The court found that the 
receipt of the monies by the second defendant was with knowledge of the breach. As 
such, the monies were deemed to be held by him as a constructive trustee. 
8.2.5 Injunction 
In situations where a breach is threatened but has not yet occurred or where the breach 
has occurred and threatens to continue, the court may grant an injunction to prevent the 
breach from occurring or from continuing. Similarly, an injunction would be 
appropriate where the breach has occurred but the consequences of the breach can be 
avoided by an injunction. An injunction would then operate to avoid or to minimise the 
damage to the company. 
In A/or Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd,52 the factors which are 
considered by the courts in granting an injunction were discussed. Among these 
48 Baden v Societe Generate pour Favoriser le Developpement du Commerce et de I'Industrie en 
France SA [ 1983] BCLC 322. 
49 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan Kok Ming [1995] 3 MLJ 74. 
50 Ibid. Woon, supra note 17, 298. 
51 [1999] 5 MLJ 42 1. 
52 [1 995] I MLJ 24 1. 
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considerations are whether damages would be an adequate remedy. 53 In circumstances 
where damages are an adequate remedy, an injunction will not be granted. The issue as 
to whether the plaintiff delayed in instituting the application for an injunction is also 
regarded as being relevant. In particular, where the delay in applying for an injunction 
would cause injustice, the courts would hesitate to grant an injunction. Another factor 
also considered by the courts is the balance of convenience between the parties. 
An injunction was granted in the case of Yuki/on Manufacturing Sdn Bhd v Dato' Wong 
Gek Meng (No. 4). 54 In Yuki/on, two of the directors set up a competing business and 
diverted the company's business to their own company in breach of their fiduciary 
duties. The plaintiff sought an injunction against the defendant directors and their 
companies to restrain them from manufacturing and selling the products similar to the 
company's products. The court granted an injunction, citing as some of the grounds, the 
fact that an award of damages would not be adequate compensation and the balance of 
convenience and justice sided the plaintiffs. 
In order for the remedy of an injunction to operate effectively, it is crucial that the 
remedy should be utilised promptly. This would often be necessary in order to avoid 
damage to the company. If the remedy is to be used effectively by a shareholder, the 
shareholder would need to be well-informed about the proposals of the board. This 
may not often be the case, particularly in larger companies, where many shareholders 
55 
are not involved in the management of the company. 
The only statutory remedy available for a breach of statutory duty which approximates 
the equitable remedy of an injunction is contained in Section 132E(4). Section 132E(4) 
53 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [ 1975] AC 396. 
54 [1998]7 MLJ 551. .. 
55 0 · p L Q~w~e~r'ls _r!Prrnin!fC.!lliP~Ie~s ~ofu.Mr£o~d~em~C~o!-"m~pan~y-=L:=..:..:aw , (6th editiOn, 1997), 649. av1es, .. , ~ 
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confers power on the court to restrain a company from entering into an arrangement or 
transaction in contravention of Section 132E( I). The power may be exercised or on the 
application of any member of the company. 
8.2.6 Dismissal of Directors 
A breach of duty by an executive director could also entitle a company to terminate his 
services, if the breach is sufficiently serious. In Ngan Tuck Seng v Ngan Yin Hoi, 56 the 
facts of the case involved the director setting up the same type of business which was 
carried on by the company. The director also misappropriated the company's resources 
and funds for his own business. The company subsequently removed him as a director. 
On application to the court, the court held that his breach of fiduciary duty involved the 
betrayal of the trust underlying the relationship and mutual confidence. Accordingly, 
there was just cause for his removal as a director. 
Similarly, the case of Houng Hai Kong v MBf Management Sdn Bhd/7 involved a 
director who obtained a secret profit for himself in breach of his fiduciary duties. 
Consequently, he was dismissed by the company. The Industrial Court held that his 
breach of duties amounted to gross misconduct which justified his dismissal. This 
decision was upheld by the High Court. 
8.2. 7 Critique of the Remedies 
Equitable remedies cover a variety of possible situations which may be encountered by 
the company as a consequence of a director's breach of fiduciary duty. The range of 
remedies available to the company is fairly wide, and are wider than the remedies 
56 (1999]5 MLJ 509. 
57 [ 1997] MLJU 313. 
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available at common law.58 These remedies are also relatively flexible. 59 As such, in 
many situations, the company would frequently be able to choose the remedy which is 
most beneficial to it. However, it must be borne in mind that the company may not 
obtain double recovery in respect of any loss. Hence, where there are multiple 
remedies which would compensate the company for a loss, the company may have to 
choose one of the options.60 
As regards the statutory remedies, as discussed in Chapter 5, the statutory provisions 
provide mainly for criminal penalties. The civil remedies available to the company or 
aggrieved shareholders for breaches of statutory duties are rather limited. As suggested 
in Chapter 5, it is submitted that providing for more civil remedies for breach of 
statutory duties would be beneficial. This is so, especially with regard to the statutory 
duties of disclosure. Nonetheless, where the directors' actions breach both statutory 
duties as well as fiduciary duties, the company would still be able to obtain equitable 
remedies for the breaches of fiduciary duties. 
There are unlikely to be problems with regard to the availability of equitable remedies 
to the company. Rather, the problem which is most likely to arise with regard to 
remedies stems from those in control of the company refusing to pursue remedies 
against the directors for breach of fiduciary duties. This may occur particularly where 
the directors are themselves the holders of the majority of the voting rights of the 
company. Alternatively, it may also occur where the majority shareholders stand to 
benefit from the breach, and are therefore disinclined to take action against the errant 
directors, who may be their nominees. 
58 Doyle, J.J., 'Commentary', In Eguitv and Commercial Relationships, (Ed. Finn, P.O.), (1987), 
213. 
59 ld 211. I , , 
60 T Mahesan v Malaysian Government Officers Co-operat1ve Housmg Society [ 1978] 1 MLJ 
149. 
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The shareholders who are most likely to be prejudiced by such a situation would be the 
minority shareholders. Alternatively, there may at times be shareholders who may not 
be in the minority, but may be bound by an agreement to exercise their voting rights in 
limited ways. These, too, may be prejudiced by a decision by those who control the 
company not to take action against errant directors. Consequently, there is a need to 
examine the position of these shareholders of the company. 
8.2.8 Remedies for Minority Shareholders 
According to the rule in Foss v Harbottle, 61 if a wrong is alleged against the company, 
the proper plaintiff is the company itself.62 Further, if the irregularity can be ratified by 
the majority, the shareholders are not permitted to sue in respect of that irregularity.63 
Shareholders are only permitted to bring an action against the errant directors where the 
wrong complained of comes within the exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle. An 
example of these exceptions is where there is a fraud on the minority.64 
Apart from common law, the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) also provides for various 
remedies which may be sought by shareholders against the errant directors. The first of 
these is found in Section 181 of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). A petition under 
Section 181 may be made not only by minority shareholders, but also by majority 
shareholders who are unable to exert their will at a general meeting.
65 
Based on this 
Section, a shareholder66 may apply to the court on the ground that the affairs of the 
company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to one or more of the members. 
61 (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
62 This was applied in Abdul Rahim bin Aki v Krubong Industrial Park (Me/aka) Sdn Bhd [ 1995] 
3 MLJ 417. 
63 Abdul Rahim bin Aki v Krubong Industrial Park (Me/aka) Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 417. 
64 Abdul Rahim bin Aki v Krubong Industrial Park (Me/aka) Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 417; Yuki/on 
Manufacturing Sdn Bhd v Dato' Wong Gek Meng (No. 4) [1998] 7 MLJ 551; Cook v Deeks 
[1916] I AC 554. · 
65 Owen Sim Liang Khui v Piasau Jaya Sdn Bhd [1996] I MLJ 113. 
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Alternatively, a shareholder may apply to court on the ground that the powers of 
directors are being exercised in a manner oppressive to one or more of the members.67 
Along similar lines, an application can be brought on the ground that the affairs of the 
company are being conducted, or the powers of directors are being exercised, in 
disregard of the applicant's interests as a member.68 On such an application, the court 
may make such orders as it thinks fit to remedy the matters. 69 The powers to make 
orders are wide. These powers include the power to regulate the conduct of the affairs 
of the company in the future. 70 Also included are the powers to prohibit any act or to 
cancel or vary any transaction. 71 In Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn 
Bhd, 72 the powers under Section 181 (2) were exercised to cancel a transaction and to 
order a compulsory purchase of a member's shares. 
Another statutory remedy available to a minority shareholder is the winding up of the 
company. Section 217(1) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125) permits a shareholder 
to apply to wind up the company. According to Section 218(l)(t), such an application 
may be made on the ground that the directors have acted in the affairs of the company 
in their own interests, rather than in the interests of the members as a whole. Similarly, 
the application may be brought if the directors have acted in any other manner which 
66 The definition of 'shareholder' is wide and includes an ex-member forced out if the company; 
Owen Sim Liang Khui v Piasau Jaya Sdn Bhd [1996] I MLJ 133. 
67 Re Kong Thai Sawmill [ 1978] 2 MLJ 227. 
68 Ibid. 
69 The factors considered in exercising the powers to make orders were discussed in Re Kong 
Thai Sawmill [ !978] 2 MLJ 227. In that case, it was held that the court would take into account 
the interest of the applicant as well as the interest of other ~e~bers. It would also consider the 
possibility of remedying the complaints in ways other than wmdmg up. 
70 Section 181 (2)(b ). 
71 Section 181 (2)(a). 
72 [ 1994] 2 MLJ 789. 
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appears to be unfair or unjust to other members. 73 Alternatively, the court may order 
the company to be wound up if it is of the opinion that it is just and equitable to do so. 74 
Such an action for the winding up of the company was brought in Indrani C 
Rajaratnam v Fairview Schools Berhad.75 In this case, R.K. Nathan JC concluded that 
there was a clear finding of fact that the board of directors had acted in their own 
interests rather than in the interest of the members as a whole. As a consequence, an 
order was granted for the winding up of the company under Section 218(1 )(f) of the 
Companies Act, I965 (Act 125). 
In lndrani C Rajaratnam, the court also adopted the definition of the phrase 'interests of 
the members as a whole' given in Foo Yin Shung v Foo Nyit Tse & Brothers Sdn Bhd. 76 
Accordingly, the crux of the phrase seems to be whether the directors are seen to have 
been acting in the interests of all members, and therefore, in the interests of members as 
a whole. Where the directors are shown to have preferred their own interests, or the 
interests of some significant section of the members, they cannot be said to have acted 
in the interest of all members or the members as a whole. Such actions of directors may 
be open to challenge, notwithstanding that it may coincide with the interests of the 
majority shareholder. This would indicate that Section 2 I 8( I )(f) would be of particular 
significance to minority shareholders. 
Nevertheless, the winding up of the company is likely to be sought by a shareholder 
only as a last resort. An application under Section I 8 I of the Companies Act, I 965 
(Act I 25) would provide the aggrieved shareholder a far wider range of remedies. The 
73 Section 2 I 8( I)( f) . 
74 Section 2I8(I)(i). See for example Tay Bok Choon v Tahansan Sdn Bhd [1987] I MLJ 443 
and Tien lk Enterprises Sdn Bhd v Woodsville Sdn Bhd [I 995] I MLJ 769. 
7~ [I 997] 3 CLJ 460. 
76 [1989] 2 MLJ 369. 
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powers to make orders under the Section are wide and flexible. As such, remedies may 
be obtained to suit the particular situation faced by the aggrieved shareholder. 
As seen above, minority shareholders have the right of recourse under Section I 8 I and 
other provisions. However, a shareholder may hesitate to bring an action under Section 
181, for the reason that it would frequently involve substantial costs, in terms of time 
and money.77 Further, the shareholder would need to have access to information 
regarding the dealings complained of in order to take action. Such information may not 
be readily available to a shareholder who is not in control of the company. 78 In 
addition, the ability of shareholders to institute proceedings is impaired by the 
difficulties in acting collectively. A public company, in particular, is likely to have 
large numbers of shareholders. Litigation involves activity and decision-making of 
some complexity. As such, there are likely to be significant difficulties in procuring 
collective agreement for the purpose of proceedings under Section I 8 I of the 
Companies Act, 1965 (Act I 25) and the other provisions. 
Hence, instead of making an application under Section I 8 I and other provisions 
discussed above, minority shareholders may often prefer to sell their shares, 79 as it may 
be the most convenient way of resolving the problems faced by the shareholder. This is 
likely to be so, particularly with public listed companies, in which one's shareholding 
77 Farrar, J.H., and Hannigan, B.M., Farrar's Company Law, (4th edition, 1998), 429; Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance, Report on Cornor~te Governance, ( Februa'?' 1999), 61. 
78 Ibid Professor Farrar notes that the suspect transactiOns are often of a complicated financial 
nature .which the shareholders cannot easily unravel. It may also be difficult to establish precisely 
what the transaction involves and who are the beneficiaries. The board of directors will usually 
refuse to disclose any information at a ge~eral me~ting, on .the basis that the matter ,is confiden~ial 
and unsuited to discussion at a pubhc meetmg. Miles, L., Proctor, G., Unresponsive 
shareholders in public companies: dial "M" for motivate?', (2000) 21 The Company Lawyer 142, 
143. f Publ ' c . 79 G 'ffith A 'Shareholding and the Governance o 1c ompan1es', In Corporate Gove~a~c:· and. ,Corporate Control, (Ed. Sheikh, S. and Rees, W. ), ( 1995), 66; Farrar, supra note 
76, 429; Miles, supra note 77, 143. 
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may easily be disposed of. 80 Nonetheless, by selling their shares, shareholders are able 
to exert a cetain degree of influence over the management of the company. 
Shareholders of a public listed company are able to affect the company's share price 
through their ability to sell their shares.8I This in tum may result in adverse publicity 
for the management, and may potentially increase vulnerability to a takeover bid.82 
This influence exercised by shareholders through market forces is known as the 'market 
in corporate control'. 83 
Where a dissatisfied shareholder disposes of his shares on the grounds of abuse of the 
directors' position, this may provide relief from the problem to that shareholder. 
However, this does not deal with the deeper underlying problem of directors' abusing 
their position.84 Admittedly, shareholders may indirectly exercise some influence on 
the situation by selling their shares. Nevertheless, the problem of directors abusing 
their positions is likely to persist, if stricter measures are not taken against such 
directors. Consequently, if abuse by directors is permitted to continue, this is likely to 
subtly erode the confidence of investors in our capital markets, and undermine the value 
of our capital markets as investments. 
8.2.9 Institutional Shareholders 
The disabilities faced by minority shareholders in influencing those in control of the 
company, as discussed above, stem primarily from the separation between ownership 
80 Pennington notes that the position of a minority shar~holder o~ a private comp~y who is not a 
director is much weaker than that of a shareholder m a public company which has a Stock 
Exchange listing for its shares. A minority shareholder of a private company .cannot readily sell 
his shares if he is dissatisfied with the management, for the reasons that the articles of association 
of a private company restricts the transfer of shares and the lack of an available market; 
Pennington R.R. Company Law, (7th edition, 1995), I 025. 
81 See for e~ampl~ Johari s., 'UEM shares fall to lowest level in 19th months', Business Times, 13 
December 2ooo; Long, H.C., 'UEM fined RMIOO,OOO on Renong purchase', New Straits Times, 
19 February 1998. 
82 Griffiths, supra note 78, 62. 
83 !d. 67. 
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and control of the company. Nevertheless, a positive development which mitigates 
some of the problems arising from the separation between ownership and control has 
begun to take place. This is brought about by the emergence of the institutional 
shareholder. 
The trends in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and 
Canada indicate significant growth of institutional investors increasing their holding of 
shares in public listed companies.85 In Malaysia, it has been estimated that by early 
1997, a quarter of the shares listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange were held by 
Malaysian institutions, and another quarter were in foreign hands, including foreign 
institutional investors. 86 
It has been observed that some of the largest shareholders in large public listed 
companies tend to be financial institutions, including insurance companies and pension 
funds. 87 The large shareholdings of these institutions constitute a power bloc within the 
company. What is unique is that this trend of institutional shareholding has been found 
to apply across the board, and is not limited to one company or to a sector of industry.88 
Hence, where there has been a separation between the ownership and control of 
companies particularly with the minority shareholders of public listed companies, with 
the emergence of institutional shareholders, there is an increasing regrouping of 
ownership with potential control. 
84 Miles, supra note 77, 143. . . . . . . . 
85 Farrar, supra note 76, 578 ... In the Umte~ ~mgdom, msti~tiO~al mvestor~ mcr:ased their 
market share of UK-Iisted equ1t1es from 17.9Yo m 1957 to 60.4Yo m 1992. It IS estunated that 
they are acquiring about 2% of the UK equity market each ;ear. It is also ~st~ated that 
institutions in the United Kingdom currently hold about 60Yo of the shares m listed UK 
companies. Individuals hold approximately 20% and the remainder is held by non-UK 
institutions. . . 
86 Chin, K.F. and Jomo. K.S., 'Financial LiberahsatiOn and System Vulnerability', In Malaysian 
Eclipse:Economic Crisis and RecoverY, (Ed. Jomo, K.S.), (2001), 107. 
87 Farrar, supra note 76, 565. 
88 !d. 581-2. 
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Given that institutional shareholders would often have a significantly large 
shareholding, they would have the voting power to influence resolutions which are put 
before shareholders of the company. Similarly, institutional shareholders are likely to 
be able to influence the share price of the company should they decide to sell their stake 
in the company.89 In view of this, they are in a much better position than minority 
shareholders to exercise influence over those in control of the company.90 
Consequently, where there are transactions suspected of involving self-dealing by 
directors, these institutional shareholders would potentially be able to engage in 
discussions with the directors to extract details of the transactions and bring the 
directors to account. 91 Even if institutional shareholders do not go so far as to institute 
legal proceedings in relation to self-dealing, they could nonetheless bargain in the 
shadow of the law. Thus, the legal rights of the company and its shareholders would to 
some extent be realised. 
Although the potential power of institutional shareholders is evident, there appears to 
be some reluctance on the part of institutional shareholders to exercise this influence. 
One of the reasons for this is that the primary responsibility of these institutional 
investors, many of whom are financial institutions, is to achieve maximum investment 
performance.92 The objective of their shareholding is one of investment rather than to 
engage in the management and control of the company. Further, their expertise is in 
93 finance rather than management. 
Recognition of the potential influence of institutional shareholders over those in control 
of companies has attracted various responses calling for institutional shareholders to 
89 !d. 581. 
90 Miles, supra note 77, 143. 
91 F' C ·tt on Corporate Governance, supra note 76, 74. 
mance omm1 ee 
n F t 76 580 J· Miles supra note 77, 143. arrar, supra no e , - , • 
93 Ibid. 
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use their influence to ensure that the management carry out their duties.94 In the United 
Kingdom, institutional shareholders have responded by forming institutional 
shareholders' committees. One of the major functions of these committees is to issue 
position statements, codes and guidance notes on behalf of its members on 
contemporary issues which its members feel strongly about.95 The efforts by 
institutional shareholders to influence corporate governance appears to have been 
effective. Preliminary indications show substantial changes in corporate governance 
along the required lines, since the publication of such statements and other 
documents.96 Various other instances of effective institutional shareholder activism 
have also been documented.97 
8.2.10 Conclusion 
The examination of the available remedies for a breach of directors duties indicates that 
there are ample remedies available to the company. Nonetheless, there are a number of 
impediments to the enforcement of these remedies. 
94 The Finance Committee on Corporate Governance remarked that given the weight of their 
votes, the way in which institutional shareholders use their power to influence the standards of 
corporate governance is of fundamental importance. Institutional shareholders should take a 
positive interest in the composition of boards, with checks and balances. The Committee also 
recommended that local institutional shareholder associations should formulate guidelines for the 
development of a constructive relationship between the company and the owner; Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance, supra note 76, 60, 68, I 00; See also Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report of the Commi~ee on the Financial Aspects 
of Corporate Governance, (December ,1992) (t~e ~adbury Committee report); Potter, J., 'The 
role of the Institutional Shareholders Committee, In Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Control, (Ed. Sheikh, Sand, Rees, W.), (1995), 288. 
95 Potter, supra note 93 , 285. 
96 !d. 290. 
97 One of these is the Thalidomide case. This case concerned the former management of 
Distillers Company Ltd who resisted publ!c pressur~ to settle with vict~s ~n ~ore generous 
terms. As a consequence, the market pnce of thei.r shares f~ll. The mstitutiOnal investors 
together with the company's merchant bankers met ~Ith the sem?r management, after which the 
company increased its offer. This formed the basis of the ultimate settlement of the matter; 
Farrar, supra note 76, 580. 
185 
The first of these obstacles arises from the rule in Foss v Harbottle. 98 As a result of this 
rule, it is clear that the entity who would be entitled to bring proceedings against errant 
directors for self-dealing would be the company. Nonetheless, where the directors who 
are engaged in self-dealing are themselves in control the company, they may refuse to 
bring such proceedings. Where these directors are themselves the controlling 
shareholders of the company, the other shareholders are left with little recourse against 
the errant directors, unless the matter falls within one of the exceptions to the rule in 
Foss v Harbottle. 99 
The other obstacle to obtaining remedies against the errant directors would be 
ratification of the breach of directors' duties by the company, as discussed in Chapter 7. 
The law at present would appear to allow the wrongdoers to exercise their voting rights 
as shareholders to ratify their wrongs. 100 Again, where the errant directors are able to 
exercise or influence the exercise of sufficient votes at a general meeting to obtain a 
ratification of the breach, other shareholders would be left in a disadvantaged 
pos ition. 101 
Minori ty shareholders have other rights available to them under Sections 181 and 
218( 1 )(f) and (i) of the Companies Act, 1965 (Act 125). However, there are significant 
practical difficulties in bringing proceedings under these provisions, as discussed in 
Section 8.2 .8 above. Consequently, a common response of minority shareholders to 
98 ( 1843) 2 Hare 46 1. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Tuan Haji Ishak bin Ismail v Leong Hup Holdings Berhad [1996] I MLJ 661; Cuyler 
Magruder v Creative Software (M) Sdn Bhd [1994] MLJU 107; North West Transportation Co 
Ltd v Beatty ( 1887) 12 App Cas 589; Northern Counties Securities Ltd v Jackson & Steeple Ltd 
[1974] I WLR 11 33. 
10 1 It is noted that where the breach amounts to a fraud on t~e ~inority the breach would be 
unratifiab1e; Cook v Deeks [ 1916] AC 554. . However, mmonty sh~ehol.ders would face 
practical impediments in bringing legal proceedmgs to challenge such ratification, as with other 
li tigation. 
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self-dealing would be to sell their shares, rather than to bring legal proceedings for 
remedies against errant directors. 
Hence, with minority shareholders, it is evident that there is a wide gap between the 
remedies available for a breach of directors' duties in theory on the one hand, and 
practical reality on the other. The one redeeming factor would appear to lie in the 
hands of institutional shareholders, who have a concentration of shares, and are 
consequently not bound by the constraints faced by minority shareholders. The 
deciding element here would not be the lack of potential power to enforce the legally 
available remedies. Rather, it would depend on the willingness of institutional 
shareholders to make the necessary paradigm shift in their perception of their 
shareholding, and to rise up to the challenge of utilising their potential influence. 
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CHAPTER 9- CONCLUSION 
The corporate scene has seen significant changes in modem times. Among the pertinent 
changes is the increase in the separation between the ownership and control of 
companies, evidenced particularly by the growth of public listed companies. This 
separation between ownership and control, coupled with the increasingly elaborate 
structures of corporate conglomerates, increases the potential for self-dealing. 
Tile separation of ownership and control, coupled with the complex corporate structures 
of many public listed companies, typically leaves the control of the company in the 
hands of a few controUing shareholders and their nomj11ee directors. Conversely, 
minority shareholders frequently lack the abijjty to influence the decision-makjng or 
control of the company. Minority shareholders are often similarly faced with a dearth of 
infonnation concerning the affairs of the company, leaving them further crippled in their 
ability to exercise any influence over the management of the company. Consequently, 
the directors of a modem company are able to manage the affairs of the company, and 
deal with its assets, relatively free from the interference and scrutiny of mjnority 
shareholders. As a result, the potential for self-dealing by directors is significantly 
increased. 
The modern company has needs which differ from the traditional company. In order to 
remain relevant and effective, company law should develop in accordance with these 
changing needs. The greater potential for selt:.dealing in modem companies creates a 
need for changes in the law in order to address the issue of self-dealing. These changes 
should address, firstly, the need for information, particularly to minmity shareholders. 
Hence there is a need to require disclosure of infonnation regarding the affairs of the 
, 
188 
company. Secondly, the greater potential for self-dealing necessarily heightens the need 
for stricter regulation of self-dealing by directors. 
The need for law reform is also heightened by the inadequacies in the existing law on 
self-dealing by directors. As noted in Chapters 3 and 4, an examination of the equitable 
no-conflict and no-profit rules indicates that the equitable mles against self-dealing are in 
some respects ambiguous. In some areas, the case law is unsettled. Although these 
equitable rules embody principles which significantly address the essence of self-dealing, 
companies would benefit from clarification of these principles. This is so, particularly in 
relation to areas such as the exploitation of corporate opportunity. 
The existing legislation regulating self-dealing provides little assistance in clarifying the 
equitable rules. A significant contribution of the legislative provisions is its specific 
regulation of pruticular instances of potential self-dealing. These include loans to 
directors, as well as acquisitions of property from directors, disposals of property to 
directors, and persons connected with directors. Nonetheless, the situations dealt with by 
the legislative provisions are limited to a nwnber of overt situations of self-dealing. 
Notably, the legislation fails to deal with indirect schemes involving self-dealing, such as 
quasi-loans and transactions made through a nwnber of layers of nominees of directors. 
The provisions leave room for various schemes which may be used to circumvent the 
legislative provisions. 
11Je above reflects significant inadequacies of the existing mles on self-dealing. There is, 
consequently, a clear need for legislative refonn of the rules on self-dealing. 
Neveitheless whilst statutory regulation is necessary, the danger of over-regulation 
' 
should be borne in mind. Excessive regulation of companies has the potential of stifling 
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their development. 1 As such, although some legislative reform is necessary, some room 
should also be left for market regulation. 
The Finance Committee on Corporate Governance in its report acknowledged the need 
to move away from traditional prescriptive legal rules, towards a market-oriented 
economy. Hence, the Committee advocated a shift to a disclosure-based regime. The 
Committee proposed a Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance which is aimed at 
encouraging disclosure and providing information to investors to enable them to 
monitor the way companies are being run.2 Accordingly, companies are given 
sufficient flexibility in implementing principles of corporate governance. At the same 
time, this addresses one of the major difficulties faced by shareholders resulting from 
the separation between ownership and control, namely the lack of information on the 
management of the company. Shareholders are, hence, facilitated in their exercise of 
influence through the 'market in corporate control'. 
In relation to the disclosure-based regime, it is submitted that disclosure of information 
on the subsidiaries of public companies is also relevant.3 These subsidiaries are in 
reality a part of the entity through which public companies operate. In such situations, 
it is submitted that the corporate veil should not be used to conceal self-dealing. 
Rather, practical realities suggest that subsidiaries of public companies should similarly 
be subject to the scrutiny of shareholders. 
1 The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), in relation to the Corporate Law jteview Bill 1997, 
noted that companies' circumstances are diverse, and it is not possible to identify meaningful 
corporate governance practices and disclosure that can apply across the diversity. The ASX 
warned that a prescriptive or intrusive approach to corporate gov.ernance. would. be a danger and 
would restrict companies abilities to fo!low world best practice as 1t contmues to evolve; 
Parliament of Australia, Senate Committee Report on the Corporate Law Review Bill 1997. 
2 Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, Report on Corporate Governance, (February 
1999), 59. See also Sheikh, s., Rees, W., 'Corporate Governance and corporate control: Self-
Regulation or Statutory Codification', In Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, (Ed. 
Sheikh, S., Rees, W.), ( 1995), 384. . . . 
3 This issue is discussed in greater detail m SectiOn 5.4.1 of Chapter 5. 
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Nonetheless, the 'market in corporate control' has its limitations. It deals with issues of 
self-dea ling indirectly, but fails to directly bring errant directors to account. If self-
dealing is left to continue without errant directors being made to account for their 
wrongs, ultimately, it is the company that will suffer. Despite the difficulties of 
enforcing the company's rights and remedies in situations of self-dealing, litigation or 
bargaining in the shadow of the law in order to curb self-dealing by directors plays an 
important role in deterring self-dealing. It is in this respect that institutional 
shareholders play a significant role. Institutional shareholders frequently hold 
sufficiently substantial shareholdings to apply the necessary pressure to cause directors 
to abide by their duties. 
The question as to the extent to which legislative intervention should be utilised and 
how much room should be left to market forces arises when specific measures for 
reform are considered. This is an issue to which there appears to be no clear-cut 
answers. The balance between the two measures forms the subject of perennial debate.4 
In considering the balance between the two measures which should be adopted in 
Malaysia, it would be prudent to keep in mind cultural factors and the individual 
circumstances of our corporate scene. 
The study of the existing law regulating self-dealing by directors leads to the finding 
that there is a need for reform of the existing laws. This is more so, in view of the share 
market's major role in the Malaysian financial system.5 Protection of shareholders' 
4 See for example Parliament of Australia, Senate ~ommittee Report on the Corporate Law 
Review Bill 1997, in which the opposing views regardmg the level of shareholder protection and 
rhe adequacy of corporare governance structures were noted. It was r~marked that both sides 
made reference to world best practices and corporate governance models m other countries. 
5 Jomo K.S. 'From Currency Crisis to Recession', In Malaysian Eclipse: Economic Crisis and 
Recove,ry, (E,d. Jomo, K.S), (200 1 ), 41; .Chin K.F. an~ Jom.o: K.S., 'Financial Liberalisation and 
System Vulnerability', In Malaysian Eclipse: Economtc Cnst~ and. Recovery, (Ed. Jomo, K.S ), 
(2001 ), !03; Lim S.Y., 'The Savings-Investment, Corporat~ Fmancmg Needs and Capital Market 
Development', In Malays ia's Vision 2~20 : Understandmg the Concept, Implications and 
Challenges, (Ed. Ahmad Sarji Abdul Hamtd), (1993), 261. 
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investments in companies from abuse by directors is regarded as being of major 
significance to the strength and competitive edge of the Malaysian economy.6 
In conclusion, there is a clear need for the reform of the existing law. Statutory reforms 
play an invaluable role in strengthening the laws against self-dealing. Similarly, 
reforms through the influence of market forces and the fostering of disclosure and 
transparency play an equally significant role in reducing the undesirable occurrence of 
self-dealing by directors. It is hoped that the measures proposed in this study will 
contribute to the strengthening of the regulatory regime aimed at deterring self-dealing 
by directors. 
6 Ramly Bin Haji Al i, 'The Rules of Good Corporate Governance: Methods of Efficient 
I I t t. , 12th Commonwealth Law Conference, Kuala Lumpur 13-16 September 1999· mpemenawn , . . ' 
S .t. C · ·on 'Strengthening the Capttal Market Regulatory Framework: Why Regulate ecun tes ommtsst , . . . 
in the first place?', The Securities Commtsston Busmess Plan 1998-2000. 
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